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The dissertation addresses the following question: why do some states win a war only to 
lose the occupation whereas other states can successfully impose their preferred outcome 
via the control of foreign territory? For example, compare the United States’ failure in 
Iraq (2003-2008) to the Allied Powers’ success in France (1815-1818). To explain this 
variation, I develop and test a principal-agent model in which I incorporate the occupied 
elite’s costs of compliance and the occupier’s strategies of control. As agents, the 
occupied elites expect to incur significant domestic and international costs if they consent 
to the occupier’s demands, and thus have strong incentives to not comply. The occupying 
state can overcome this hostility through a costly exercise of power to shape the choices 
and manipulate the incentives of elites to influence their decision-making. Occupying 
 
 
states that engage in dictating as a strategy of control are compelling the elites to make a 
costly choice. By constraining the choice set to compliance or non-compliance with its 
terms, the occupying power can effectively separate strongly adverse elites from 
moderately or weakly adverse ones, and thereby gain a commitment to its objectives. 
Although previous work on occupations recognizes the difficulties in achieving success, 
the costs of compliance to the elite and the occupiers’ strategy of control are largely 
overlooked in previous scholarship.  
To evaluate the theoretical argument, I employ two research methods in the 
project. First, I built an original dataset to test the effects of the costs of compliance and 
the strategies of control on the outcomes of 137 military occupations that result from 
interstate wars between 1815 and 2003. The statistical analyses are paired with two 
plausibility probes: the Chilean Occupation of Peru (1881-1883) and the Soviet 
Occupation of North Korea (1945-1948). Second, I examine in-depth the American 
Occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952. The case study investigates how the costs of 
compliance – across regime change, economic stabilization, and rearmament – generated 
resistance among Japanese politicians, and how the Americans exercised their power to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 





Following the War of the Seventh Coalition in July 1815, the Allied Powers 
imposed a military occupation on Northern France as part of the Second Treaty of Paris. 
Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom had decided that the victor’s peace 
would not be left to mere promises and a scrap of paper this time. After capturing Paris, 
the Allied Powers took their time to restore Louis to the Bourbon throne. Though he was 
the most likely candidate, the Great Powers did not trust Louis or the French government 
to carry out their preferred terms absence a strong hand to guide their decision-making. 
Louis had done relatively little to establish himself among the French population as their 
new ruler on the throne before the war began. When Napoleon started to amass French 
support, the restored Bourbon did nothing to challenge him and immediately fled the 
country. The remainder of the French government had proven to be equally ineffective 
during its brief time in office. These suspicions caused the Allied Powers great concern 
over whether the newly re-established regime could bring about stability in the country, 
and to the region. Furthermore, the Allies realized that with the Second Treaty they had 
imposed significantly greater costs on the French, and they intended to insure that latter 
would meet its obligations to insure that peace would emerge on the European Continent. 
Whereas the First Treaty of Paris (1814) had failed, the Allied Powers decided that they 
                                                 
1 Louise Chipley Slavicek, The Treaty of Versailles (New York: Chelsea House Publications, 2010), 8. 
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would enforce the Second (1815).
2
 In response to the foreign military forces controlling 
French territory, the Duke of Richelieu noted that “Unfortunately for France, her enemies 
held the power ‘to impose their wills upon us.’”
3
 For the next three years, the Allied 
Powers would pressure the French government to pursue policies and take actions that 
conformed to their peace. In 1818, the Allied Occupation of France ended in success. 
The Allied Occupation of France presents two anomalies for international 
relations theory regarding why states impose occupations and whether these operations 
will subsequently succeed. First, why did the Allies impose the occupation? Louis wanted 
to return to the throne in Paris and reinstate the monarchy as a reputable regime in the 
international system. Yet, the Allied Powers were not convinced that he would establish 
himself and an administration suitable to their demands. If foreign imposed regime 
change and military occupations are supposed to resolve the commitment dilemma, why 
did the Allied Powers continue to have concerns over whether the French government 
would comply with their demands in the postwar era?  
Second, how did the occupation achieve the Allies’ goals given their concerns 
over whether the French would comply? Theories concerning success in military 
occupations have focused on shared threats perceptions as generating incentives for 
cooperation
4
 and the use of coercion to gain compliance
5
 as playing prominent roles in 
                                                 
2 Frederick Herman, “The Victors and The Vanquished: The Quest for Security as Illustrated by the Three 
Allied Occupations of Territory of the Defeated Power – France, 1815-1818, Germany, 1919-1929, and 
Germany 1945” (PhD diss., Tufts University, 1954); J. Garston, “Armies of Occupation, I: The British in 
France 1815-1818,” History Today 11, no. 6 (1961): 396-404. 
3 Quoted in Thomas Dwight Veve, The Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 
1815-1818 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992), 21. 
4 David M. Edelstein, “Occupation Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” International 
Security 29, no. 1 (2004): 49-91; David M. Edelstein, Occupation Hazards: Success and Failure in Military 
Occupations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Jesse-Douglas Mathewson, “An Occupation with 
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achieving the occupier’s preferred outcome. However, no external threat challenged the 
occupation and the Army of Occupation specifically refrained from using coercive 
strategies. Without either element, why did the French comply with and ultimately adhere 
to the demands made by the Allied Powers that proved costly for former to implement?  
More broadly, the dissertation addresses the following question: why do some 
states win a war only to lose the occupation whereas other states can successfully impose 
their preferred outcome via the control of foreign territory? To answer the inquiry, I 
develop a principal-agent model of international politics that builds on two important, yet 
overlooked insights concerning the use of military occupations in the modern 
international system. First, I contend that the occupied elite are the primary targets of 
influence when a state imposes a military occupation as a result of an interstate war. 
While I recognize the importance of the occupied population living under foreign control, 
this dissertation argues that the occupied elite are the ones that must accede to the 
political demands made by the occupying power. Influencing their decision-making is 
central to obtaining what I call the victor’s peace. Second, the outcome of the occupation 
is subsequently influenced by how the occupied elite react to the demands of the 
occupying power and the latter’s attempts to sway the former into complying with those 
demands. Following the principal-agent model, the elite are adverse to the costs they will 
incur in establishing the victor’s peace. Consequently, the occupying power has to engage 
                                                                                                                                                 
Democratization: A Marginal Value Approach to Understanding the Consolidation of Imposed Democratic 
Regimes” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2013). 
5 Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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in a costly exercise of power to shape the former’s choice set into making a commitment 
toward the latter’s preferred outcome. 
 The chapter is divided into four sections. First, I discuss the importance of 
studying military occupations as a recent historical phenomenon in international relations 
when compared to questions of war and peace more generally. This section addresses the 
relevance of investigating occupations as well as the broader contributions that the 
project will make to the literature. The next three sections discuss the more specific 
contributions made to the scholarship on occupations in the context of commitment 
dilemmas and power politics. Initially, I discuss the importance of the elite in an 
occupation, illustrating how they constitute a central dilemma to the occupying power. 
The subsequent section discusses how the occupier has to respond to the occupied elite: 
power. Previous work on military occupations has framed the debate as a choice between 
cooperation and coercion without recognizing a third important possibility. Finally, the 
chapter discusses the organization of the dissertation with an outline of chapters 2 
through 6.  
Between War and Peace: Military Occupations in the Modern International System 
The recent failures of the United States in the occupations of Afghanistan (2001-
2012) and Iraq (2003-2008) have renewed concerns on how states can take a military 
victory from war, and translate it into their preferred peace. Furthermore, the importance 
of understanding military occupations has grown in the preceding months. As I write this 
introduction, two conflicts pose new concerns for addressing if and when states should 
take control of foreign territory. As of the end of October 2014, the bombing campaign 
against the forces of the Islamic State has yet to produce the intended results of driving 
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their soldiers out of Iraq and back into Syria.
6
 While some policymakers contend that the 
strategy needs more time, the Obama Administration is likely confronted with a difficult 
choice on whether to commit American ground forces to defeat this new threat. In all 
likelihood, the option to occupy Iraqi territory is once more on the table. In defeating the 
Islamic State, the already political unstable regions of Iraq will be vulnerable to 
continued ethnic strife. American officials must now consider whether the Iraqi central 
government can effectively stabilize the region after years of infighting, or take control of 
the region to restore order and prevent further violence. In November 2014, Russian 
military forces increased the scale of their invasion into eastern Ukraine that could well 
lead to an occupation of territory.
7
 In particular, the economic sanctions currently in place 
may weaken Russian capabilities to press forward on the military attack. However, the 
sanctions will likely prove insufficient to dislodge Russia from the territory. Unless the 
West considers the option for military intervention, the Russian position can consolidate 
and establish an occupation to pressure the Ukrainian government into compliance with 
the former’s preferred outcome.  
In recognizing the relevance of the subject to the modern world, it is also 
important to understand that military occupations are a relatively new phenomenon that 
has emerged as part of the modern state system. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is 
often invoked by scholars to represent the beginning of the current system of state 
                                                 
6 Tom Bowman, “With Limited Gains, U.S. Bombing Campaign Faces Growing Criticism,” National 
Public Radio Accessed 31 October 2014.  
7 “Russian Troops enter Ukraine,” BBC News 12 November 2014, Accessed 12 November 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30025138. For a history of the conflict, see Alan Yuhas, “Ukraine 
Crisis: An Essential Guide to Everything that’s happened so far,” The Guardian, 13 April 2014, Accessed  
19 November 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/11/ukraine-russia-crimea-sanctions-us-






 In the 18
th
 century, the writings of Vattel, Rousseau, and Locke developed 
the idea that states could control foreign soil as a temporary measure without also 
claiming ownership.
9
 The development of military occupations raised new possibilities 
for how states could transition between war and peace. Though victorious states had a 
new option for implementing their terms, questions emerged regarding how states could 
use military occupations to successfully shape the aftermath of a conflict to conform to 
the victor’s peace. For example, in 1854, Baron von Moltke lamented the problem of 
understanding how occupations can succeed when he wrote the following: “Indeed, the 
military occupation of large towns, without previous agreement, is a problem for the 
solution of which the history of war offers few precedents.”
10
 
Today, we still have relatively few answers regarding the major questions 
concerning the use of military occupations. As an instrument of foreign policy, 
occupations are understudied in the scholarly literature though they remain a prominent 
                                                 
8 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 20-21. 
As Krasner notes, however, the modern notion of sovereignty emerged almost a hundred years after 
Westphalia. That modern understanding coincides with the writings of authors mentioned in the following 
sentence.  
9 Emmerich de Vattel, The Laws of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law (London: G. G. and J. 
Robinson, 1758/1797); Also see Elbridge Colby, “Occupation under the Laws of War,” Columbia Law 
Review 25, no. 7 (1925): 904-922.There is some confusion here, as scholars occasionally assume that the 
notion of occupying foreign territory is as old as war. For example, Arthur Birnie discusses the Roman 
occupation of the British Islands and R. F. J. Jones focuses on the Roman occupation in Spain. However, 
the ancients believed that territory captured as a result of their military victory simultaneously transferred 
the property rights to the winning government. Hence, the notion of occupying territory, or an occupation, 
was not necessarily an option that the ancients considered when engaging in war and peace. For the use of 
the term occupation in reference to Roman conquests, see Arthur Birnie, An Economic History of the 
British Isles (New York: Routledge, 2005), Chapter 2; and R. F. J. Jones, “The Roman Military Occupation 
of North-West Spain,” Journal of Roman Studies 66 (1976): 45-66. For a discussion on the ancients notion 
that military victory equated ownership of conquered territory, see  Henry Wheaton, Elements of 
International Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1866), 432-442; Frederick H. Russell, The Just War 
in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 6-7. 
10 Baron von Moltke, The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829 (London: John Murray, 
1854), 413-414.  
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means to achieve a state’s national interests.
11
 Volumes have been written about the 
fighting and politics of war
12
 and whether states can remain at peace afterwards.
13
 Yet, 
relatively little systematic and rigorous scholarship has emerged on the use of 
occupations. The majority of the studies on military occupations have focused on 
historical analyses of individual cases
14
, or on examining the relevant aspects of 
international law across a few instances.
15
 Those works that have attempted to assess the 
                                                 
11 In 1961, Garston acknowledges that historians often overlook the postwar era when writing about the 
modern wars. See, Garston, “Armies of Occupation, I.” 
12 For example, see, Allen C. Stam, Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War 
Termination and the First World War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Dan Reiter, How 
Wars End (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
13 Suzanne Werner, “The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and 
Renegotiating the Terms,” American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 3 (1999): 912-934; Virginia Page 
Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004);  Suzanne Werner and May Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” International Organization 
59, no. 2 (2005): 261-292; Nigel Lo, Barry Hasimoto, and Dan Reiter, “Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed 
Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration,” International Organization 62, no. 4 (2008): 717-736. 
14 See the Case Appendix for a large sample of these works.  
15 The literature on international law and military occupations is too vast for a thorough review. Instead, I 
list the sources from international law that I have reviewed regarding military occupations. de Vattel, The 
Laws of Nations; Wheaton, Elements of International Law; L. Oppenheim. International Law: A Treatise 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1906); Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State. 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1945); Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict: A 
Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes and War Law. (New York: Rinehart & Company Inc., Publishers, 
1954); Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory …A Commentary on the Law and Practice 
of Belligerent Occupation. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1957); Jan H. W. Verzijl, 
International Law in Historical Perspective: The Laws of War (Leyden; A. W. Sijthoff, 1978); Allan 
Gerson, “War, Conquered Territory, and Military Occupation in the Contemporary International Legal 
System,” Harvard International Law Journal 18, no. 3 (1977): 525-556; Adam Roberts, “What is a 
Military Occupation,” British Year Book on International Law 55 (1984): 249-305; Ian Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Edward Kwakwa. The 
International Law of Armed Conflict: Personal and Material Fields of Application (Leyden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1992); Emma Playfair, International Law and the Administration of Occupied 
Territories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to 
International Law (New York: Routledge, 1993); Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition 
of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Surya P. 
Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes, and International Law (Leyden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1997); Tim Hillier, Sourcebook on Public International Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
1998); Michael Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations: The Search for A 
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utility of military occupations have drawn on limited samples without identifying the 
broader universe of cases that have occurred in the last two hundred years.
16
 One of the 
primary contributions of this project constitutes a new conceptualization of occupations 
for recognizing the relevant cases for inclusion in the Military Occupations Dataset.  
Furthermore, the literature has not developed a core insight regarding the 
transition phase from war to peace: winning the war does not imply that the victor on the 
battlefield can and will successfully establish their peace. As David Lake has noted, the 
current rationalist approach “assumes that a war is over once a settlement is reached,” 
and this literature has yet to produce solid explanations for why this failure might occur.
17
 
That is, the bargaining theories of war have neglected the importance of postwar politics 
in establishing and enforcing the victor’s peace once the fighting between militaries 
terminates. Victory on the battlefield is important, but it is the first phase for a state to 
achieve its political goals. James L. McCamy wrote that, “…[the] end of fighting was in 
reality to be only the beginning of victory, or rather the struggle not yet ended to gain a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Legal Framework (Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Ingrid Detter, The Law of War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); John O’Brien, 2001. International Law (London: 
Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001); Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History 
(Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 2005); Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of International 
Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
Yutaka Arai. The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law, and Its 
Interaction with International Human Rights Law (Leyden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009); Yoram 
Dinstein. The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009). 
16 Eric Carlton, Occupation: the Policies and Practices of Military Conquerors (Savage: Barnes and Nobles 
Books, 1992); Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alexander Cooley, The Logics of Hierarchy: The 
Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); 
Edelstein, Occupational Hazards; James Gannon, Military Occupations in the Age of Self-Determination: 
The History Neocons Neglected (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008). 
17 David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq 
War,” International Security 35, no. 3 (2010-2011): 9. 
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victory from the defeat of the enemy.”
18
 There is a strategic component to imposing a 
military occupation that the literature has yet to sufficiently address in terms of 
developing theoretical arguments that link the phases of war, peace, and the transitions 
between each.  
In the project, the model focuses on the strategic interaction between the occupier 
and the occupied elite. In doing so, I consider two related aspects in the theoretical 
argument: why states selected into military occupations and how the occupier’s beliefs on 
non-compliance affect its subsequent interactions with the occupied elite. First, the 
theoretical argument incorporates the idea that states impose military occupations given 
that they expect the opponent to be non-compliant otherwise. Those states that win wars, 
but do not impose occupations likely do so if they expect the opponent to adhere to the 
agreement without further compulsion. The states that do impose occupations likely have 
concerns over whether the vanquished opponent will adhere to and establish their 
preferred peace. Second, states that select into occupations demonstrate some variation in 
their beliefs about the likelihood of compliance, and those beliefs influence how the 
occupier will choose to interact with the occupied elite. A prime advantage for this 
project in using strategic interaction to investigate military occupations is that the 
modeling process requires organizing and specifying one’s ideas about the opposing 
actors in a systematic manner.
19
 In the study of military occupations, a significant actor 
has often been overlooked: the occupied elite. 
                                                 
18 James L. McCamy, The Administration of American Foreign Affairs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1950), 245. 
19 David A. Lake, and Robert Powell, “International Relations: A Strategic Choice Approach,” In Strategic 
Choice and International Relations, ed. by David A. Lake and Robert Powell. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999). 
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A Central Dilemma for Peace: Occupied Elites and the Costs of Compliance 
International relations theory has recognized the problems of defection, cheating 
exploitation, and misrepresentation when discussing the emergence of cooperation among 
egotistic states with diverging interests in a system without third-party enforcement.
20
 
Rationalists and realists have concurred that military occupations following interstate 
wars are supposed to diminish these concerns over non-compliance and secure the 
victor‘s peace.
21
 In doing so, previous work has generally focused on the target of a 
military occupation has either a unified actor – in particular, the state – lumping the 
occupied elite and the occupied population into one analytical unit
22
 or simply on the 
population.
23
 A central assumption underlying the commitment dilemma is that the 
opposition always has the motivation for non-compliance; it simply lacks the capabilities 
                                                 
20 Here, I have listed a few of the core works that discussion these notions in international relations theory: 
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 no. 2 (1979: 167-214; Robert 
O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984); Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986); David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).  
21 F. Lewellyn Jones, “Military Occupation of Alien Territory in Time of Peace,” Transactions of the 
Grotius Society 9 (1923): 149-163; and Herman, “The Victors and The Vanquished,” passim; Karen Ruth 
Adams, “Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance,” 
International Security 28, no. 3(2003-2004): 45-83; David B. Rivkin and Darin R. Bartram, “Military 
Occupation: Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2003): 87-103; 
Tanisha Fazal, State Death (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Dan Reiter, How Wars End 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).  
22 For instance, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); 
Carlton, Occupation; Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Edelstein, “Occupation Hazards,” and Occupational Hazards. 
23 Karl Brandt, “Problems of Invasion and Occupation,” Foreign Affairs 21, no. 4 (1943): 699-710; Peter 
Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996); Wimberley, “Pyrrhic Victory”; Gannon, Military Occupations in the Age of Self-
Determination;  Michael Hechter, “Alien Rule and Its Discontents,” American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 
3 (2009): 289-310; Simon Collard-Wexler, “Understanding Resistance to Foreign Occupation,” (PhD diss., 
Columbia University, 2013); Michael Hechter, Alien Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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to act on those incentives.
24
 Subsequently, the literature suggests that opportunities for 
non-compliance emerge with general power shifts, when the state has the capabilities to 
act on its incentives. This generates two problems. First, these explanations generally 
lack sufficient foundations as to why the vanquished have incentives to not comply with 
the agreement. Actors usually have specific reasons for non-compliance, and models of 
strategic interaction can offer some insight into how the demands of one actor can 
conflict with the preferences of another. Second, by focusing on the state, previous work 
has overlooked important variation on the part of the vanquished: across military 
occupations, the evidence clearly demonstrates some actors have incentives to engage in 
the opportunistic behaviors, and some actors do not. What explains this variation in the 
defeated power’s behavior? 
In order to identify the origin of the motivation for non-compliance, I argue that 
the primary theoretical focus should shift from the state to the occupied elite. Recent 
scholarship has focused on elites in opposing countries as the primary targets of a state’s 
foreign policy choices, especially the use of more coercive options such as economic 
sanctions and military force.
25
 A similar approach is called for based on how leaders of 
                                                 
24 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-
414; Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model War,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (2003): 27-43; 
Robert Powell, “The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information,” American 
Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (2004): 231-241; Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 
International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006): 169-203; Scott Wolford, Dan Reiter, and Clifford J. Carrubba, 
“Information, Commitment, and War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 4 (2011): 556-579. 
25 For example, Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith, “Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific 
Punishments,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 809-824; Fiona McGillivray and Alastair 
Smith, “The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations between States,” International 
Organization 58, no. 3 (2004): 567-600; Nikolavy Marinov, “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country 
Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 564-576; Fiona McGillivray and 
Alastair Smith, “The Impact of Leadership Turnover and  Domestic Institutions on International 
Cooperation,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 5 (2005): 639-660; Fiona McGillivray and 
Alastair Smith, “Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and Credibility,” 
The Journal of Politics 68, no. 2 (2006): 248-258; Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith, Punishing the 
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invading countries have historically approached occupations as a means to influence 
opposing political elites. For example, General John E. Wood noted in the invasion of 
northern Mexico, “Tomorrow you will…occupy the Territory of our Enemies. We have 
not come to make war upon the people or peasantry of the country, but to compel the 
Government of Mexico to render justice to the United States.”
26
 This focus on elites has 
followed the history of military occupations, through to the recent American Occupation 
of Iraq. On 12 September 2002, President George W. Bush described the threat that the 
Iraqi government presented to international peace and security, emphasizing that “The 
United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people.”
27
 Hence, the Bush Administration 
sought a new regime to govern Iraq, one that would be more amicable to American 
national interests and security.
28
 States target the occupied elite as they are the ones in 
positions of political power that the occupiers can attempt to influence into accepting and 
implementing the political elements of the victor’s peace. 
The question becomes why do these elite have incentives for non-compliance and 
when can they act on them to subvert the victor’s peace? The reason for this is simple: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
26 Harwood Perry Wood, “The Military Career of John Ellis Wood,” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 
1960), 195. 
27 Federal News Service, “Text of President Bush’s Address to U.N.,” Washington Post, 13 September 
2002.  
28 In the project, I am not arguing that the population residing in the occupied territory is irrelevant to 
military occupiers. The occupied population can certainly prove difficult to manage, whether through 
passive or active resistance that can increase the costs of governing territory to the occupying power. 
Rather, that the occupied population in general are not the individuals in positions of political authority and 
power that the occupier has to influence into making a commitment to its preferred peace. Those 
individuals who play a role in making a commitment to the victor’s peace are the actors who have the 
motivation to not comply with the terms, and they are the ones waiting for an opportunity to emerge that 
will allow them to escape the agreement. For discussions that focus on the occupied population, see 
Wimberley, “Pyrrhic Peace.”; Gannon, Military Occupations in the Age of Self-Determination; Collard-
Wexler, “Understanding Resistance to Foreign Occupation.” 
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the occupied elite are politicians interested in maintaining access to office and power 
with incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviors, relative to the victor’s peace.
29
 
Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher succinctly recognize that, “[politicians] want to 
preserve political power and ensure that [the] peace implementation process either 
enhances or does not harm their political and economic interests.”
30
 By controlling 
foreign territory, an occupier is impeding the ability of political actors from pursuing 
their goals by reducing their autonomy in decision-making and policy implementation. It 
is this action that brings political elite into conflict with the goals of the occupying power.
 
 
Harold Lasswell recognized that in the study of politics the elite are those 
individuals “who get the most.”
31
 In military occupations, I assert that the occupied elite 
are the central target for achieving an occupying power’s goals. The aims of the 
occupation constitute the terms of the contract that the occupied elite are expected to 
fulfill in order for the occupation to terminate. In effect, the occupation’s aims constitute 
the price that the occupier is compelling the elite to pay for the postwar peace. The war 
aims literature has generally viewed the issues at stake as a benefit that each participant 
seeks to compel from an opponent.
32
 More recent work has suggested that the war aims 
of one state – especially high ones like territorial conquest and foreign imposed regime 
                                                 
29 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1957). 
30 Michael Barnett, and Christoph Zürcher. “The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Statebuilding 
Reinforces Weak Statehood,” in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of 
Postwar Peace Operations eds. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (London: Routledge, 2009), 31. Also 
see, Christoph Zürcher, Carrie Manning, Kristie D. Evenson, Rachel Hayman, Sarah Riese, and Nora 
Roehner, Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization after War (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2013). 
31 Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who gets What, When, How (New York: P. Smith, 1936), iv.  
32 For example, see Allan C. Stam, Win, Lose or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War (Ann 
Arbor: University Michigan Press, 1996); and, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, “The Duration of 
Interstate Wars, 1816-1985,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 2 (June 1996): 239-257.  
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change – may function as motivation for an opponent to ignore the mounting costs and 
continue fighting to prevent such a catastrophic loss.
33
 Here, I build on this idea that the 
occupier’s aims affect the decision-making of the occupied elite by altering the conflict 
of interests between the two. After the fighting, the occupying power enforces its 
interests as the aims it wants to as achieve for its preferred peace.
34
 I theorize that the 
aims of the occupying power become the costs of compliance for the elite. These costs 
represent the losses that the political elite will have to suffer in the postwar era if they 
comply with the occupying power.  
Hence, it is not the governing or relational structure itself, but the political aims of 
the occupying power that drive the elite to favor non-compliance over compliance.
35
 For 
example, recent efforts to explain variation in the outcomes of foreign imposed regime 
change have focused on institutional, cultural, and economic factors to explain variation 
in the outcomes.
36
 I contend that the occupied elite had incentives to exploit the 
opportunity of institutional change to their political advantage and to the detriment of the 
                                                 
33 Hans Speier, “War Aims in Political Warfare,” Social Research 12, no. 2 (1945): 159; Suzanne Werner, 
“Absolute and Limited War: The Possibilities of Foreign Imposed Regime Change,” International 
Interactions 22, no. 1 (1996): 67-88; Bruce Bueno de Mesquitia, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, 
and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003); Sarah E. Croco, 
“Peace At What Price? Domestic Politics, Settlement Costs and War Termination,” (PhD diss., University 
of Michigan, 2008). 
34 Martin Kyre and Joan Kyre, Military Occupation and National Security (Washington, D.C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1968), 23 and 30-31. 
35 Lake contends that variation in governance structure creates incentives for opportunistic behavior. 
Hence, he would compare military occupations to empires to examine whether politicians will comply. I 
contend that in military occupations, the incentives for opportunistic behavior vary based on the demands 
made by the occupying power. See, Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International 
Relations,” 14. 
36 Christopher J. Coyne, After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2008); Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to be Free? Why Foreign-




occupying power’s preferred outcome. In essence, the dissertation reverses Lasswell’s 
insight in the context of military occupations: the occupied elite are the individuals who 
can potentially lose the most in the postwar era by complying with the occupying power’s 
demands. Whether the occupying power can overcome the elite’s adverse intentions to 
gain a commitment to the former’s postwar interests is the central puzzle to solve for 
achieving success in military occupations.  
Power Politics and the Establishment of the Victor’s Peace 
By identifying the elites as the primary targets, and recognizing that the goals of 
the occupation constitute the costs of compliance that these politicians will likely resist, 
the central concern becomes how an occupying power can influence the elite into 
accepting by the victor’s peace. In this dissertation, I suggest that the answer lies in 
power politics. The imposition of a military occupation presents an opportunity to resolve 
the commitment dilemma that emerges from the concerns over whether the opponent will 
comply with the victor’s demands. To gain compliance with its preferred peace, the 
occupying power has to engage in a costly exercise of power during the course of the 
military occupation to influence the decision-making of the elite. Robert Dahl has 
provided a definition of such power: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B 
to do something that B would not otherwise do.”
37
 The occupation, then, becomes the 
opportunity by which A attempts to compel B to favor its preferred peace over the costs it 
will incur for complying with A’s orders. At the same time, A is attempting to constrain 
the options available to B, specifically in regards to the options that might work against 
                                                 





 Depending on B’s hostility, he might engage in actions that 
prove beneficial to him but ultimately would harm or negate the possible benefits to A. 
Subsequently, A wants to limit the choices for B that would allow him to engage in 
behaviors that would be harmful to her preferred peace.
39
 That requires A to remove 
certain options from B’s choice set, and manipulate the incentives regarding the limited 
range that B has to favor A’s preferred outcome. Specifically, what we need to 




To understand the relationship between the occupying power and the occupied 
elite, I draw on the principal-agent model to explain why military occupations succeed in 
establishing the victor’s peace. In an occupation, the occupied elite are effectively the 
employees of the occupier and the occupier has concerns over whether the former will 
comply with their demands. Specifically, there is an asymmetry of information between 
the occupied elite and the occupying power. The occupied elite are disinclined to favor 
the peace that the occupying power wants to establish. As previous discussed, elite expect 
                                                 
38 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” The American Political Science Review 
56, no. 4 (1962): 947-952. 
39 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 2000). 
40 Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 74-76; David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New 
Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): 163-164. Power limited to capabilities and 
resources committed to operation is not sufficient to understanding how power politics shapes the decision-
making of the elite into accepting the victor’s peace. The resources available to a victorious state may 
influence its decision-making on whether to fight and impose an occupation. Material power is important 
then to understanding how long states can remain involved in occupations, yet how states manage their 
relations with one another frequently focuses on their expectations of the other actor. For perspectives 
focusing on resources committed to occupations, see James T. Quilivan, “Force Requirements in Stability 
Operations,” Parameters (Winter 1995): 59-69; Dobbins, et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From 
Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: Rand National Security Research Division, 2003). 
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to incur some costs in altering the status quo to the interests of the occupying power. As 
the occupied elites’ expectation of the costs of compliance increases, ceteris paribus, 
their adversity also increases such that they have incentives to act against the interests of 
the occupier, and to engage in opportunistic behaviors. These actions, while potentially 
beneficial to the elite, can prove detrimental to the occupying power’s efforts to establish 
its preferred peace.  
The occupying power will attempt to influence the elites’ decision-making to 
fulfill the former’s demands given that it does not know whether the elite intend to abide 
by its terms. As previously mentioned, the theory holds that the occupying power shapes 
the costly exercise of power through its expectations about whether the opponent will 
comply with its demands. Specifically, the approach here builds on the ideas found in 
defensive and neoclassical realist thought: the exercise of power is often influenced by 
the beliefs of decision-makers.
41
 As a state’s uncertainty over the elites’ likelihood of 
compliance decreases, it subsequently believes that the occupation will demand greater 
resources and harsher treatment of the occupied elite to gain compliance. A state’s beliefs 
then will influence its selection on which strategy of control to use with the occupied elite 
and how the two will interact through the course of the occupation.  
Exercising Power as Control 
Essentially, the occupying power uses the occupied elite to alter the status quo to 
a position more favorable to their interests for the postwar era. The occupier 
accomplishes this through its exercising power to manage the elite into complying with 
                                                 
41 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 
151-153; Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation” Understanding the Debate,” 
International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 62. 
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the victor’s peace. What I term the strategy of control are the primary means by which 
the occupying power pressure the occupied elite into making decisions on compliance 
and non-compliance. These strategies reflect how the occupier assigns authority over the 
primary demand and what measures it uses to influence the use of that authority by the 
elite.  
 Following traditional perspectives, the scholarship has generally found that there 





 Scholars and policy makers 
have debated the effectiveness of these two approaches in dealing with defeated 
opponents and achieving a commitment to the victor’s peace. Following the First World 
War, Lord d’Abernon aptly noted that, 
One of two views must be adopted: Either Germany must be regarded as a danger 
and be held in check by military conventions and by overpowering force, or 
Germany must be regarded as an ex-enemy whom it is desirable to treat with 
fairness and generosity in order to strengthen the elements of peace and 
reconciliation within her borders. It appears difficult if not impossible to frame a 




In a similar vein, Arnold Wolfers notes, “even within the camp that sees a chance of 
victory there is frequently passionate controversy between those who advocate a punitive 
peace and those who prefer to settle for a conciliatory peace. The goal of both factions is 
                                                 
42 Brandt, “Problems of Invasion and Occupation,”; Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation 
of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).  
43 Edelstein, “Occupation Hazards,” and Occupation Hazards.  
44 Quoted in Frederick Herman, “The Victors and The Vanquished: The Quest for Security as Illustrated by 
the Three Allied Occupations of Territory of the Defeated Power – France, 1815-1818, Germany, 1919-
1929, and Germany 1945” (PhD diss., Tufts University, 1954), 3. Herman labels these two approaches as 
strategies of moderation or force for the occupying power. See Herman’s comments on page 100.  
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an “enduring peace,” but the proper road to that goal is not clear.”
45
 Both d’Abernon and 
Wolfers are describing the two options that have been at the heart of the dispute on how 
to approach former opponents and gain their compliance to the victor’s peace.  
The two perspectives, however, overlook the possibility of a third approach. 
Napoleon noted it first, stating that “the conduct of a general in a conquered country is 
full of difficulties. If severe, he irritates and increases the number of his enemies. If 
lenient, he gives birth to expectations which only render the abuses and vexations 
inseparable from war the more intolerable. A victorious general must know how to 
employ severity, justice, and mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition, or prevent 
it.”
46
 This notion of a third strategy has been suggested in previous works on occupations. 
As Hardy C. Dillard noted, military occupations are ‘instruments of diplomacy’ that often 
blur the line in international relations between what has traditionally considered 
compulsion and persuasion.
47
 Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla have gone further, 
developing a typology that includes three different types of military occupations with the 
middle type being a hybrid of the more benign- and the more punishment-orientated 
approach.
48
 Empirically, a third approach also seems plausible. For example, the Allied 
Occupation of France does not fit in this dichotomy given that the occupying powers 
purposively avoided the use of coercion to initially influence the French government and 
                                                 
45 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics, (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1962), 137. 
46 Quote from James R. Arnold, Napoleon Conquers Austria: The 1809 Campaign for Vienna (Westport: 
Praeger, 1985), 95.  
47 Hardy C. Dillard, “Power and Persuasion: The Role of Military Government,” The Yale Review 42 
(December 1953): 212. 




that no external threat shaped that perceptions of both participations to induce 
cooperation. The Allied Powers did not pursue a policy that fits into the coercive or 
cooperative dichotomy that has developed in the literature on military occupations. 
I assert that the third approach constitutes ‘dictating’ the peace to the occupied 
elite. As a strategy, dictating amounts to the occupying power issuing an order to the 
occupied elite to implement the former’s demands. The occupier has given the elite a 
choice in compliance and granted them some responsibility in carrying out the 
occupation. By essentially commanding the vanquished to comply, the occupying power 
is thereby removing the status quo and other alternatives that deviate from its terms as 
options from the agent’s choice set. The occupied elite’s decision is thus constrained to 
compliance, or non-compliance, with the demands of the occupying power. Each 
response carries with it costs to the elite. The costs of compliance – both domestic and 
international – can affect the elite’s political standing in the future given that they are the 
ones fulfilling the occupier’s demands. Yet, non-compliance carries the possibility of 
enforcement now by the occupying power – such as removing the offending elite from 
office if necessary. The occupying power makes an effort to manipulate both: it can 
establish the disincentive for non-compliance, and attaches any incentives for the elite as 
contingent to their compliance in implementing the victor’s peace.  
It is not sufficient to co-opt the elites into the operation to reduce their resistance 
to the occupation’s goals. The elite still have their own political interests to look out for, 
and they will not incur the costs of compliance willingly to fulfill the occupier’s agenda. 
Hence, their opposition to the victor’s peace remains unchanged whether the occupier co-
21 
 
opts them into the operation.
49
 As I argue in the theory chapter, granting the elites 
authority – albeit limited – might increase their likelihood of engaging in opportunistic 
behaviors and demonstrate their adversity to the occupier’s demands. The benefit, 
however, is that the occupying power can effectively learn the intentions of the elite. 
Hence, the occupying power’s authority when dictating the peace emerges from a costly 
exercise of power that influences the occupied elite into revealing their preferences for 
compliance. The occupier can then distinguish among the possible types of elites, 
removing those who favor non-compliance and compelling the less resistant into 
accepting the loss that comes with establishing the victor’s peace.
50
 
By designating the strategy as dictating, the term immediately becomes associated 
with dictators, and these types of leaders have gained a negative connation in the modern 
world full of democratic institutions. However, I assert that the term aptly describes the 
strategy of an occupying power when influencing the occupied elite into complying with 
its demands. Military occupations are essentially a ‘working model of authoritarian 
                                                 
49 Edelstein, Occupational Hazards; Michael Hechter, Ioana Emy Matesan, and Chris Hale, “Resistance to 
Alien Rule in Taiwan and Korea,” Nations and Nationalism 15, no. 1 (2009); 36-59; Jeremy Ferwerda and 
Nicholas L. Miller, “Political Devolution and Resistance to Foreign Rule: A Natural Experiment,” The 
American Political Science Review 108, no. 3 (August 2014): 642-660. 
50 The argument offers a sharp contrast to models of hierarchy which propose that the origin of the 
motivation for compliance with authority comes from legitimacy, rightfulness, or obligation. Lake’s 
argument is difficult to reconcile with that the fact that obedience does not always stem from obligation, 
legitimacy, or rightfulness: sometimes opponents comply to survive. As I demonstrate in the dissertation, 
the elites do not accept the occupier’s demands due to any duty, legitimacy, or rightfulness for the latter’s 
position. It is the occupier’s exercise of power that influences their compliance. For a discussion on 
hierarchy and political authority, see, David A. Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and 
Hierarchy in World Politics,” International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 50-61; David A. Lake, “Hobbesian 
Hierarchy: The Political Economy of Political Organization,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 
(2009): 265-266.  
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Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 establishes the conceptual foundation for identifying military 
occupations in international politics. First, I discuss a new conceptualization of 
occupations. The primary distinguishing feature differentiates occupations with a political 
goal from those limited to military purposes. The conceptualization also accounts for 
variation in the actors involved and whether the occupation resulted from coercive or 
cooperative actions. I discuss the components of this conceptualization, providing 
historical examples to illustrate those cases that will enter the dataset and the types of 
cases that will not. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the differences between military 
occupations in relation to interventions and colonies in the context of the distribution of 
sovereign rights among states. The distribution of sovereign rights builds on the recent 
literature that argues sovereignty is a bundle of rights, and that states frequently bargain 
over these rights.
52
 Previously work, though, has focused mainly on the bundle of rights 
in terms of less coercive interaction, whereas this dissertation is an initial attempt to 
introduce that idea to the study of international conflict. Finally, the chapter details the 
procedures for identifying military occupations, and the conditions under which such 
                                                 
51 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1999), 212.  
52 For example, Alexander Cooley, “Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty, and Security in 
Post-Soviet Space,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000-2001): 100-127; R. Harrison Wagner, War and 
State: The Theory of International Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2007); Alexander Cooley 
and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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events either enter or exit the dataset. Specifically, I note the population of possible cases 
following from the Correlates of War Resort to War publication, and the procedures I 
followed to collect information on the relevant cases.
53
  
In Chapter 3, I develop the principal-agent model for international politics. First, I 
discuss the four general assumptions underlying the model and proceed to describe the 
game being played between the occupying power and the occupied elite. The model 
explains how the adversity of the elite emerges from the demands imposed by the 
occupying power to comply with its peace. Essentially, these demands will provide the 
occupied elite with a perverse incentive to work against the interests of the occupier in 
establishing the victor’s peace. The occupying power moves to counteract the costs it 
imposes through a strategy of control to influence the elite’s decision-making. Based on 
its beliefs concerning the likelihood of compliance by the elite, the occupying power will 
select a strategy that reflects how it will conduct the costly exercise of power and 
ultimately shape the outcome of the military occupation. Following the logic of the 
model, I generate the primary hypothesis under investigation for the dissertation, which 
the following two chapters will evaluate empirically.  
 In chapter 4, I conduct the statistical analyses on the new dataset of military 
occupations concerning when occupying powers succeed or fail to establish their 
preferred peace. The statistical analysis focuses on the primary prediction of the model: 
how the strategies of control influence the decision-making of the elite, and the 
                                                 
53 Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort to War, 1816-2007 (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 2010). In order to use the COW Interstate War list, I made several modifications to the list 
of cases following my review of the relevant military and diplomatic histories for the conflicts. In 
Appendix A, I present the list of wars investigated according to the procedures outlined in Chapter 2 along 
with the sources for my modifications and additions.  
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subsequent outcome of the military occupation. To further demonstrate the utility of the 
dictating strategy, I also present two plausibility probes to augment the interpretation of 
the statistical findings: the Chilean Occupation of Peru (1881-1883) and the initial phases 
of the Soviet Occupation of North Korea (1945-1948). Both probes address how the 
demands of the occupying power influenced the occupied elites’ evaluation of the costs 
of compliance, and their subsequent resistance to the former’s terms. The first probe 
addresses how Chile dictated its terms to the leaders of Peru, who in turn attempted a 
strategy of delay to increase the costs of the operation to the former. The second probe 
addresses the problem of popular leaders who attempt to leverage their support from the 
population against the occupier’s demands. Both probes then demonstrate how Chile and 
the Soviet Union dictated their terms to the elite. 
In Chapter 5, I present an in-depth case study on the American Occupation of 
Japan (1945-1952). Scholars have frequently referred to the success of this occupation, 
and numerous theoretical competitors have emerged to explain how the Americans 
achieved their goals. The case study breaks the occupation down into three major 
observations based on the variation in the American demands of the Japanese elite. 
Within each observation, I can test the primary hypothesis while evaluating the 
implications of the principal-agent model concerning how the Americans wielded their 
power to shape the choices and influence the decision-making of the Japanese elite. I 
examine the retention of the Imperial Institution and the establishment of the new 
Constitution, Economic Stabilization and the emerging Cold War, and the Security and 
Rearmament of Japan. The case study investigates how the American demands generated 
the costs of compliance for Japanese politicians. The hostility among Japanese politicians 
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brought them to make numerous attempts at altering, undermining, or denying the 
occupiers success in achieving their preferred postwar goals. In turn, I examine how the 
Americans exercised their power to dictate that the former comply with the latter’s costly 
terms during the course of the occupation.  
 In chapter 6, I begin with a review of the principal-agent model and the empirical 
findings as presented in the previous chapters. Then, I present some implications of the 
arguments addressed here for scholars and policymakers. Finally, I address some future 





Chapter 2:  Purgatory in International Politics: the Military Occupations Dataset, 
1815 – 2003 
 
“If war is hell, military occupation is a severe form of purgatory.” 




The primary purpose of this chapter is to address a central question for empirical 
research in international relations: how to conceptualize instances of military occupation. 
To answer this inquiry, the chapter is divided into three parts. The first section discusses 
how the project defines military occupations for the dataset. I present the concept in its 
simplest form and then describe the components using historical examples to illustrate 
each one. The second section discusses how this conceptualization of military 
occupations fits into the broader scheme of the distribution of sovereign rights in the 
international system. Along these dimensions, I compare and contrast the concept of 
military occupations to interventions, colonies, and annexations. The third section 
discusses the population of military occupations in the dataset and the parameters for the 
identification of the universe of cases.  
Conceptualizing Military Occupations 
A military occupation constitutes a state (i.e., the occupier or occupying power) 
using its military forces to coercively capture and assume governing authority over 
another state’s territory (i.e., the occupied) to compel the latter to fulfill the former’s 
                                                 
54 Martin Kyre and Joan Kyre, Military Occupation and National Security (Washington, D.C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1968), 4.  
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goals. To be more explicit, a military occupation involves five criteria. A state must use 
(1) its military to threaten force and/or defeat an opponent’s military (2) to capture 
territory from another government, ranging from a small portion to its entire set of 
territorial possessions. By doing so, the state (3) displaces the ability of another state to 
act as sovereign, i.e., diminishes its capacity for exercising control via its central 
institutions and (4) assumes some level of governance to administrate the foreign 
territory. Finally, the occupying state must (5) demand, or impose, that the occupied 
territory fulfill a goal, or set of goals, in order for the occupation to terminate. The five 
criteria establish the requisite components for a military occupation.
55
 The following 
discussion shall expand on these criteria and draw on historical examples to demonstrate 
their application for including cases in the dataset. 
Military occupations originate from the use of a state’s armed forces to coerce an 
opponent into submitting its territory to the control of a foreign power.
56
 This use of 
coercion may occur in one of two ways. First, a state can use its military to invade 
another state’s territory and through defeating the latter’s armed forces create an 
                                                 
55 There is an extensive debate among scholars as to what constitutes a military occupation. I do not address 
these debates, but present my own definition of military occupations. For some alternatives to the 
conceptualization presented here that strongly influenced my own thinking on the subject, see, L. 
Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise Vol. II (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1906); Raymond 
Robin, Des Occupations Militaires: En Dehors des Occupations de Guerre  Trans. by the Division of 
International Law (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1942); Julius Stone, Legal 
Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes and War Law. (New York: 
Rinehart & Company Inc., Publishers, 1954); Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory …A 
Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation. (Minneapolis: The University of 
Minnesota Press, 1957); Adam Roberts, “What is a Military Occupation,” British Year Book on 
International Law 55 (1984): 249-305; Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993); Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial 
Conflict in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); David M. Edelstein, 
Occupation Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2008); Peter M. R. Stirk, The Politics of Military Occupation (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
2009). 
56 Roberts, “What is a Military Occupation,” 256. 
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opportunity for imposing an occupation. In the Lopez War of 1864 to 1869, the militaries 
of Argentina and Brazil defeated the last of the Paraguayan army in a final confrontation 
in August 1869. Following the destruction of the Paraguayan military, Argentina and 
Brazil had captured significant portions of their opponent’s territory, and imposed an 
occupation on Paraguay.
57
 Second, a state may threaten further coercive measures against 
an opponent if it does not surrender territory to an occupation. At the termination of the 
First World War, the Allied and Associate Powers threatened to continue the fight unless 
German authorities submitted the Rhineland to an occupation. When confronted with the 




On occasion, a state will consent to a military occupation on its territory without a 
prior use of coercion. For example, a state may initiate an occupation on allied territory to 
fighting off invading powers, current occupiers, or insurgencies. In World War I, the 
Ukrainian government invited the military forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary into 
their territory to establish an occupation. Though the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of February 
1918 recognized the independence of the Ukraine, Soviet military forces continued their 
efforts to oust the Rada government. Facing certain defeat, the Rada called upon 
Germany and Austria-Hungary to assist in repelling Soviet forces and to help the 
government establish order within its borders. Both countries immediately sent military 
                                                 
57 Charles J. Kolinski, Independence or Death: The Story of the Paraguayan War (Gainesville: University 
of Florida Press, 1965), 218; Scheina, Robert L., Latin America’s Wars. Vol. 1: The Age of the Caudilloa, 
1791-1899 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2003), 331. After this battle in August 1869, the armed forces of 
the three governments engaged in no further hostilities.  
58 Walter A. McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924: The Last Bid for a Balance of Power 
in Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and 
the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). 
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forces to the Ukraine. By the middle of April 1918, the German and Austrian forces had 
recaptured the Ukrainian territory lost to the Soviets, and initiated their occupation. The 
Rada, however, regretted their decision when German authorities installed a new 
government that was more supportive of their policies. Though the Rada was replaced at 
the end of April, the occupation of the Ukraine began as a cooperative act between the 
three governments involved.
59
 World War II has numerous examples of states consenting 
to military occupations via civil affairs agreements with the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and other members of the Allied coalition following the defeat of Axis military 
forces.
60
 The occupations described above did not result from conflicting interests and 
militarized hostilities between the occupier and the occupied, but from cooperative 
arrangements previously negotiated by the parties involved. The dataset excludes military 
occupations that occur as a result of consent among states.  
Next, the occupying power must use its military forces to capture and control 
territory from its opponent. States can occupy any portion of another state’s territory, 
ranging from coastal cities to the entirety of the country’s formal boundaries. The extent 
of territory captured by the state’s military forces varies across each of the cases. 
Following the First Spanish-Moroccan War of 1859-1860, the Spanish government 
imposed an occupation on the city of Tetuan and its surrounding territories. The 
occupation may encompass the state’s capital, such the Chilean Occupation of Peru when 
                                                 
59 Xenia Eudin, “The German Occupation of the Ukraine in 1918,” Russian Review 1, no. 1 (1941): 90-105; 
Clifford F. Wargelin, “The Economic Collapse of Austro-Hungarian Dualism, 1914-1918,” East European 
Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2000): 261-288; Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, 2010. “German-Occupied Eastern Europe,” 
In A Companion to World War I ed. by John Horne (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). 
60 F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government in North-West Europe, 1944-1946 (London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1961); F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central 
Organization and Planning (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1966).  
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it captured Lima in January 1881. The occupations of Egypt (1882-1936) and Italy (1943-
1947) constitute instances of invading armies occupying their opponent’s entire territory. 
Furthermore, the territory captured may constitute former colonial possessions of a 
defeated power, which occurred after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Upon the 
surrender of Spanish forces, the US military established occupation regimes in three of 
Spain’s former colonies: Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.  
Requirements three and four of the conceptualization are essential for 
understanding how a military occupation functions. With the third criteria, displacing the 
authority of an opponent focuses explicitly on the authority held by the central 
government for a territory and not necessarily provincial or local administrative units. 
The occupation must limit, or prevent, the institutions of a central government from 
controlling its territory. Whether regional or city governments remain in place varies 
across the cases, often depending on the needs and interests of the individual occupying 
powers. This leads to the fourth condition, that the occupying state must act has a 
governing authority. I refer to this as “active control,” when the occupant serves as the 
central authority for the occupied territory.
61
 The military force must take “concrete 
actions” that one would expect of a government when serving as the public 
administration for an occupied territory.
62
 Such concrete actions can include settling 
disputes in local communities, enforcing tax collections, and/or managing the flow of 
                                                 
61 International law often refers to this requirement for military occupation as ‘effective’ control, which 
generates some confusion as to what it necessitates of the occupier. Though what they imply with this 
concept is that the state actively engages in the governance of the territory under occupation, and not that it 
do so in an optimal manner. See, for example, Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict; von Glahn, 
The Occupation of Enemy Territory; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 4th Ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990); Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation. 
62 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 141. 
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goods and people. In order to fulfill requirement four, ground troops must be stationed in 
the occupied territory regardless if the administration has a military or civilian leader.
63
 
An occupying power must use its military forces as the primary means to control and 
govern the territory.
64
 This requirement that occupying powers commit ‘boots on the 
ground’ for an occupation removes activities referred to as “air occupations” from the 
theoretical and empirical analysis.
65
 
Finally, a core notion to the concept of an occupation is that the purpose of using 
coercion to take control of foreign territory is to compel an opponent to accept and abide 
                                                 
63 The term ground forces may include any members of a respective country’s army, navy or air force. The 
expectation here is that the troops must be deployed on foreign territory as a means of control rather than 
jets participating in no-fly zones or battleships preventing ports from functioning. The difference in these 
events emerges in the chances that political leaders are willing to take with their country’s armed forces. 
The commitment of ground forces to control and administer territory is a risky decision for most political 
leaders. One purpose of the project here is to investigate how leaders can manage these risks and achieve 
success in establishing the peace by committing ground troops to governing foreign territory. As such, it 
serves as a challenge to recent work on grand strategy that has called into the question the practice of 
‘putting boots on the ground,’ for any purpose, including occupations. For example, see, Richard 
Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993); Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Colin Dueck, 
Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to 
the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
64 This does not exclude the possibility of a civilian administrator for occupation. It merely means that the 
occupying power must maintain a military presence as a primary instrument to enforce its authority against 
the foreign territory. For a discussion on the use of civilian administrators in occupations, see Kyre and 
Kyre, Military Occupation and National Security, 23; Carnes Lord, Proconsuls: Delegated Political-
Military Leadership from Rome to America Today (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
65 There are two reasons for excluding such cases from the analysis. First, air occupations do not include 
much – if any – interaction between the elites and the population living in the territory, and the occupying 
power. This is exactly what leaders want with air occupations: to diminish the risks of placing troops in 
harm’s way. By limiting the exposure of its military forces, a state decreases the possibility of any hostile 
interactions. Military occupations, however, generally increase that risk given the exposure of troops to 
potentially unfriendly populations. Second, air occupations do not involve a state governing foreign 
territory. The state employing the air occupation does deny a central government the ability to the control 
its territory. Yet, that state does not take on the governing authority for that territory. Rather, it allows 
regional/local elites to govern the territory without interference from the central government and its armed 
forces. Air superiority, then, might prevent the government of the occupied territory from enacting its 
authority, but it does not enable a state to become an occupier. For a discussion on the use of air 
occupations, see Marc K. Dippold, “Air Occupation: Asking the Right Questions,” (Thesis, Air Command 
and Staff College, 1997); Alexander Benard, “Lessons from Iraq and Bosnia on the Theory and Practice of 
No-fly Zones,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004): 454-478. 
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by the postwar goals of the occupying power. The goal of an occupation should be 
something that the occupier wants from the occupied as part of the postwar peace, 
something more than an immediate military advantage in a conflict. These goals 
represent the reason that leaders imposed occupations upon foreign territory, the political 
demands that the occupier wants the occupied territory to fulfill in order for the 
occupation to end. At the most basic level, military occupations are about providing 
security for the occupying power in the postwar period. Following the end of a conflict, 
many leaders believe that the defeated may re-initiate hostilities at some point in the 
future, and occupations are a means to provide security against an immediate resumption 
of combat. Yet, most occupations represent an opportunity to settle the outstanding issues 
of the conflict, and to shape the postwar relations between the former opponents. Leaders 
usually have specific, long-term goals in mind when engaging in the occupation of 
foreign territory. These aims range from the defeated state paying an indemnity, the 
disarmament of the opponent’s military forces, or the installation of new domestic 
institutions. For these ambitions, the occupation of foreign territory is the means by 
which a state may compel an opponent to concede to its postwar demands.  
There is an important reason for including postwar goals as a component in 
defining military occupations: it allows us to distinguish between instances of 
occupations that are purely military in nature, and those that have more far reaching 
political consequences for the opponent after its defeat. In the former category, states 
establish occupations on foreign soil as a part of their military campaign to convince their 
opponents to capitulate. The occupation itself fulfills no political goal. In the latter 
category – what can be called coercive political occupations – the state initiates an 
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occupation in order to impose its long-term aims to the vanquished. The occupation, then, 
becomes the opportunity for achieving a peace favorable to the occupant’s ambitions. It is 
important to note that the concept does not specify the content of these postwar goals. 
Instead, I contend that military occupations must have political aims that go beyond 
seeking a military advantage in contests of strength.  
Most of these cases – where the state capturing territory has no postwar goal for 
the occupation – are likely to end in the quick restoration of the defeated state’s capacity 
to govern. The victorious power may believe that by unilaterally restoring governance to 
the losing power that such an action would serve as a confidence building measure and 
signal its intentions to honor the forthcoming peace. For example, in the final battles of 
the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 Russian military forces captured Adrianople and its 
surrounding territories.
66
 Without question, Russia coercively displaced the authority of 
the Ottoman Empire and assumed an administrative role over the territory. Yet, in 
negotiating the Treaty of Adrianople the Russian government placed no demands on the 
return of city to Ottoman authority. Instead, Russia sought to restore the territory as 
quickly as possible to the Ottoman Empire once the peace negotiations had concluded.
67
 
In such cases, the captured territory might be under an occupation but its purpose was 
                                                 
66 United Kingdom Foreign Office, Turkey: Correspondence Respecting the Organization of Danubian 
Principalities, 1828-1836 Confidential Print, FO 881/3666 (1978): Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by 
Treaty: Showing the Various Political and Territorial Chances which have take place Since the General 
Peace of 1814 Vol. 2 (London: Butterworths, 1875). 
67 One could argue that the capture of Adrianople led the Ottoman Empire to end the hostilities and enter 
into negotiations with Russia. In all likelihood, that was the Russian goal to force the capitulation of 
Turkish armed forces and to initiate peace negotiations. However, such instances would be a false positive 
for evaluating the theoretical argument as the occupation would initiate in success. That is, termination of 
hostilities would fulfill the goal of the occupation. As discussed, the occupation does not initiate until the 




purely one of military advantage. I exclude such cases where the occupying power has no 
political goal for the postwar relations with its opponent.  
The conceptualization of military occupations excludes two further types of cases 
from the analysis. First, I assume that the occupying power is a state, and not an 
international organization. Some authors do argue that the governing norms and tactics of 
control for occupying powers in foreign territory are similar to those of international 
organizations. Consequentially, these scholars want to treat occupations and international 
administrations as analytically the same.
68
 However, when an international organization 
has taken on administrative responsibilities for territory it often does so in a manner 
similar to the cooperative occupations described above. For instance, the United Nations 
(UN) does not ‘threaten or invade’ territory to establish an international administration. 
Instead, the parties involved consent to such arrangements through diplomatic notes or 
status of forces agreements. These arrangements establish the framework for the UN’s 
activities prior to it initiating an administration.
69
 Hence, I exclude these instances for 
lacking the coercion component of the definition. Though, occupations where 
international organizations later join, or contribute, to the operation are included as long 
as the primary occupying powers – i.e., those holding the governance rights – remain 
states. 
                                                 
68 For example, see, Steven R. Ratner, “Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: 
The Challenges of Convergence,” The European Journal of International Law 16, no. 4 (2005): 695-719. 
69 Rene-Jean Dupuy, Handbook of International Organizations (Leyden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1998), 295-297; Sally Morphet, “Organizing Civil Administration in Peace-Maintenance,” in The Politics 
of Peace-Maintenance  ed. by Jarat Chopra (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Richard Caplan, International 
Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4 
and footnote 6.  
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Second, the conceptualization excludes occupations that result from an internal 
conflict, or civil war, between a government and a portion of its population.
70
 I eliminate 
such cases for two reasons. First, it is possible that authors have used the term 
inappropriately to describe the activities of a state on its internal territory. As Peter Stirk 
notes, these cases might serve as instances of governments declaring martial law to quell 
a rebellion or promote stability as opposed to establishing an actual military government 
that will manage the territory.
71
 While the two activities certainly have some similarities, 
the two terms are not synonymous. Second, the state is not capturing and imposing itself 
on foreign territory; it is enacting the coercive dimension of its control over its own 
territory.
72
  If states engage in occupations on their own territorial possessions, that act 
would have no affect on the distribution of sovereign rights among states. In the next 
section, I will elaborate on this distribution and discuss how military occupations 
compare with activities such as interventions, annexations, and colonization.   
                                                 
70 The most common example here is the Northern States imposing an occupation on the South at the end 
of the American Civil War. See Judkin Browning, ““Bringing Light to Our Land…When She was Dark as 
Night”: Northerners, Freedpeople, and Education during Military Occupation in North Carolina, 1862-
1865,” Nineteenth Century History 9, no. 1 (2008): 1-17; Peter Maslowski, Treason Must be Made Odious: 
Military Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction in Nashville, Tennessee (Millwood: KTO Press, 1978); 
Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Michael G. Wade, ““I would 
Rather be among the Comanches”: The Military Occupation of Southwest Louisiana, 1865,” Louisiana 
History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 39, no. 1 (1998): 45-64. 
71 Stirk, The Politics of Military Occupation, 34-36. Furthermore, military government might resemble a 
military dictatorship in terms of the loci of power in an internal actor governing the population. Again, a 
foreign power imposes a military occupation. This actor is distinct from military governments and 
dictatorships that emerge internally to take on the political authority to govern. See Hugh Seton-Watson, 
“Military Occupations: Some Reflections from Recent and More Distant History,” in Armies of Occupation 
ed. by Roy Arnold Prete and A. Hamish Ion (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1984), 1-16. 
72 Leslie Green discusses how a state might win back its own land through military victory, thus ending a 
belligerent occupation by a foreign power, and then proceeding to initiate its own occupation on previously 
possessed territory. See Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993), 247. In these cases, the victorious state is simply reclaiming territory 
that it has previously incorporated.  
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Military Occupations and the Distribution of Sovereign Rights 
In a world where states can engage in military interventions, establish far flung 
colonies, and annex territory, how does one recognize a military occupation in 
comparison to these other activities?
73
 The key to answering this question lies in 
understanding sovereignty, and the distribution of rights among states. There is 
significant confusion within the scholarship and among policy makers as to what 
constitutes sovereignty among states. For instance, many scholars and policymakers do 
not distinguish between sovereignty as ownership and authority as administration when 
discussing a territory that is under a military occupation. Instead, both academics and 
political figures often conflate the terms and use them interchangeably.
74
 The difference 
between the two is essential to understanding what constitutes a military occupation, and 
how to distinguish it from intervention and annexations in the international system.  
At its core, sovereignty is “a bundle of various property rights that correspond to 
different functional entitlements” that a government possesses over territory.
75
 In 
particular, this project focuses on two of these rights: governance rights and ownership 
rights. The right to governance encompasses two specific rights that every state uses to 
                                                 
73 Some scholars might contend that the differences are negligible. For example, see the arguments made in 
David Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1999); Kimberly Zisk Marten, The Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Such arguments, however, overlook the importance with 
which states attach to these various distinctions, and the lengths that government officials will go to 
convince their audiences – domestic as well as international – that these differences matter.  
74 For a discussion on this confusion among policy makers, see Adam Roberts, “The End of Occupation: 
Iraq 2004,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 54, no. 1 (2005): 27-48. For a brief mention on 
the conceptual confusion among scholars, see Daniel H. Deudney, “The Philadelphian System: 
Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787-1861,” 
International Organization 49, no. 2 (1995): 191-228. 
75 Alexander Cooley, “Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty, and Security in Post-Soviet 
Space,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000-2001): 105.  
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administer territory: authority and control. As Stephen D Krasner notes, “authority 
involves a mutually recognized right for an actor to engage in specific kinds of 
activities.”
76
 For states, those ‘specific kinds of activities’ are often the creation of 
expectations and rules regarding the behavior of the various actors residing within a 
portion of territory. Control is defined in terms of a government’s capabilities to monitor 
those individuals under its influence, and sanction those who fail to comply with its 
directives. Hence, the right to governance includes the authority to make rules – rule 
creation – and the control necessary to enforce those upon the population – rule 
enforcement.
77
 The second right – ownership – refers to whether a state has claimed 
possession over a piece of territory, and incorporated the land into its permanent 
property. The project here addresses how states redistribute these two rights during the 
postwar era as a means to identifying occupations in comparison to other foreign policy 
behaviors.  
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Sovereign Rights: Governance & Ownership 
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76 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 
10.  
77 For a discussion on this analytical distinction between control and authority, see Janice E. Thomson, 
“State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research,” 
International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1995): 223. Empirically, it is often difficult to untangle the two 
concepts. That is why I consider them as combined to form the right to governance.  
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Figure 1 represents the four possible distributions for the rights of governance and 
ownership when discussing the invasion of military forces into foreign territory. The 
working assumption here is that the states have previously engaged in some type of 
armed hostilities and the conflict between them has terminated. The rows denote whether 
a state in sending its armed forces into foreign territory seized the governance rights from 
the opposing state. The top line represents whether a state makes a formal claim to 
incorporate a piece of territory and takes over the ownership rights. 
The first cell (a) captures intervention. Scholars have generally conceptualized 
foreign military interventions as having the following characteristics: (1) the use of 
militarized force by a challenger (2) within a target’s territory (3) to interfere with some 
political aspect of the target’s affairs.
78
 Examples of foreign military intervention that 
scholars typically include in datasets are naval bombardment of the target’s territory, air 
strikes, and deployment of ground troops for combat in addition to some instances of 
military occupation.
79
 Conceptually, foreign military interventions and military 
occupations share some core components, such as the element of coercion and the 
interference in another state’s internal affairs. Interventions are infringements upon a 
state’s right to govern, but not all interventions constitute military occupations. The 
                                                 
78 The following works use these three basic components for conceptualizing intervention: Margaret G. 
Hermann and Charles W. Kegley, “Democracies and Intervention: Is there a Danger Zone in the 
Democratic Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (2001): 237-245; Christopher C, Joyner, 
“International Law,” in Intervention in the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World ed. by Peter J. 
Schraeder (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Herbert K. Tillema, International Armed Conflict Since 1945: 
A Bibliographic Handbook of Wars and Military Interventions (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).  
79 Herbert K. Tillman and John R. Wingen, “Law and Power in Military Intervention: Major States after 
World War II,” International Studies Quarterly 26, no. 2 (1982): 220-250; Frederic S. Pearson and Robert 
A. Baumann, “International Military Intervention, 1946-1993,” (ICPSR 6035) (St. Louis: University of 
Missouri-St. Louis, Center for International Studies, 1993). 
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defining difference between intervening in another state’s affairs and occupying its 
territory rests on whether the military forces assume the rights to governance.
80
  
The second cell (b) captures those territories which are incorporated under a 
state’s ownership, but allowed to maintain governance rights that grant an administration 
significant authority to rule itself. Such autonomous regions may emerge in one of two 
ways. A state has made a claim to ownership over the territory, thereby incorporating the 
land under its sovereignty. Yet, the incorporating state has not taken over the governance 
rights from the administration and thereby has allowed the region to govern itself. 
Alternatively, the state with ownership rights has granted the territory governing rights 
under some conditions that mitigate or diminish its own ability to control the land in 
question. The dispute between Taiwan and China has a number of elements that meet the 
description of an autonomous region. Taiwan could be considered part of China, and yet 




The third cell (c) captures the focus of this investigation: military occupations. In 
the terms of the distribution of sovereign rights, a state has engaged in an occupation 
                                                 
80 How do spheres of influence fit into this discussion on governance and ownership? For the most part, 
spheres of influence are not immediately relevant to either right. Spheres of influence merely denote 
regions where a single power has claimed the right to intervene when necessary. For example, Lord Curzon 
defined a sphere of influence as an area where, “no exterior power but one may reassert itself in the 
territory so described.” Quoted in Friedrich Kratochwil, “Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An 
Inquiry into the Formation of the State System,” World Politics 39, no. 1 (1986): 38. Spheres of influence 
constitute geographical regions that may include multiple states. Within that region, a single state claims 
some special right to interfere as it deems necessary with the expectation that competing powers will not 
hinder its objectives. States that exist within a sphere of influence, then, are not precluded from the 
possibility of suffering an intervention, an occupation, annexation, or colonization. Instead, spheres of 
influence simply denote a region where one state in particular is likely to engage in such activities.  
81 Claude S. Phillips, Jr., “The International Legal Status of Formosa,” The Western Political Science 
Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1957); 276-289; Michael Yahuda, “The International Standing of the Republic of 
China on Taiwan,” The China Quarterly no. 148 (December 1996): 1319-1339.   
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when it holds the governance rights over a portion of territory but has not made any 
formal, public claim to incorporate the land. A core element of interest in studying 
military occupations is the recognition by the occupant that it is a temporary situation, not 
a permanent plan, to accomplish its foreign policy goals. As the opening quote to this 
chapter noted, occupations represent a form a purgatory for foreign territory. Purgatory is 
a transitional state that will eventually terminate when the occupying power chooses to 
restore authority to a native government, or decides to incorporate the land under its own 
sovereignty. As von Glahn notes, “…the occupant …exercises a temporary right of 
administration on a trustee basis until such time as the final disposition of the occupied 
territory is determined.”
82
 Until leaders make the decision to exit purgatory, their military 
forces remain in an occupation. The governance rights are temporarily assumed by the 
occupying power, and the ownership rights remain with the occupied state. Hence, the 
occupation is a temporary redistribution of sovereign rights, a means to an end for the 
occupying power to accomplish its postwar goals.  
When the occupation terminates, the subsequent redistribution of rights will either 
alter the designation of the troops to an intervening force on foreign soil, or establish the 
state’s ownership of the territory. In the former case, the occupying powers can restore 
the right to governance to the inhabitants regardless if their military forces remain in 
foreign lands. For example, following the end of War of the Roman Republic in July 
1849, the French government assumed the right to govern Rome and its immediate 
territories. While the French military expedition remained for several years, Napoleon III 
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ceded the governance rights when the pope returned to the capital in April 1850, thereby 
transforming the occupation into an intervention.
83
 The occupying power might also 
withdrawal its military forces when terminating an occupation. Austria, Prussia, Russia, 
and the United Kingdom removed their forces from French soil when the occupation 
terminated in 1818.
84
 A third possibility is that the military forces remain on foreign 
territory after restoring governance rights, albeit under more cooperative conditions such 
as basing agreements. For instance, the United States negotiated for extensive basing 
rights for its armed forces at the conclusion of the occupation of Japan.
85
 In these three 
instances, the occupying power’s decision to restore the governance rights to a domestic 
government occurred independently of whether its armed forces remained present in the 
territory. Alternatively, an occupier might end the occupation by claiming the territory as 
a permanent possession.  
The final cell (d) represents the incorporation of territory via a state taking the 
right to ownership. In this way, the incorporation of territory is what many scholars 
traditionally refer to as annexations as well as colonies. While most scholars treat 
annexation and colonization as distinct phenomena, the two processes share an 
underlying similarity: in both cases, a state makes a formal claim to the long-term 
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possession of the ownership rights for a piece of territory.
86
 The question then becomes, 
how do states redistribute ownership rights in order to incorporate territory? Sharon 
Korman has identified three methods by which states have customarily incorporated 
territory: state death, negotiated settlement, or acquiescence. As Korman notes, “in the 
first and third of these cases, the title of conquest is formally complete when the 
conquering state unilaterally annexes the conquered territory, extending its own civil 
administration over it and incorporating it into the body of its own state territory.” The 
second method usually involves a peace treaty whereby the defeated state surrenders its 
ownership rights to the victor.
87
 To incorporate territory, a state must make a formal 
claim to sovereignty; that is, the government must make a public statement – such as a 
declaration or a treaty – announcing its possession of the territory’s ownership rights. The 
emphasis here is that the claim to ownership over the foreign territory must be made 
explicit to other states in the international system, regardless if those other countries 
choose to recognize that claim or not. Occupations, then, can terminate with either the 
relinquishing of governance rights to a native government, or the incorporation of 
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ownership rights into a state’s permanent possession. In both cases, the redistribution of 
rights focuses on the actions of states with regards to the territory under occupation.  
In discussing the conceptualization of military occupations and the redistribution 
of rights, I do not include a component that distinguishes among the intentions of leaders 
in regards to the territory and the subsequent outcome of an occupation. For example, 
David Edelstein has emphasized the intentions of the occupying power as one of the most 
important aspects for recognizing occupations. Edelstein states that a politician’s goals 
must reflect a temporary willingness to act as sovereign: “An occupying power must 
intend at the onset of the occupation to vacate the occupied territory and return control of 
the territory to an indigenous government.”
88
 The problem is that the intentions of a state 
– specifically whether leaders want to make a permanent claim to ownership – are better 
captured as a variable rather than as a distinguishing feature of military occupations. That 
is, we should treat occupations as a means to accomplish a political goal, and control for 
the variation in ambitions as to whether states are more, or less, likely to succeed.
89
 
We should not deduce the intentions of actors from conceptualizations, nor can 
we assume motivations from outcomes. The former requires the introduction of 
unnecessary assumptions that might limit the explanatory power of any theoretical 
investigation.
90
 The latter problem ignores the strategic dimension in leaders’ decision-
making. Jeffrey Friedan has noted, “…where actors are strategic, we cannot infer the 
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cause of their behavior directly from their behavior.”
91
 In other words, we should not 
assume that the relationship between motivations and outcomes is strictly observable and 
perfectly correlated. Even in well documented cases, such as the Allied Occupation of the 
Rhineland following World War I, scholars disagree on how to interpret the intentions of 
leaders towards the occupied territory.
92
 Rather than rely on the intentions of occupying 
actors, the project focuses on the behavioral aspect of the redistribution of rights for 
whether a state establishes a military occupation on foreign soil. The next section 
discusses the population of military occupations in the dataset and the parameters for 
identifying instances of military occupations from 1815 to 2003. 
Identifying the Universe of Cases 
Having established a conceptualization of military occupations and the 
distribution of rights, the project now turns to identifying the possible universe of cases 
for inclusion in the empirical analysis. I concentrated data collection specifically on 
military occupations that follow the conclusion of hostilities in interstate wars. The 
Correlates of War (COW) Project provides an established definition and list of interstate 
wars for 1815 to 2003 in its most recent publication, Resort to War.
93
 There are two 
benefits in using the list of interstate wars for identifying the possible instances of states 
imposing military occupations. First, Resort to War has the advantage of being a global 
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inventory of interstate conflicts that is not limited to wars in one time period or 
geographical location. Second, using the COW Resort to War list reduces the potential 
bias on deciding which cases of occupations should be included in the dataset. By 
identifying the possible opportunities for states to impose occupations, we can have more 
confidence in the subsequent empirical results. There is one drawback to using the 
interstate war list. By limiting the focus to occupations that result from wars, military 
occupations from lesser levels of interstate violence are excluded from the dataset. Such 
examples would include the second occupation of Cuba from 1906-1909
94
 as well as the 
occupations of Haiti from 1915-1924
95
 and the Dominican Republic during 1916-1924.
96
 
As I noted in the introduction, however, identifying military occupations that occur 
outside of interstate wars can be difficult, and the purpose here is to explain how states 
enforce their peace following the conclusion of major conflicts.  
Beginning with the Neapolitan War of 1815 through the Invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
I examine each war for evidence of whether a state imposed an occupation on its 
opponent’s territory. At the end of the chapter, Table 2.1 presents the list of military 
occupations that result from 90 interstate wars investigated as a part of this project.
97
 Of 
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those 90 interstate wars that occurred between 1815 and 2003, 37 of those wars involved 
the imposition of a military occupation, bringing the case list to a total of 134 occupations 
on foreign territory under investigation.
98
 I further break down the distribution of the 
cases across the five regions of the world from 1815 to 2003. In Europe, there have been 
77 cases of military occupations, or approximately 56.2 percent of all cases in the dataset. 
There were 25 occupations in the Middle East, representing 18.25 percent of the cases. 
The region of Asia has had 20 cases of military occupation, which is approximately 16.06 
percent of the observations. The Americas have approximately 9 cases of military 
occupation, or 6.57 percent of the dataset. Finally, there have been 3 occupations in 
Africa, accounting for 2.92 percent of the cases. Only 54 of 134 occupations resulted in a 
success for the victorious state, approximately 41.6 percent of the occupations imposed 
following a major conflict. The remaining 80 cases constitute a failure for the occupying 
power to achieve its postwar goals. The average duration of a military occupation has 
been approximately 85 months, though the mode duration has been significantly lower, at 
43 months. 
To identify these cases, I focused the investigation for occupations on the war 
plans made by political and military decision-makers regarding the conflict. This 
disaggregates the analysis of each conflict to focus on the individual war participants, and 
their respective plans for waging the war. By focusing on war plans, then, I can identify 
the theaters of operation as possible opportunities for imposing military occupations. This 
is important as political leaders often establish the extent of territory that they want to 
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capture and occupy prior to the end of a conflict.
99
 In some instances, the decision-
makers sought to capture all of the territory held by an opponent. In World War II, 
American, British, and Soviet planners all agreed on the complete defeat of Germany and 
the total occupation of all its territory.
100
 American politicians also sought the total defeat 
of Afghanistan and Iraq, resulting in the complete occupation of both states following the 
termination of hostilities. In other cases, political decision-makers only sought to capture 
specific portions of territory from an opponent, such as in the Anglo-Persian War of 
1856-1857. The British government initially planned separate assaults on several portions 
of Persia, including “…the island of Karrack, Mohammerah at the head of the Gulf, 
Bushire and Bunder Abbas on the eastern shore.”
101
 By capturing and occupying these 
territories, the British sought to compel the Persian government to evacuate Herat and to 
comply with its treaty obligations.  
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There are two advantages to examining the war plans of leaders and separating 
the analysis into the theaters of operations. First, the dataset can be used to evaluate the 
specific goals and strategies employed in each territory as well as their varying outcomes. 
For instance, the Mexican-American War resulted in four separate occupations of 
Mexican territory. Initially, the Americans had planned on occupying the territories of 
New Mexico and California while the main army captured Northern Mexico. By 
February 1847, the US Army had firmly established military occupations in all three 
territories. However, President James Polk realized in September 1846 that occupying 
Northern Mexico would not be sufficient to compel the Mexican government to accept 
his postwar goals. Furthermore, the occupying forces were simply too far from Mexico 
City to march through and capture the territory in between without significant increases 
in their numbers and significant costs to the American government. Based on this 
assessment, President Polk ordered General Winfield Scott to invade Central Mexico and 
establish an occupation on the territory from Vera Cruz to Mexico City.
 102
 In this case, 
the occupation of Northern Mexico failed. 
Second, I can examine the dyadic nature of conflict between all the opponents 
involved rather than broadly examining the termination of the war. It is possible that in a 
war between multiple opponents, say, A, B, and C, that C defeats A early in the conflict 
and imposes an occupation on part of A’s territory. The war continues between B and C, 
but the fighting between C and A has stopped. In this instance, the occupation of A 
initiates when the fighting ends between its military forces and those of C. The War of 
the Pacific provides an excellent example. Following Resort to War, the war of Peru and 
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Bolivia against Chile lasted from February 1879 until December 1883.
103
 However, Peru 
and Bolivia did not fight against Chile for the entire duration of the conflict. Bolivia did 
not participate in any military operations following its defeat at the Battle of Tacna in 
May 1880. After the capture of Lima in January 1881, the Peruvian government 
collapsed and its armed forces scattered into the surrounding wilderness. While the two 
governments did not reach a peace treaty until two years later, the fighting had stopped 
between the two opponents in January 1881. Thus, the dataset captures the Chilean 
occupation of Peru as beginning in January 1881.
104
 
By focusing on the leaders’ war plans and the end of combat among states’ armed 
forces, the dataset excludes ‘rolling occupations’ from the theoretical and empirical 
analysis.
105
 During the course of battles, the frontlines between opponents shift. Each 
shift results in the redistribution of territory from one military to another. As the 
frontlines move, the right of governance also changes to the state that captures the 
territory. Identifying which state has the right to govern in these situations is difficult, 
especially since participants might capture more territory or, more importantly, lose some 
land in subsequent battles as the fighting amongst soldiers continues. For example, I code 
the Allied Occupation of Germany following World War Two as beginning in May 1945 
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with the capture of Berlin. However, one could argue that the occupation of Germany 
began in 1944 when the Allied forces captured and governed the city of Aachen while the 
frontlines pushed deeper into the German homeland.
106
 Rather than attempt to capture 
such minute changes, the dataset focuses explicitly on territory that a state intends to 
capture and the termination of combat in that territory as the initiation of the occupation.  
Now that I have established the possible opportunities, the next few paragraphs 
will discuss how the components for conceptualizing occupations interact with 
identifying whether cases should be included in the dataset. The coercive element of 
occupations must occur as part of the interstate war, whether as a threat of invasion, or as 
the actual incursion into enemy territory. Put simply, the coercive element must occur as 
part of the operations for the larger conflict, not as an incident that is prior to the 
initiation of hostilities. Furthermore, the use of coercion must come from one of the war 
participants as established by the Resort to War compendium. As an illustration of both 
requirements, the dataset does not include the Russian, and subsequent Austrian, 
occupation of the Ottoman territories Moldavia and Wallachia as part of the Crimean 
War of 1853 to 1856. Russia sent her military forces into the Danubian Principalities in 
July 1853 to take control of the territory from the Ottoman Empire.
107
 The territories 
were captured and occupied prior to the initiation of the Crimean War in October of the 
same year, thereby excluding it from the dataset.
108
 The Austrian occupation of Moldavia 
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and Wallachia initiated in the middle of August 1854.
109
 However, Austria is not 
included as a war participant in the Crimean War  according to Resort to War. Hence, its 
occupation of the Ottoman territories does not fall into the parameters of the dataset.  
The target of a military occupation may constitute another war participant as 
designated by Resort to War, or a neutral state that did not participate in the hostilities. I 
include neutral states for two reasons. First, war participants may impose military 
occupations upon neutral territories in order to preempt any actions by the neutral 
government. The war participant may suspect that it has conflicting interests with the 
neutral territory, especially if it expects that another war participant may exploit the 
neutral territory as part of its military operations. During the opening of World War I, 
German military planners questioned whether Belgium would remain neutral while the 
war raged along western front. Many individuals within Belgium assumed that Germany 
would respect its neutrality, yet German planners firmly believed that the French military 
would attempt an assault on their homeland via a crossing of Belgian territory. Rather 
than accept Belgium’s proclamations of neutrality, the German military invaded in 
August 1914 and occupied the vast majority of the country from October 1914 until 
withdrawing in November 1918.
110
  
Second, neutral territory may constitute the primary battleground between states. 
Neutral territory already under the control of a foreign army is especially relevant as both 
the old and new occupying powers may have postwar goals that conflict with each other 
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as well as the territory’s government. For instance, in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-
1905, the Chinese government declared its neutrality with respect to the conflict 
occurring within its territorial borders. By the end of the conflict, the Japanese army had 
driven the Russia military out of southern Manchuria. As quickly as the Japanese military 
had forced Russia out, they established their own military occupation upon Chinese 
territory. While the Japanese government wanted to diminish Russian influence, the 
former was neither an ally of China nor set on restoring Chinese authority without first 
extracting certain promises from the government in Beijing . The southern portion of 
Manchuria remained under Japanese occupation until 1907.
111
 
Finally, if an occupying power makes a formal claim to ownership on said 
territory within 12 months of terminating hostilities, it is then excluded as an occupation 
from the dataset. The reason being that states often times can and do move quickly when 
redistributing the rights over territory at the end of a war. States that intend to incorporate 
territories immediately under their sovereignty do not refrain from changing institutions, 
officials, and customs to match with those of their new owners. In these cases, the state 
capturing the territory takes immediate steps to secure its possession of the territory, often 
imposing its laws and administration while preparing to take over the ownership rights. 
For example, the Soviet forces in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania immediately set out to 
incorporate the territories into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In such cases, it is 
difficult to discern when the redistribution of rights occurs given the occupying powers 
immediacy in claiming the territory and asserting its right to ownership.  
                                                 




Alternatively, states often treat territories differently when they wait longer than 
twelve months to incorporate it. In such instances, states are more likely to engage in 
occupations as an independent phase in the redistribution of rights among states. For 
instance, in the American occupations of California and New Mexico, the Polk 
administration intended to annex the territories after the war ended with Mexico. During 
the fight, however, Polk and other officials were reluctant to treat the territories as if 
owned by the United States. They encouraged the commanding officers of the 
occupations to accept that the territory remained under Mexican sovereignty, much to the 
chagrin of the American citizens already inhabiting the two areas. As Secretary of War 
Marcy stated in regard to the trials and convictions of insurgents in the territory:  
The foundation of the civil government in New Mexico is not derived directly 
from the laws and constitution of the United States, but rests upon the rights 
acquired by conquest …. The territory conquered by our arms does not become, 




Hence, the American forces spent almost two years governing these territories under 
Mexican laws. The two territories remained under military occupation until April 1848 
when Mexico formally relinquished ownership to the American government.
113
 This 
behavior is similar to Prussia in the occupations of the two duchies following the Second 
Schleswig-Holstein War of 1864. Though Prussian officials wanted to annex the 
territories, their arrangements with Austria made them hesitant to take steps towards 
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incorporating the territory until August 1866.
114
 In these cases, the state capturing the 
territory – although fully intending to make a formal claim to the ownership rights – 
explicitly held only the governing rights for at least twelve months through an 
occupation.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has established three vital components for the project’s theoretical 
and empirical investigation of military occupations. First, the chapter introduced the 
conceptualization of military occupations. Second, I discussed how military occupations 
fit into the redistribution of sovereign rights after international conflicts. Finally, the 
chapter identified the universe of possible cases for finding and including instances of 
military occupations in the dataset. The subsequent chapter will discuss the theoretical 
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Table 2.1: The Population of Military Occupations resulting from Interstate Wars, 1815-2003 
Occupation Occupier Target Start End Outcome 
Occupation of Naples Austria Naples 5/1815 8/1817 Success 




France 7/1815 11/1818 Success 
Occupation of Moldavia & Wallachia Russia Moldavia & Wallachia  5/1828 9/1834 Success 
Occupation of Bulgaria & Roumelia Russia Ottoman Empire 9/1829 10/1830 Success 
Occupation of Silistria Russia Ottoman Empire 9/1829 9/1836 Success 
Occupation of New Mexico  United States New Mexico 8/1846 2/1848 Success 
Occupation of California United States California 8/1846 2/1848 Success 
Occupation of Northern Mexico United States Mexico 2/1847 7/1848 Failure 
Occupation of Central Mexico United States Mexico 10/1847 7/1848 Success 
Occupation of Novara Austria Piedmont 4/1849 8/1849 Success 
Occupation of Tuscany Austria Tuscany 5/1849 5/1855 Success 
Occupation of the Marches,  
                         Romagna, & Umbria 
Austria Papal States 6/1849 6/1857 Failure 
Occupation of Rome France Papal States 7/1849 4/1850 Failure 
Occupation of Bushire United Kingdom Iran 12/1856 10/1857 Success 
Occupation of Tétouan Spain Morocco 3/1860 5/1862 Success 
Occupation of Central Mexico France Mexico 5/1863 2/1867 Failure 
Occupation of the Jutland Prussia 
Austria 
Denmark 7/1864 10/1864 Success 
Occupation of Schleswig Prussia Schleswig 6/1864 8/1866 Success 
Occupation of Holstein Austria Holstein 6/1864 8/1866 Failure 
Occupation of Paraguay Brazil 
Argentina 
Paraguay 8/1869 6/1876 Success 
Occupation of France Prussia France 1/1871 9/1873 Success 
Occupation of Bulgaria Russia Bulgaria 1/1878 4/1879 Failure 
Occupation of Eastern Roumelia Russia Eastern Roumelia 1/1878 4/1879 Failure 
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Occupation of Peru Chile Peru 1/1881 10/1883 Success 
Occupation of Egypt United Kingdom Egypt 9/1882 8/1936 Failure 
Occupation of Weihaiwei Japan China 2/1895 5/1898 Success 
Occupation of Cuba United States Cuba 8/1898 5/1902 Success 
Occupation of Puerto Rico  United States Puerto Rico  8/1898 5/1900 Success 
Occupation of the Philippines United States Philippines 8/1898 4/1942 Failure 






China 8/1900 8/1902 Success 
Occupation of Manchuria Russia China 10/1900 4/1907 Failure 
Occupation of Southern Manchuria Japan China 3/1905 4/1907 Success 
Occupation of Northern Epirus Greece Albania 3/1913 3/1914 Failure 
Occupation of Luxembourg Germany Luxembourg 8/1914 11/1918 Failure 
Occupation of East Galicia &  
                        Bukovina I 
Russia Austria 9/1914 6/1915 Failure 
Occupation of Belgium Germany Belgium 10/1914 11/1918 Failure 
Occupation of Northern France Germany France 11/1914 11/1918 Failure 
Occupation of Shandung Peninsula Japan China 11/1914 12/1922 Failure 
Occupation of Valona Italy Albania 12/1914 9/1920 Failure 
Occupation of Lithuania Germany Lithuania 3/1915 10/1918 Failure 
Occupation of Poland Germany 
Austria 
Poland 8/1915 11/1918 Failure 
Occupation of Serbia Austria 
Bulgaria 
Serbia 10/1915 11/1918 Failure 
Occupation of Montenegro Austria 
Bulgaria 
Montenegro 1/1916 11/1918 Failure 
Occupation of East Galicia &  
                        Bukovina II 
Russia Austria 6/1916 7/1917 Failure 
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Occupation of Korce France Albania 12/1916 5/1920 Failure 
Occupation of Dobrudja  
                     & Wallachia 
Germany 
Austria 
Romania 12/1916 11/1918 Failure 
Occupation of Southern Dobrudja Bulgaria Romania 12/1916 5/1918 Success 
Occupation of Northern Epirus II Greece Albania 7/1917 10/1924 Failure 
Occupation of Palestine United Kingdom Palestine 12/1917 6/1948 Failure 
Occupation of the United Baltic  
                              Duchy 
Germany Estonia 
Latvia 
2/1918 11/1918 Failure 
Occupation of Belorussia Germany Russia 2/1918 11/1918 Failure 
Occupation of Iraq United Kingdom Iraq 10/1918 10/1932 Success 
Occupation of Syria & Lebanon France Syria & Lebanon 10/1918 8/1946 Failure 




Germany 11/1918 5/1930 Failure 
Occupation of the Saarland I France Saarland 11/1918 5/1930 Success 
Occupation of Istanbul United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
Turkey 11/1918 10/1923 Failure 
Occupation of Hungary Romania Hungary 11/1918 4/1920 Success 
Occupation of Cilicia France Turkey 11/1918 12/1921 Failure 
Occupation of Adalia Italy Turkey 4/1919 7/1921 Failure 
Occupation of Smyrna Greece Turkey 5/1919 9/1922 Failure 
Occupation of Vilnius Poland Lithuania 10/1920 2/1922 Success 
Occupation of Manchuria Japan Manchuria 3/1933 8/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Inner Mongolia Japan Inner Mongolia 5/1936 8/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Northern & Central  
                       China 
Japan China 12/1937 8/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Poland Germany Poland 9/1939 1/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Denmark Germany Denmark 4/1940 5/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Luxembourg Germany Luxembourg 5/1940 8/1942 Success 
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Occupation of Belgium & Northern  
                        France 
Germany Belgium 5/1940 9/1944 Failure 
Occupation of the Netherlands Germany Netherlands 5/1940 5/1945 Failure 
Occupation of France I Germany France 5/1940 11/1942 Failure 
Occupation of Iceland United Kingdom 
United States 
Iceland 5/1940 6/1944 Success 
Occupation of Southeastern France Italy France 6/1940 9/1943 Failure 
Occupation of Norway Germany Norway 6/1940 5/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Serbia Germany Serbia 4/1941 10/1944 Failure 
Occupation of Greece Germany Greece 4/1941 11/1944 Failure 
Occupation of Greece Italy Greece 4/1941 9/1943 Failure 
Occupation of Montenegro Italy Montenegro 4/1941 9/1943 Failure 
Occupation of Italian Somaliland United Kingdom Italian Somalia 4/1941 4/1950 Failure 
Occupation of Eritrea United Kingdom Eritrea 4/1941 9/1952 Failure 
Occupation of Iraq II United Kingdom Iraq 6/1941 10/1947 Success 
Occupation of Lithuania Germany Lithuania 7/1941 10/1944 Failure 
Occupation of Latvia Germany Latvia 7/1941 11/1944 Failure 
Occupation of Belarus Germany Belarus 7/1941 8/1944 Failure 
Occupation of Ukraine Germany Ukraine 7/1941 5/1944 Failure 
Occupation of Estonia Germany Estonia 8/1941 9/1944 Failure 
Occupation of Croatia Germany Croatia 8/1941 5/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Croatia Italy Croatia 8/1941 5/1943 Failure 
Occupation of Iran United Kingdom Iran 10/1941 3/1946 Success 
Occupation of Iran Soviet Union Iran 10/1941 6/1946 Failure 
Occupation of British Borneo Japan British Borneo 12/1941 8/1945 Failure 
Occupation of the Philippines  Japan Philippines 1/1942 4/1945 Failure 
Occupation of British Malay Japan British Malay 2/1942 8/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Dutch East Indies Japan Dutch East Indies 3/1942 8/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Crimea Germany Crimea 7/1942 5/1944 Failure 
Occupation of France II Germany France 11/1942 9/1944 Failure 
Occupation of Cyrenica United Kingdom Cyrenica 1/1943 12/1951 Success 
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Occupation of Tripoli United Kingdom Tripoli 1/1943 12/1951 Success 
Occupation of Fezzan France Fezzan 1/1943 12/1951 Failure 
Occupation of Montenegro Germany Montenegro 5/1943 10/1944 Failure 
Occupation of Italy United Kingdom 
United States 
Italy 9/1943 1/1947 Success 
Occupation of Albania Germany Albania 9/1943 1/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Hungary Germany Hungary 3/1944 4/1945 Failure 
Occupation of Romania Soviet Union Romania 8/1944 8/1958 Success 
Occupation of Bulgaria Soviet Union Bulgaria 9/1944 12/1947 Success 
Occupation of Poland Soviet Union Poland 3/1945 12/1956 Success 
Occupation of Austria United States 
United Kingdom 
France 
Austria 4/1945 5/1955 Success 
Occupation of Austria Soviet Union Austria 4/1945 5/1955 Success 
Occupation of Hungary Soviet Union Hungary 4/1945 5/1957 Success 
Occupation of the Philippines United States Philippines 4/1945 7/1946 Success 
Occupation of West Germany United States 
United Kingdom 
France 
West Germany 5/1945 5/1955 Success 
Occupation of East Germany Soviet Union East Germany 5/1945 3/1954 Success 
Occupation of Czechoslovakia Soviet Union Czechoslovakia 5/1945 12/1945 Success 
Occupation of Czechoslovakia United States Czechoslovakia 5/1945 12/1945 Success 
Occupation of Oder Niesse Poland East Germany 6/1945 6/1950 Success 
Occupation of the Saarland II France Saarland 7/1945 12/1956 Success 
Occupation of Berlin United States 
United Kingdom 
France 
Soviet Union 7/1945 10/1990 Success 
Occupation of Berlin Soviet Union United States 
United Kingdom 
France 
7/1945 10/1990 Failure 
Occupation of Japan United States Japan 8/1945 4/1952 Success 
60 
 
Occupation of Ryukyu Islands United States  Japan 8/1945 5/1972 Success 
Occupation of Korea Soviet Union North Korea 8/1945 9/1948 Success 
Occupation of Korea United States South Korea 9/1945 8/1948 Failure 
Occupation of Gaza I Egypt Gaza 5/1948 11/1956 Failure 
Occupation of Gaza II Israel Gaza 11/1956 3/1957 Failure 
Occupation of Gaza III Egypt Gaza 3/1957 6/1967 Failure 
Occupation of Aksai Chin China India 11/1962 Ongoing  
Occupation of West Bank Israel Jordan 6/1967 10/1994 Failure 
Occupation of Gaza IV Israel Gaza 6/1967 9/2005 Failure 
Occupation of Golan Heights Israel Syria 6/1967 12/1981 Success 
Occupation of Sinai Peninsula Israel Egypt 6/1967 4/1982 Success 
Occupation of Cyprus Turkey Cyprus 8/1974 12/1983 Success 
Occupation of Cambodia Vietnam Cambodia 1/1979 9/1989 Failure 
Occupation of Uganda Tanzania Uganda 4/1979 6/1981 Failure 
Occupation of Lebanon Israel Lebanon 6/1982 5/2000 Failure 
Occupation of Nagorno-Karabahk Armenia Azerbaijan 5/1994 Ongoing  
Occupation of Badme Ethiopia Eritrea 2/1999 Ongoing  
Occupation of Afghanistan United States Afghanistan 12/2000 5/2012 Failure 
Occupation of Iraq United States Iraq 5/2003 12/2008 Failure 
      







Chapter 3: Power, Strategy, and Success in Military Occupations 





In this chapter, I develop a theory on how an occupying power influences the 
decision-making of the occupied elite towards complying with the victor’s preferred 
peace, and the outcome of a military occupation. As noted, previous scholars have 
addressed several dimensions of why occupations succeed or fail, such as the role of 
prewar planning, the influence of international threats, and the previous economic or 
political development of the occupied country. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a 
theoretical argument that addresses the missing dimension of occupation strategies as an 
essential component for understanding the dynamics of military occupations. The theory 
focuses on the relationship between the occupying power and the occupied elite as a 
principal-agent model that incorporates the costly exercise of power as the primary factor 
for explaining success in achieving the victor’s peace. As this chapter will contend, the 
crucial means to successfully compel the elite to making a commitment to the occupier’s 
goals is via its strategy of control. Specifically, states that engage in what I call dictating 
strategies are more likely to screen the intentions of the occupied agents while 
simultaneously being in a position to compel and enforce their interests should that elite 
attempt to undermine the victor’s peace. As a result of employing a dictating strategy, 
                                                 
115 Quoted in Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” Parameters 33 (Autumn 2003): 85. 
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occupiers will more likely succeed in gaining a commitment from the occupied elite 
towards their preferred goals.  
Before proceeding, I want to articulate the scope conditions of the theoretical 
argument presented here. First, the project focuses on the outcomes of military 
occupations for occupying powers, specifically how they achieve success, and not on the 
question of why states impose an occupation once the fighting ends. Though the theory 
endogenizes such arguments, I leave the empirical testing of this assumption for future 
work. Second, I am concerned primarily with the interaction of an occupying power and 
the occupied elite via the former’s strategy of control relative to the outcome of the 
occupation. This work does not address why states select one strategy of control over 
another when imposing a military occupation on an opponent’s territory. However, the 
theory does suggest that the occupier’s prior beliefs about the elite’s intentions for 
compliance will strongly influence which strategy it will select for a particular 
occupation. Both questions represent interesting and fruitful inquiries for future research, 
but the project focuses solely on how the strategy for controlling the elite affects the 
outcomes of military occupations. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section introduces the theoretical 
argument, starting with the four general assumptions for a principal-agent model of 
international politics.  The following section presents the game being played between the 
occupying power and the occupied elite, theorizing on why states select into occupations 
as crucial for understanding their interaction with the elite. The next two sections address 
how the costly exercise of power in a military occupation is the primary means through 
which victorious states can overcome the elite’s adverse intentions and effectively 
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establish the postwar peace. Specifically, I discuss how the strategy of control employed 
by the occupier influences the elite into accepting and implementing the victor’s peace. 
The following section presents the three strategies of control, linking up the discussion on 
autonomy and the means of influence to the occupying power’s expectation on 
compliance from the elite. The final section addresses how those strategies affect the 
interaction of the occupier with the elite and subsequently the outcome of the military 
occupation.  
Clarifying the Vocabulary 
Throughout this chapter, the model focuses on the strategic interaction of two 
actors as part of a military occupation. I have varied the respective designations of the 
two actors to keep the vocabulary from becoming too dull or repetitive, though the terms 
are largely synonymous. For the sake of clarity, here are the terms of reference for the 
two actors involved. First, the actor engaging in the occupation is always a state, and 
often referred to as the occupier, occupying power/state, and/or victor. This actor is the 
principal. Second, the actor being occupied varies depending on occupation. Sometimes 
the actor is an officially recognized government, other times this actor is not. In either 
case, this second actor is the one targeted by the first during the course of the 
occupation.
116
 I often refer to the second actor as being the occupied, occupied elite, 
and/or vanquished/defeated, respectively. This actor is the agent for the purposes of the 
model.  
                                                 
116 Because of the variation in this actor, I explicitly identify who the occupier is targeting in each instance 




Enforcement in World Politics: Assumptions of the Model 
The theory builds on four general propositions – anarchy, strategic actors, costly 
nature of power, and uncertainty – to generate a principal-agent theory of international 
politics.
117
 First, the international system is one of anarchy; it lacks a third-party to 
enforce agreements among states. As a result of the absence of a higher authority, states 
must be concerned with advancing their own interests and maintaining their foreign 
policy autonomy. Both goals require states to balance the distribution of their finite 
resources in relation to the pursuit of the benefits of their interests in matters of foreign 
policy.
118
 As such, states do not value occupying territory for the sake of occupying 
territory. If states could, they would likely prefer to create commitments without 
engaging their limited resources in costly enforcement measures to insure their preferred 
peace.
119
 Under anarchy, however, states have no alternative but to enforce their own 
interests and hence, such costly actions can become necessary.  
Second, states are strategic, future-oriented actors in that they make rational 
calculations based on available information regarding the current and future intentions of 
                                                 
117 For a brief, yet insight introduction to the Principal-Agent Model, see Samuel Bowles, Microeconomics: 
Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 249-257. For more 
technical discussion on the differences between Moral Hazards and Adverse Selection in the Principal-
Agent Model, please see Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic 
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Chapters 13 and 14 specifically. For an overview of the 
principal-agent model and its applications in political science, see Gary J. Miller, “The Political Evolution 
of Principal-Agent Models,” Annual Review of Political Science  8 (2005): 203-225.  
118 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John J. 
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); Charles L. 
Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
119 This assumption is similar to the one made through the literature on bargaining and war, though applied 
to military occupations. For example, see James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 
International Organization 49 no. 3 (1995): 379-414; and H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The 
Causes of War Termination and the First World War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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other actors in the system.
120
 States purposefully take actions, weighing out the cost-
benefit analysis before making a choice. Their actions should follow in line with their 
interests; that is no actor will knowingly take an action that will undermine her position 
given the available information. In terms of the actors in the model, I assume that the 
occupying power is rational unitary actor. That is, I hold constant the possible domestic 
implications of their actions. I am not contending that domestic politics is unimportant, 
but instead the argument developed here focuses on the international aspects of a 
principal-agent relationship. On the elite side, I assume that the actor has one eye on the 
international aspects of events and another on her political position at home.  
Third, a military occupation remains a fundamental exercise in the power to bring 
the defeated in line with the preferred postwar agenda of the victor. The occupier has 
imposed the occupation as a means to limit the elite’s possible responses to the former’s 
demands. This exercise of power is, however, an act of costly enforcement.
121
 The act is 
costly to both the occupier in terms of the resources spent to enforce its interests and to 
the occupied if terms of autonomy as well as resources denied. The occupier has to 
commit resources – troops, equipment, logistics, etc. – to controlling foreign territory. 
Constraining the authority and power of another actor requires serious investments and a 
number of potential risks that could greatly increase the costs of the operation while 
                                                 
120 Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,” International 
Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 187-212. 
121 Following along the lines of Bowles and Gintis concerning contested exchange models, enforcement 
here is assumed to come at the expense of the occupying power given that it has no recourse to a third 
party. See, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, “Contested Exchange: Political Economy and Modern 
Economic Theory,” The American Economic Review 78, no. 2 (May 1988): 145-150; Samuel Bowles and 
Herbert Gintis, “The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political 




simultaneously diminishing any tangible benefits.
122
 The occupier has to be able to incur 
the costs of occupation, as the elite might not immediately make a commitment or the 
nature of the commitment is such that it will take time to fully mature. The costs of the 
operation, then, must remain lower than the costs the occupier is willing to absorb in 
order to accomplish its goal. The costs incurred by the occupying power must also be 
lower than the costs to the occupied elite in order to continue the occupation. Otherwise, 
it loses the advantage of holding the territory as leverage. Furthermore this constraint on 
the elite likely has diminishing returns for the occupier power given that the costs rise 
over time and the possible returns from the occupation, while potentially increasing, more 
than likely remain static and diminish in comparison. 
To the occupied elite, the occupation has denied them access to some or all of its 
territory. More importantly, the occupation has denied it the authority to govern that 
territory and its resources. That undermines the elite’s ability to pursue its political 
ambitions given that it lacks some or all of its authority to enact its preferred policies.
123
 
For its part, the occupied elite would prefer not to have an army of occupation stationed 
on its soil, and interfering with its affairs. Instead, the elite would rather pursue its own 
interests domestically as well as internationally without a foreign presence attempting to 
pressure them into costly decisions following a military defeat. In effect, the military 
occupation is a constraint on the elite’s decision-making to limit its autonomy to engage 
                                                 
122 The costs of direct rule are generally considered to be high by most scholars in international politics. 
See, for example, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), and David A. Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1999). 
123 Even if the occupation only holds a fraction of territory, it still represents a threat as the occupying 
power has an established foothold from which to pursue further incursions if necessary. In that way, the 
occupation becomes a form of signaling via sunk costs. See James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy 
Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997): 68-90. 
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in its agenda in order to influence it towards favoring the victor’s peace. Yet, that 
constraint in and of itself does not reveal whether the elite have adverse intentions 
towards the occupier’s goals. It is these intentions of the elite that will lead them to select 
policies that could undermine the goals of the occupying power.   
The final assumption concerns the role of uncertainty in military occupations. I 
assume both the occupying power and the occupied elite are uncertain of each other’s 
intentions.
124
 The occupied elite are uncertain as to whether the occupying power, in a 
position of authority and superior capabilities, will take advantage of their weakened 
position now to enforce demands that diminish their ability to pursue independent 
political agendas in the future.
125
 Occupying powers confront the occupied elite as first 
and foremost political actors with their own goals and agendas, as noted previously in the 
introduction as a central dilemma for establishing the peace. However, the occupier does 
not know the type of elite it is dealing with in regards to the latter’s intentions towards 
the former’s goals.
126
 Whether dealing with an established elite or a newly imposed 
leadership, the occupier does not know if the occupied have intentions to seek 
alternatives that are advantageous to their agendas but detrimental to the former’s 
postwar peace.
127
 Even in the presence of a foreign power controlling territory, 
                                                 
124 Paul Seabury, and Angelo Codevilla, War Ends and Means (New York: Basic Books, Inc.. 1989), 243-
244. 
125 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1979): 167-214; 
Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40, no. 1 (1986): 
1-27; Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).  
126 Robert W. Rauchhaus, “Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazards, 
Adverse Selection, and the Commitment Dilemma,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2009): 871-
884. Careful selection of the elite a priori is difficult and not always possible in military occupations. This 
is especially so in cases where new elites emerge, or are imposed, to lead a defeated country.  
127 In typical PA Models, the principal is concerned with the agent shirking, which is often defined as the 
agent doing ‘nothing’ rather than fulfilling their contract terms. I agree with Meier and Hill that the real 
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opportunities can and will emerge for the elite to use for its own political advantage. For 
the purposes of the model, I assume that all elites are adverse to the peace, though they 
vary between weak, moderate, and strong in terms of opposition.  
In model, then, uncertainty plays an important role in how the occupying power 
decides to interact with the elite in order to establish its preferred peace. As Andrew 
Kydd notes, “Uncertainty is typically represented in game theory by establishing different 
types of players and giving other players probability estimates over these types.”
128
 I 
contend that the specific form of an occupier’s uncertainty reflects its probability estimate 
over the type of elite it believes that it is dealing with during an occupation. The 
particular form of uncertainty represents the occupiers’ prior beliefs about the conditions 
under which that type of elite will comply with its demands. That prior belief about the 
likelihood of compliance from the elite will influence its selection for a particular 
strategy of control.
129
 An occupier’s uncertainty can take one of three forms.
130
 The first 
form of uncertainty is fear: that is the elite have unfavorable intentions and will act on 
them, if not today then possibly tomorrow, to undermine the occupier’s interests. The 
expectation is that the elite will not comply if given the choice. The second form is 
                                                                                                                                                 
problem is “that the agent will act more than the principal seeks.” (However, I disagree with those authors 
that such actions undermine the utility of the PA model.) The problem in military occupations becomes one 
of constraining the occupied elite to comply with the occupier’s goals. See Kenneth J. Meier and Gregory 
C. Hill, “Bureaucracy in the Twenty-First Century,” in The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, eds. 
by Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E. Lynn Jr., and Christopher Pollitt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 60. 
128 Andrew Kydd, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” World Politics 49, no. 3 (1997): 374. 
129 Charles Glaser has made a similar argument concerning how the intentions of an adversary would likely 
lead a state to adopt differing policies in the security dilemma. See Charles L. Glaser, “Political 
Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” World 
Politics 44, no. 4 (1992):497-538. 
130 This idea that the source of uncertainty varies comes from Rathbun, who identifies the nature and role of 
the concept for the leading theories of international relations. See, Brian C. Rathbun, “Uncertain about 
Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations 
Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2007): 533-557. 
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indeterminacy: the elite’s intentions are open to the possibility of change. The occupier 
expects that the intentions of the elite are malleable, and through a process of 
reinforcement, can be altered to create a shared interest in the victor’s peace.
131
 The final 
form is ignorance: the occupying power does not know the elite’s intentions towards its 
preferred peace. The occupier imposes the occupation to enforce its measures and to 
determine whether the elite will commit to its demands. I will further elaborate on how 
the sources of uncertainty are reflected in the occupier’s actions when discussing the 
strategies of control.  
Selection, Costly Compliance, and the Principal-Agent Model in Military Occupations 
War is the bargaining phase of international conflict. As Carl von Clausewitz so 
aptly noted, states pitch their armies against one another in an effort to continue their 
politics by other means.
132
 Once the fighting stops, states can survey the battlefield to 
judge their military victories. While the combat between the armies might be over, the 
states involved can still harbor conflicting interests and divergent expectations regarding 
the postwar era. The war has not necessarily settled the political issues at stake.
133
 
Instead, the victor has created an opportunity to enforce its preferred peace against the 
vanquished. Following hostilities, the victor is the only actor concerned with fulfilling its 
                                                 
131 Rathbun, “Uncertain about Uncertainty,”, 550. 
132 Carl von Clausewitz, On War Trans. by Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
133 Here I note that wars may end in a limited or total outcome, and still result in a military occupation. That 
is expectations about further fighting might converge between the participants as a result of information 
revelation or one combatant might pursue total victory due to commitment concerns for the fighting to end. 
States will still impose a military occupation, regardless of these distinctions. On convergence, see R. 
Harrison Wagner, “Bargaining and War,” American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 3 (2000): 469-484 
and, on absolute outcomes see Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).  
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goals, and it must now consider whether its former opponent will commit to its preferred 
peace. While the defeated power has lost the contest of military strength, its leaders can 
still resist the winning state’s demands in the postwar era. Even if the opponent agrees to 
a treaty immediately following the termination of hostilities, a victorious state that has 
strong doubts over the former’s commitment will not leave the establishment of its peace 
to ink and parchment alone.
134
 Leaders are not likely to assume that all agreements 
reached following interstate wars will be self-reinforcing, no matter how strong the 
stipulations or how decisive the victory.
135
 The choice, then, is whether to impose an 
army of occupation on foreign territory to insure the victor’s peace. Successfully 
enforcing its preferred peace, however, is likely just as difficult if not more so than 
winning the war. 
Figure 1 illustrates the selection process for states deciding to impose military 
occupations and the subsequent interaction with the occupied elite. At the initial node, a 
state has to decide whether an occupation is necessary to enforce its demands upon 
winning the war. The advantages to imposing an occupation can be immense for the 
victor in achieving its postwar goals. As Frederick Herman noted, “Occupation of all or 
parts of the defeated power’s territory supplied the means by which the powers could put 
                                                 
134 Winning the war, even an absolute war, does not solve the commitment dilemma for states in a system 
of anarchy. It does, however, present an opportunity to do so via a military occupation. On the commitment 
dilemma in international politics, see Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,”; Robert Powell, “War as 
a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006): 169-203; and Reiter, How Wars 
End.  
135 For a defense of the terms of the agreement, see Virginia P. Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements 
and the Durability of Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and for the influence of decisive 
victories on the peace, see Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” International 
Organization 59, no. 2 (2005): 261-292.  For an empirical rebuttal to Fortuna’s primary findings regarding 
the durability of peace agreements and corroborating evidence for Werner and Yuen, see Nigel Lo, Barry 
Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter, “Ensuring the Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace 
Duration,” International Organization 62, no. 4 (2008): 717-736. 
71 
 
[its] policies into effect even if they had been unable to have them written into the peace 
treaty or agreements.”
136
 However, such operations constitute a costly exercise of power 
further drawing on the finite resources of the state to increase the expenses already 
incurred by fighting the war. The cost of losing the occupation is the failure to develop 
the benefits of the postwar peace in line with the occupier’s goals in addition to the 
squandered resources on the war. Winning the peace, then, should result in a substantial 
benefit to a state that offsets the price it paid for a military victory in a war and the 
subsequent occupation when it suspects that the elite will not commit to its goals. Hence, 
victorious states are only likely to impose military occupations when they are uncertain 
regarding the elite’s intentions towards fulfilling their demands. Given that the victor is 
uncertain over the intentions of the defeated, the military occupation presents an 






                                                 
136 Frederick Herman, “The Victors and Vanquished: The Quest for Security as Illustrated by Three Allied 
Occupations of Territory of the Defeated Power – France, 1815-1818, Germany, 1918-1929, and Germany 
1945-,” (PhD diss., Tufts University, 1954), 3. 
137 Following the advice of Schultz and others, the theoretical argument endogenizes selection effects by 
theorizing on the prior beliefs that lead a victorious state to impose an occupation on its opponent. For a 
discussion on the utility of theorizing on prior beliefs and selection effects, see, Kenneth A. Schultz, 
“Looking Audience Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 1 (2001): 32-60. Also see, Vesna 





The victor (V) moves first by capturing the opponent’s territory and imposing the 
occupation if it is uncertain regarding the intentions of the elite (E) in committing to its 
peace.
138
 In doing so, the occupying power offers the occupied elite its terms and adopts a 
strategy to influence the elite‘s behavior towards accepting its peace. The selection of a 
strategy is how the occupier attempts to achieve its preferred postwar goals. The 
strategies of control reflect the means as well as the costs that the occupier power is likely 
to endure to fulfill its goals.
139
 Though military occupations are frequently viewed as 
instances of might makes right, the extent to which a state achieves right is dependent 
upon whether the occupied elite comply with its demands. The occupied elite can and 
                                                 
138 Otherwise, the victor reaches an agreement with the defeated and enjoys with fruits of victory without 
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will likely take actions that affect the payoff to the occupying power. In order to succeed, 
the occupying power has to ‘hire’ the occupied elite to assist in accomplishing its postwar 
goals. In a single shot game, the occupier needs sufficient control to wield it effectively 
over the occupied while it waits for the credible commitment to its agenda. In multiple 
iterations of the game, the occupying power might break the desired commitment into 
several ‘pieces’ that the elite have to fulfill throughout the duration. The occupier would 
have to maintain sufficient control over the elite to continue to influence them towards 
accepting the victor’s peace across the each phase.
140
 The occupied elite then have to 
choose between pursuing policies that favor their political intentions and further their 
political agendas (also referred to as non-compliance), or collaborating with the occupier 
and complying with its demands for the postwar peace (compliance).
141
 If the elite choose 
to not comply, the occupying power has to decide whether to abandon the project, or 
enforce its demands depending on the further costs it will incur. In turn, the elite will then 




In the choice over whether to comply with the occupying power, the elite’s 
intentions play a large role in the decision-making to pursue their own political agendas. 
                                                 
140 It is possible that across each iteration, each smaller choice accumulates, building on the previous one, 
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tactics as described by Schelling to outright defection of the elite. See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and 
Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), on salami tactics. 
142 After the elite’s second instance of non-compliance, the occupier would have to decide on whether to 
abandon the operation or to enforce its interests. I only include two periods of interaction between the 
occupier and the occupied in the game to simplify its presentation.  
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The elite’s intentions are influenced by the costs that are likely to be incurred from 
complying with the occupier’s demands. In addition to the loss of autonomy and policy 
implementation, all occupations place some demands upon the occupied elite that affects 
their calculations for choosing between compliance and non-compliance. The benefits 
that the occupier expects are the costs of compliance that the occupied elite must accept. 
That is, the commitment to the victor’s peace places the elite in a position to suffer losses 
that they would not otherwise incur so that its former opponent might reap the rewards. 
Following Figure 1, when the elite comply with the demands of the victor’s peace they 
are assenting to pay a price to their political agenda as a result of losing the war.  
Though these costs vary across each case in terms of how much the elite will 
suffer, both the occupier and the occupied recognize that these costs are visible to 
domestic and international audiences. As Thomas C. Schelling has noted, “It is that the 
very act of compliance – of doing what is demanded – is more conspicuously compliant, 
more recognizable as submission under duress, than when an act is merely withheld in 
the face of a deterrent threat.”
143
 The elite cannot hide their compliance with the demands 
of an occupying power, and as a result, the costs they anticipate incurring from 
complying with a foreign state’s demands affect their adverse intentions towards the 
peace.  
The costs of compliance and their interaction with the occupied elite’s intentions 
are only partially visible to an occupying power during the course of a military 
occupation. The occupier is of course familiar with its demands upon the occupied elite 
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as these constitute their national interests that they are enforcing through the 
occupation
144
, though how the elite will react to these demands remains a source of 
uncertainty. Alexander L. George notes, “…the strength of the opponent’s motivation not 
to comply is highly dependent on what is demanded of him.”
145
 The demands made by 
the occupying power might encourage the elite to favor non-compliance given the 
possible costs they might incur to their interests, and the possibilities that emerge for 
opportunistic behaviors.
146
 By complying with the occupier’s demands, the elite might 
diminish the resources of the state by costing it valuable territory, populations, or 
industrial resources.
147
 Such demands directly affect the resources available to elites, 
challenging their capacity to pursue their political agendas now and in the future, thereby 
increasing their favorability towards non-compliance.
148
 Furthermore, the elite might 
have incentives to pursue policies that preserve their political power institutionally. If the 
elite can, they might resist broad domestic institutional changes that would limit their 
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access to political office, or twist those changes to fit their political needs which result in 
detrimental outcomes for the occupying power. The elites might owe their political 
position to the occupying power, yet that debt does not serve as an obligation to sacrifice 
their own interests.  
There are additional costs of compliance that also influence the decision-making 
of the elite related to, though separate from the demands by the occupying power. 
Compliance with the occupier’s demands might affect the occupied elite’s reputation and 
political standing. Complying with the demands might give the appearance of being 
‘puppets’ to domestic and international audiences, thereby reducing the elite in stature. 
Allies might expect the elite to resist the demands placed before it, and following the 
occupier’s demands might undermine their security relationship. Adversaries might see 
compliance as a demonstration of the elite’s vulnerability, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of future challenges and threats to the occupied territory. Domestically, the 
elite will likely face charges of ‘collaboration’ with a foreign enemy from friends and 
foes alike. Though the occupied elite might frame their efforts as ‘shielding’ the nation 
from further aggression, their supporters and any domestic opposition will see such acts 
as more self serving to the elite’s political survival.
149
 The costs paid to end an 
occupation will likely reflect on the elite’s political record for the remainder of their life, 
if they survive the fall from office.  
The occupying power will attempt to anticipate when its demands will encourage 
non-compliance from the occupied elite. This strategic anticipation will lead the 
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occupying power to take steps to influence the costs of compliance. The occupying power 
recognizes that the elite have their own interests, but the former remains uncertain as to 
whether the elites have incentives to act on those interests in a way that is detrimental to 
the victor’s peace. That is why occupying powers adopt a strategy of control to manage 
the elite’s intentions towards the peace. The strategies represent the efforts of the 
occupier to use its position to manipulate the elite’s choice between compliance and non-
compliance in addition to representing its willingness to enforce its interests when 
necessary. It is the strategy of control that will influence whether the occupation results in 
a success, or failure. 
Power, Risk-taking, and the Strategic Nature of Costly Control 
States select into occupations to gain compliance with their postwar demands 
when they are uncertain of the elite’s intentions towards the peace. Without knowing the 
elite’s intention, the occupier has to rely on the costly exercise of its power to gain a 
credible commitment from the former in favor of the latter’s interests.
150
 How states gain 
that compliance is based off the strategy they select for influencing the elite during the 
occupation. The initial uncertainty that drives states to impose military occupations also 
influences their strategy selection for engaging with the occupied elite, and therefore how 
they exercise their power to enforce their aims. States initially select a strategy of control 
based on what they believe will be the response of the elite in complying with their 
                                                 
150 Power here does not necessarily refer to the military force involved in the occupation specifically. I 
conceive of power in terms of the policies adopted by the occupier in relation to the occupied elite in order 
to influence their behavior into making a credible commitment. The necessary military force, then, varies 
accordingly to each strategy and the goal intended. For a discussion on how capabilities do not translate 
into compliance, see Robert Jackman, Power Without Force: The Political Capacity of Nation-States (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).  
78 
 
demands. These prior beliefs shape whether the occupying power allows the elite some 
authority over relevant political decisions and the means of influence used to alter their 
decision-making. Depending on the strategy selected, the occupier can reduce the 
chances of the elite to unilaterally alter its policy in a way unfavorable to the victor’s 
interest, or acting in a manner to subvert former’s preferred peace.
151
  
Given its uncertainty over the elite’s compliance, the occupier is attempting to 
influence them away from acting on their intentions to the detriment of the former’s 
peace. In essence, the occupier wants to shape the decision-making of the elite to favor 
compliance while simultaneous discouraging non-compliance. The occupying power 
wants to structure the choice set of the elite in such a way as to “… [likely] deny B the 
opportunity to [choose] alternatives that would undermine A’s interests were they to be 
adopted” while improving the chances of gaining its preferred peace.
152
 That includes 
eliminating the status quo from the choice of options, and establishing that set of choices 
that will constitute compliance with the occupying power’s aims for the postwar era.   
The victorious state accomplishes this through its strategy of a control. These strategies 
of control can alter the elite’s calculation for choosing between compliance and its 
political agenda by demonstrating the costs that the occupier is willing to bear and the 
measures it will implement to enforce its interests. Most importantly, the strategy selected 
by the occupying power can determine what choices the elite will have during the course 
of the occupation in relation to the former’s political objectives. The occupier can 
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constrain the possible options available within the set such that the elite have limits on 
how they can respond, and that those responses will distinguish between the types of elite 
that will comply from those that will act on their unfavorable intentions.  
In structuring the possible choices for the elite, the occupier will establish that the 
termination of the occupation is conditional on elite’s behavior in complying with the 
former’s demands. That is, the occupier sets the end of the occupation upon the decisions 
taken by the elite in fulfilling the former’s goals, especially in regards to making a 
commitment to the postwar peace. That structuring of the decision for and conditioning 
the occupation’s termination on a commitment puts the occupied elite in a unique 
position. The elite can change the outcome of the occupation for the victorious state 
given that success of the operation will depend on their decision on whether to comply. 
As a consequence of being able to influence the outcome of the occupation, the elite are 
also in a position to influence the costs incurred to the occupier as well as themselves 
depending on their responses to the latter’s demands. Given the elite’s position to 
influence the costs and subsequently the outcome of the occupation, they have incentives 
to act on their adverse intentions that will be damaging to the victor’s peace. Without 
knowing the elite’s intentions and their interaction with the costs of compliance, the 
occupying power is undertaking a risk in allowing the former some influence in the 
establishment of its preferred peace. 
The risk here is that the elite might attempt to exploit its position whether through 
an open defection with the demands of occupying power or a subtle exploitation of the 
opportunities to further its goals. Two strategies are worth noting here: misrepresentation 
and delaying tactics. The first strategy employed by the occupied elite focuses on their 
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attempts to misrepresent their capabilities and interests to the occupying power to 
diminish the losses incurred as part of the war and occupation.
153
 In misrepresenting their 
capabilities, the elite purposively play on their position as being materially weakened 
such that they want to ‘intimidate’ the occupier into diminishing any costs imposed by 
the victor’s peace, or improving their access to potentially available resources.
154
 
Specifically, the elite are either seeking a reduction in the costs of they will incur through 
compliance (such as reduction in reparations or reimbursements), or alternatively, an 
increase in expenditures by the occupying power (such as more aid). The elites will 
justify these actions to the occupying power based on their ‘weakened’ positions that 
materially hinder their abilities to meet the demands made by the latter. With intentions, 
the occupied elite attempt to use a shared perception or interest with the occupying power 
as a means to gain a better deal than the one currently being pursued by the latter.
155
 The 
elite play on the notion that the shared interests requires a more balanced approach by the 
occupier, and to convince the latter actor that continuing to pursue its demands can 
sufficiently harm any benefits that the two could gain from a more equal relationship. 
This strategy might prove especially attractive to the elite if a third party represents a 
threat to themselves and the occupier that they can effectively play on as a challenge to 
the victor’s peace. Both types of misrepresentation are attractive to the elite, especially 
since they constitute a form of ‘cheap talk’ that can pay high dividends and will likely 
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incur low costs if recognized as possibly detrimental to the interests of the occupying 
power. 
The second strategy is also particularly attractive option for the elite: to engage in 
a costly delay on making a commitment to the occupier’s demands. Delaying the 
commitment can be costly to the occupying power for two reasons. First, by delaying the 
termination of the occupation, the elite increases the occupier’s time spent not accessing 
the spoils of winning the war. Second, a delay in making the commitment increases the 
costs to the occupying power, and thereby could increase the risk that those costs will 
exceed what it is willing to endure to achieve its peace.
156
 Increasing the costs to the 
occupier might cause it to lower the demands, thereby decreasing the costs of compliance 
to elite, or to simply leave without fulfilling its objectives. However, such a delay will 
also require that the elite bear further costs to their own political interests as the 
occupation endures. The effectiveness of such a tactic depends heavily upon the elite 
generating sufficient costs for the occupier to consider a withdrawal without the latter 
retaliating with its own measures in response to the former’s non-compliance. 
Such risky measures require that the occupier increase the costs of the occupation 
to itself, and thereby to the elite as well, to insure that the latter cannot undermine its 
interests. First, the occupier has to maintain sufficient control to enforce its demands 
against the elite, as failing to do so would undermine its position. The victor’s strategy 
will likely reflect the costs it is willing to incur and measures it will implement during the 
occupation to achieve its goals. The strategy, then, can serve as an indicator of the latent 
coercive power that a victorious state could wield against the elite if necessary to insure 
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that its demands are met.
157
 Second, the occupier has to anticipate that the occupied elite 
will engage in non-compliance to some extent. Whether via a defection or salami tactics, 
the occupying power has to expect that the occupied elite will attempt to undermine the 
former’s preferred goals in favor of pursuing the latter’s interests. The occupier then has 
to be prepared to enforce its interests. The elite may decide against being compliant, and 
if that occurs, then occupier has to take action otherwise it risks losing the peace.  
The occupier’s strategy also establishes the means of influence that it will use 
during the operation to manipulate incentives of the occupied elite to make a commitment 
to the victor’s peace. The occupier has to convince the elite that it will engage in coercion 
against the latter if and when necessary, ranging from a stern message enforcing that the 
occupied elite undertake certain measures to threatening and removing the elite from 
power who are undermining its interests.
158
 These acts are not likely to seem ‘benevolent’ 
to the occupied elite, but the occupying power has to adhere to its position and the costs 
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incurred in the occupation can make those threats credible.
159
 Alongside the coercive 
measure, concessions from the occupying power can be useful in offsetting some of the 
costs of compliance to the elite by making the decision for agreement more palatable 
though still costly to their interests. Any concessions granted by the occupying power 
should not place its interests in a precarious position but should grant the elite further 
incentives to comply with its demands. Mixing the use of both threats and cooperative 
measures is essential to gaining a commitment to the victor’s preferred peace. As Eric 
Carlton notes, “Control is usually achieved by a combination of force which induces 
compliance and persuasion.”
160
 Neither incentives nor threats alone will likely be 
sufficient to compel elites to fulfill the occupier’s demands. The occupying power will 
likely require the means to encourage compliance as well as discouraging non-
compliance. Hence, the combination of these measures is more likely to effectively 
manipulate the incentives of the elite to favor compliance and increase the chances of 
success for the achieving the occupier’s goals. 
Control, Commitments, and Agents’ Information 
For the occupier, then, the advantage in increasing the risks of the occupation is 
gathering consequentially valuable information on the elite’s intentions to comply with 
its preferred peace. As Terry Moe has noted, the power of an agent in the principal-agent 
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model is the information they possess and their attempt to use that ‘power’ to influence 
the principal’s decisions.
161
 In the context of military occupations, the elite will vary in 
their hostility towards the peace. In a few instances, the elite’s intentions become known 
via their open resistance to the demands of the occupying power. In the majority of cases, 
the occupied elite will likely try to alleviate itself of some or all of the demands made by 
the occupier, especially when the elite anticipate high compliance costs. That is why the 
occupying power has to compel the occupied elite into making a choice on complying 
with their preferred terms. Compliance will result in losses for the occupied elite that they 
would prefer not to incur if possible. The greater the costs associated with compliance, 
the more the elite might resist making any commitment to the occupier’s demands. In 
part, the elite recognize that if they comply with the terms of the occupying power, the 
losses they incur as a result will be difficult to undo once the occupation is over and 
hence their compliance will turn into a commitment to the victor’s peace that will be 
difficult to break. Given their adversity towards incurring these costs, the decision on 
compliance is an expensive one for the elite to make, and one that they will likely not 
undertake without the right amount of pressure to forgo their political agenda. In order to 
succeed, then, the victor wants to use its strategy against the elite to diminish their power 
by compelling them to decide on whether to comply, as their response would allow the 
occupying power to gather information and to evaluate their intentions while establishing 
its peace.  
The occupier accomplishes this through its costly exercise of power by shifting 
the decision for compliance back to the elite. The choice for whether to comply with the 
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victor’s demands becomes voluntary on the part of the occupied elite, in that they have to 
decide their response to the occupying power’s demands. By allowing the elite some 
capacity to make decisions, the occupying power is taking a risk that the elite might 
choose against its interests in order to assess the latter’s intentions. However, the benefit 
of shifting the decision to the occupied elite is two-fold. First, as James Morrow has 
noted, “Giving other actors power is a common way to make a credible commitment to 
them. If one actor is worried that another will not honor a commitment, giving the first 
some power over the outcome can be sufficient to assure that actor of commitment.”
162
 
That is, allowing the occupied elite some narrow, constrained margin of choice can 
effectively serve as a measure of strategic restraint or reassurance that the occupier will 
adhere to the commitment if the elite make the choice that coincides with its preferred 
peace.
163
 This act might encourage some elites towards favoring compliance if they 
expect that the occupier will not subsequently alter the deal by increasing its demands. 
Second, the choice set on the victor’s peace must be sufficiently constrained such that 
when the elite decide either in favor of, or against, compliance it will constitute an 
informative signal to the occupier about the latter’s type.
164
 A cheap decision, or a non-
decision, will provide no information regarding the elite’s intentions. An order to act on 
the victor’s peace, however, can effectively separate those likely to execute the 
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occupier’s demands from those who are likely to act on their intentions. By the limiting 
the possible options and compelling the elite to make a choice, the occupier’s strategy 
should allow it to determine whether elites will commit to its peace. 
Those elites with intentions favoring compliance will follow the demands of the 
occupying power. The less-adverse elite might not like the limited choices presented by 
the occupying power, but risking their positions is less preferable. The argument does not 
imply that compliant elites merely accept the demands of the occupier as mere puppets. 
Rather, these elites will likely select out of riskiest options in terms of resisting the 
demands of the occupying power, and are likely in favor of more restrained attempts to 
influence the occupation. The compliant elites might continue to pursue changes in the 
occupier’s demands that favor their political agendas, and are more likely to attempt 
small measures to test the occupier’s limits. When confronted, however, this type of elite 
is also likely to back down and comply with the demands of the occupier rather than 
suffer any serious consequences. The more-adverse elites will favor non-compliance, and 
attempt to undermine the victor’s peace when presented with the choice. Though the 
occupier has likely incurred increasing costs to bear this risk, the occupied elite will act 
on their hostile intentions for two reasons. First, given that the decision is a costly, such 
elite would engage in measures to resist making the decision set forth by the occupying 
power to evade the commitment demanded of them. Second, these elite might anticipate 
that their non-compliance will be too costly for the occupier to bear, and that their actions 
will undermine the occupation.  
The prime advantage to this costly exercise of power in structuring the choice set 
and shifting the decision to the elite is that the victor can effectively screen the agents for 
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any adverse intentions. The screening occurs by compelling the agent to choose between 
complying with the occupier’s demands, and accepting the losses that come with it. That 
is, the costly exercise of power to control foreign territory should result in an increase in 
the amount of information available to the occupying power to evaluate the agent’s 
intentions towards compliance. The occupier will gather information regarding the 
behavior of the elite as it likely knows the actions they take. The occupying power still 
has to evaluate those actions in light of its goals, and attempt to assess the possible 
intentions of the elite towards accepting their peace. Theorists of strategic interaction 
have long recognized we cannot simply infer the intentions of an actor from observing 
her behavior. This is especially true since multiple preferences might lead to the same 
action, or alternatively, the action observed is part of a larger game in which this single 
choice is the best option available to reach another goal.
165
 Hence, behavioral signals can 
constitute noisy indicators of the elite’s intentions towards the victor’s peace.
166
 This is 
especially complicated as many elites have incentives to criticize the actions of the 
occupying power to play to domestic and international audiences. Though such 
complaints are likely cheap talk, it complicates the evaluation of the elite’s actions and 
inferring their intent as well as the consequences in relation to the postwar objectives.
167
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That is why the occupying power that compels the elite to make a decision on accepting 
the victor’s peace is usually more successful, as it effectively pursues a separating 
equilibrium that allows it to distinguish among the possible types of elite. As Andrew 
Kydd points out, “in separating equilibrium one ends up with beliefs that are, on average, 
more likely to be correct than the prior beliefs one had before observing the behavior.”
168
 
The information is imperfect, but across the duration of the occupation such signals can 
accumulate and provide the occupying power with sufficient information to confidently 
evaluate the elite’s intentions towards its preferred peace. An occupier can accomplish 
this separation through the strategy it uses against the occupied elite. 
Autonomy & Influence: Strategies of Control as Power 
Here, I develop the strategies of control that occupying powers may use during an 
occupation to gain a credible commitment from the elite. Each strategy varies along two 
possible dimensions. First, the authority available to elite to make decisions over political 
affairs that might affect the outcome of the occupation. The second dimension is the 
means of influence employed by the occupying power to persuade the elite to comply 
with its demands during the course of the occupation. Across the two dimensions, three 
possible strategies emerge for an occupying power to select from when dealing with the 
elite: dominating, accommodating, and dictating.
169
 Each of the three strategies 
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corresponds to a particular form of uncertainty on the part of the occupying power as 
discussed in the assumptions of the model section. Here I will explain how the source 
uncertainty for an occupying power, as its prior belief on compliance, links to a particular 
strategy, and describe how that strategy works across the two dimensions. In the next 
section, I discuss how each of the three strategies affects the outcome for the victor’s 
postwar peace. 
For a dominating strategy, the underlying uncertainty for the occupying power is 
fear: the elite have adverse intentions and will act on them, if not today then possibly 
tomorrow, to undermine the occupier’s interests.
170
 The occupying power likely assumes 
that the elite will not comply with its goals if given the choice and therefore, the state 
presents relatively few opportunities for the occupied to make a decision. Operating 
under such a belief, the occupier minimizes the authority of the elite concerning the 
outcome of the occupation while acquiring significant control over the occupied territory 
so that it can act on its own initiative in an almost unilateral manner to accomplish its 
objectives. If the elite are needed to assist in implementing policies, the occupier likely 
uses threats or coercion to motivate them into compliance. Additionally, the occupier 
using dominating strategies will make no attempts to compensate the elite for the costs 
they incur in complying with the former’s demands. Concessions might seem 
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unnecessary or suggest weakness to the elite, thereby encouraging their non-compliance 
with the victor’s peace. The occupier might offer trivial concessions to the elite, as long 
these measures have no bearing on the course of the occupation. During the German 
Occupation of the Crimea, the local Tatars wanted autonomy to manage their affairs. The 
army officials granted them the ability to form committees, but specifically withheld all 
authority over political affairs that might interfere with the former’s occupation.
171
 
Additionally, in the course of a dominating strategy, the occupying power likely escalates 
its control, diminishing the capacity of the elite to govern as the occupation endures. For 
example, in the British Occupation of Egypt, the administration increasingly grew in 
terms of its responsibilities to reform the country’s institutions. In essence, the 
dominating strategy attempts to minimize the occupied elite’s ability to interfere with the 
occupier’s postwar goals. 
For the accommodating strategy, the underlying source of uncertainty for an 
occupier is indeterminacy: the elite’s intentions are open to the possibility of change and 
through a ‘process of reinforcement’ they will come to favor the victor’s peace.
172
 As 
David Edelstein notes in regards to accommodation strategies, the occupying powers 
attempt to ‘co-opt’ elites into the operation.
173
  The occupying power sets out its demands 
and then offers cooperative assurances or concessions to the occupied elite as incentives 
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to fulfill its goals. By offering rewards and incentives for compliance, the occupying 
power expects that the elite will be induced, or persuaded, into making the commitment 
that it seeks.
174
 Timothy Crawford has explained this logic behind accommodation as 
“…making of concessions, or taking steps that compensate or credit the adversary’s 
interests, for sake of improving relations or sidestepping conflict.”
175
 The occupier also 
shifts authority back to the elite, likely expecting that they will enforce its interests as 
necessary.
176
 The occupier might expect that the occupied elite will have fewer incentives 
to act against the occupation if they are involved in the project. Furthermore, 
accommodation strategies lack any coercive element that might target the elite to 
influence their behavior. In 1864, Napoleon III relinquished a significant portion of 
political authority over to Maximilian upon his ascension to Emperor of Mexico. In doing 
so, Napoleon expected that Maximilian’s actions would further their shared goal of 
establishing a new government in Mexico that would be friendly to French interests in the 
Americas.
177
 An accommodating strategy then places few restraints on the occupied elite 
while employing cooperative measures to gain their compliance during the course of the 
military occupation. 
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With a dictating strategy, the underlying source of uncertainty for an occupying 
power is ignorance: it does not know whether or how such individuals will comply with 
its demands to establish the peace.
178
 Given that the occupier does not know the 
intentions of the elite, it sets out to compel their compliance towards a preferred peace. 
The occupying power stipulates the terms to the occupied elite, and takes a firm stance 
that the elite must decide on whether to comply with the former’s demands. Unlike 
dominating strategies, the elite have some authority to make decisions that can affect the 
outcome of the military occupation. The elite have a limited autonomy to decide on 
whether to comply, and on how to fulfill the commands set out by the occupying power 
during the course of the occupation. Unlike accommodation strategies, though, the 
occupying power is compelling that decision from the elite. The occupier is essentially 
issuing orders to the elite to conform to its preferred peace then waiting for the elite to 
respond to these demands. The occupier then responds to the occupied elite in kind with 
its means of influence, by granting concessions when compliant, enforcing when needed, 
or making threats when non-compliant. By establishing that the use of its means of 
influence is contingent on the elite’s actions, the occupying power attempts to 
simultaneous manipulate the elite’s incentives towards favoring compliance while 
diminishing the attractiveness of non-compliance.
179
 When the elite comply with its 
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orders, the occupier might grant a concession for such actions. Non-compliance, 
however, will be met increasing levels of coercion, ranging from an occupier further 
pressuring the elite to comply up to the occupying power threatening to and removing the 
elite from political office. The Allied Occupation of France described in the introduction 
is an excellent example. The Allied Powers wanted a politically stable France under a 
Bourbon king, yet the regime had quickly collapsed when Napoleon returned from exile 
in 1815. When the allies captured Paris in July, they eventually restored the Bourbon king 
to the throne, but this time imposed a military occupation across northern France. Rather 
than accept promises that the regime would consolidate its reign over the country, the 
Allied Powers sought to enforce it while collecting reparations for their losses in the War 
of the Seventh Coalition. The Allied Powers wanted a government that the French 
population would support and would be amicable to their international interests without 
further fears of revolutionary uprisings. The occupier uses a dictating strategy to compel 
the elite to a decision on whether to comply with the victor’s peace during the occupation 
while making contingent use of concessions and threats on manipulate the latter’s 
behavior.  
Strategies, Costs, and the likelihood of the Victor’s Peace 
Previously, I discussed the strategic interaction of occupying power to 
successfully compel the elite to accepting the losses associated with the victor’s peace. 
The above section has set out the three strategies of control that the occupying power can 
select from when imposing the military occupation on foreign soil. Each of the three 
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strategies varies in terms of how the occupying power will use its costly exercise of 
power to influence the elite, and whether it will result in successfully establishing its 
preferred peace. Here I address how these exercises of power influence the decision-
making of elite between favoring compliance and non-compliance, and the likelihood that 
the subsequent outcome of the military occupation will favor the victor’s peace. 
With a dominating strategy, the occupying power has likely assumed the worst 
case scenario for the postwar peace – the elite will never comply with the demands. The 
possibility of changing intentions in the future has driven the occupier to dismissing 
information that might suggest that the elite would adhere to the former’s postwar 
goals.
180
 Rather than risk including the elite, the occupying power assumes control over 
the territory and sets about fulfilling its aims. Under a domination strategy, the occupier 
is not compelling the elite to accomplishing its goals by granting them any type of choice. 
Instead, the occupier removes that choice when selecting its strategy in order to minimize 
its uncertainty, and subsequently attempts to unilaterally impose its goals. The occupier 
assumes that the elite refrain from acting against its demands given the power and threats 
the former employees towards the latter in the occupation. If the occupier wants to 
succeed, then, it has to continually bear high costs to maintain its position relative to the 
elite given its expectation that those individuals will not comply if allowed the choice. 
The problem is, that the superior advantage is costly to maintain. As Robert Gilpin has 
noted, “[dominating] …requires the existence of a continuing economic surplus…it 
becomes more difficult to generate sufficient revenues to cover the protection costs, and 
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the protection costs themselves increase over time.”
181
 That is, the costs of managing 
foreign territory constantly increase over time while the occupying power might not 
receive sufficient benefits to cover the expenses that it incurs.  
Elites suffer severe restrictions on their autonomy, especially over any decisions 
that might affect the goals of occupation. The heavy constraint on the elite reduces their 
capacity to pursue their political agendas, and to possibly compromise the goals of the 
occupier. The elite only have incentives to comply as long as the occupier retains a 
superior position relative to them. During the course of the occupation, this reliance on 
capabilities to dominate the elite likely results in one of two responses, which result in a 
similar outcome. First, the weakly and moderately adverse elite comply with the demands 
of the occupying power for fear of suffering the consequences of non-compliance. For 
weak and moderately adverse elites, there is no assurance that the occupier might abide 
any terms imposed. The severity of restrictions on their autonomy likely diminishes these 
types of elite’s likelihood of compliance with the peace once the occupation ends.182 
Second, the highly-adverse elite comply since there is no cost commitment to make on 
their part, but they also take advantage of possible opportunities to undermine the 
occupier if/when these instances emerge. With both types of elites, the high costs of 
compliance incurred during the occupation will contribute to their overturning the peace 
given that the occupier fully imposed these upon them. Unless the occupier can 
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unilaterally maintain the costs, it is likely that the occupied elite will opt for other 
arrangements when the opportunity emerges and abandon the victor’s peace when the 
operation terminates. Dominating strategies, then, are likely to be self-defeating for an 
occupying power to manage its relations with the occupied elite, and should increase the 
chances of failure for establishing a commitment to the victor’s peace. 
Accommodation strategies are not much better in achieving the victor’s peace. 
The occupier’s prior beliefs likely suggest that the elite’s type is potentially receptive 
towards favoring compliance, and committing to the postwar peace. As intentions of the 
elite are malleable, they will come to favor and actively support victor’s peace as their 
shared interest through a process of reinforcement. By granting the elite autonomy over 
some areas of policy-making, the occupier attempts to signal its benign intentions and 
assure its commitment to their decisions.
183
 The occupier also attempts to structure the 
choice set such that the exchange of concessions and cooperative measures increase the 
elite’s favorability toward compliance and makes a commitment to the victor’s peace an 
attractive option.
 184
 As result, the occupier likely expects to incur fewer costs enforcing 
its interests upon the elite for two reasons. First, the occupier might not anticipate the 
elite’s defiance in committing to its terms given that the former expects that the latter will 
likely share a similar interest in the establishing peace. Second, the occupier might expect 
that the elite, being persuaded that the peace is in their interests, will contribute their 
finite resources to insuring a successful outcome for the occupation. Therefore, the 
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occupying power expects that it will have to invest fewer resources into the occupation 
itself in order to succeed, and consequently does so during the operation. This argument 
is not to suggesting that the occupation will be inexpensive. Rather, that the occupier 
anticipates that the elite will use their own resources to contribute to furthering the 
occupation’s goals and subsequently reduce the necessary investment of the former’s 
resources in order to succeed. 
The problem for the occupying power is that such cooperative assurances leave 
open the possibility of opportunistic behavior on the part of the elite. The incentives 
might diminish the cost of compliance to the elite, and increase the likelihood of favoring 
compliance. However, by restoring the elite to almost autonomous status, the occupier 
has run into the dilemma that they can select and change some policies at their choosing 
to meet their agendas.
185
 The incentives are not enough to guarantee that the elite will 
accept the occupier’s goals without pursuing their own agendas that can undermine the 
victor’s peace. Instead, the assurances likely serve as a signal, encouraging the elite to act 
on their agendas, and to pursue measures that will increase the costs to the occupier. 
Weakly adverse elites might not share the occupier’s goals initially, but the concessions 
and cooperative assurances can alter their preferences to favor the victor’s peace. 
Moderately adverse elite are the dangerous ones. These elites exploit the cooperative 
measures made by the occupier under the expectation that the latter approves of the 
former’s actions, or accepts its policies in relation to the occupation’s goals. For instance, 
leaders can come to depend on the continued support of the army of occupation to 
maintain and enforce their rule rather than spending their resources on institutionalizing 
                                                 





 Strongly adverse elite likely exploit the concessions as well. In either case, 
the cooperative assurances from the occupier suggest to the elite that there are minimum 
consequences for engaging in their agendas, thereby furthering incentivizing its behavior. 
When the elite engage in opportunistic behaviors that have detrimental effects for the 
occupations, the costs of the operation can quickly escalate beyond the initial 
expectations of the occupying power. The occupier is then confronted with the choice of 
either devoting further finite resources to the occupation to establish its preferred peace, 
or to abandon the project all together at a substantial loss. The unanticipated costs to save 
the operation dissuade the occupier from remaining, and subsequently accommodating 
strategies contribute to the failure of occupations.
187
 
With both of the dominating and accommodating strategies, the occupying power 
has some expectations regarding the behavior of elites and how their actions will 
ultimately affect the outcome of the occupation. In dominating the elite, the occupier will 
likely not update its beliefs about the likelihood of compliance. Its strategy does not 
allow the elite an opportunity to demonstrate compliance. Instead, the costly exercise of 
power becomes the primary focus for establishing its peace. In accommodating the elite, 
the occupier can update its beliefs about the likelihood of compliance. However, the 
updating of beliefs occurs as the costs of the occupation subsequently grow as a result of 
the elite’s decisions to act on their interests. That learning process is costly, and most 
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likely leads the occupier to failure. Neither strategy then allows for a separation of the 
possible types of elite that the occupying power might be confronting. Without that 
separation of types, the exercise of power is costly and more likely to fail in achieving 
the victor’s peace.  
An occupying power that uses the dictating strategy against the elite is more 
likely to succeed in military occupations. Dictating strategies work precisely because the 
occupying power uses its costly exercise of power to gain demonstrations from the 
defeated that they will abide by its postwar demands. Rather than holding on to 
expectations of whether the agent will comply, the occupying power takes a risk in 
shifting some authority to the elite and attempts to influence their behavior by compelling 
them to make a choice on the victor’s peace. The dictating strategy accomplishes this 
through a structuring of the elite’s choice set such that they confront a command from the 
occupying power to decide on whether to comply with its demands. Compelling that 
choice via a dictating strategy is important in two respects. First, it gains an acceptance 
from the occupied elite to the victor’s peace. Second, these decisions reveal information 
about the elite’s intentions which the occupier can use to infer whether it will comply 
with the peace after the occupation has terminated. Thus, when an occupying power 
dictates the peace to its former opponent during an occupation, it consequently uses its 
costly exercise of power as a separating equilibrium that divides the types of elite based 
on their adverse intentions. Elites with strong adverse intentions will defect or delay their 
actions on fulfilling the occupier’s demands, even in the shadow of a foreign power 
controlling their territory with a clear advantage in capabilities. Elites with weakly or 
moderately unfavorable intentions will not rejoice at fulfilling the terms demanded by the 
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occupier. This type of elite will still resist the occupier. Yet, when pressed to follow 
through, they will comply with the victor’s peace as it allows them to pursue their 
autonomy in the future while maintaining their political positions now.  
 The occupier further manipulates the options of the elite through its means of 
influence during the occupation, to alter the cost-benefit calculation of the latter to favor 
its preferred peace. The occupying power can make use of concessions, or threats, 
contingent on behaviors that the elites engage in to fulfill the former’s goals. The costs of 
compliance can be steep, and yet, the concessions offered by the occupier can alter the 
incentives for favoring compliance. For weakly and moderately hostile elites, the 
concessions offered can offset some of the costs of compliance, making the option 
somewhat less costly to the elite. Such concessions might allow the elite some options in 
implementing the occupier’s demands, or grant them a measure relative to the primary 
goal that favors their agendas. The possibility of enforcement actions by the occupier in 
also influences these elites, making non-compliance less favorable given the further costs 
that they might incur. For the strongly hostile elite, concessions and sanction actions have 
relatively less affect on their decision-making. Their opposition to the victor’s peace is 
such that they will favor non-compliance and are willing to demonstrate it. 
The dictating strategy does imply that the occupier will have to incur higher costs 
initially in the occupation to influence the behavior of the elite. In the preliminary phases, 
the occupier likely has more extensive concerns on whether it can influence the elite’s 
decision-making, and maintain control over foreign territory. The occupying power has to 
establish a sufficiently strong position to effectively influence the elite when it risks 
granting them some authority to make decisions that can affect the outcome of the 
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occupation. Compelling a choice is difficult and can require an extensive expenditure of 
power to procure the benefits the occupier seeks for the postwar peace. As the occupation 
progresses, the occupier can reevaluate its position and the costs it incurs as a result of 
the operation. A reduction in costs is possible if the elite demonstrate compliance, and 
have made sufficient commitments to the occupier’s goals. The occupying power might 
be able to reduce the costs of the occupation to itself and thereby to the elite as a result, 
under the right conditions. Occupying power should retain sufficient control to insure 
further compliance with its goals, and not risk sacrificing the operation. That implies the 
necessity of being able to respond as necessary to the choices of the elites without 
weakening its position when reducing the costs of the occupation. Hence, reductions in 
costs should depend on the elite signaling their intentions via the actions to continue 
complying with the postwar goals to establish the victor’s peace. This leads to the 
primary hypothesis.  
H1: Occupying powers pursuing a dictating strategy against the occupied elite increase 
the chances of gaining a commitment to their preferred peace 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I develop a principal-agent model to explain how occupying 
powers can influence the decisions of the occupied elite, and ultimately the outcomes of 
military occupations. My theoretical argument focuses specifically on the strategies that 
the occupying power uses to gain its preferred peace from occupied elite. I posit that 
these exercises of power are essential to understanding whether victors can establish their 
preferred postwar peace. The primary hypothesis is evaluated through statistical analyses 
in the following chapter on an original data set of military occupations resulting from 
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interstate wars beginning in 1815 through 2003. In chapter 5, I further evaluate the 
primary hypothesis concerning the utility of a dictating strategy through a case study of 




Chapter 4 Testing the Theory 
 
 The preceding chapter established a principal-agent theory for international 
politics that focuses on the costly exercise of power as the primary means for an occupier 
to successfully compel the elite to adhere to the former’s peace. That costly exercise of 
power takes the form of a state’s strategy of control. This strategy is a link between the 
occupying power’s uncertainty over the occupied elite’s intentions towards the peace, and 
their subsequent interactions during the course of the occupation. The purpose of this 
chapter then is to evaluate the primary hypothesis through statistical analyses concerning 
the occupying power’s strategies of control: that dictating should increase the likelihood 
of successfully achieving the victor’s peace.  
 This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the unit of analysis and then 
operationalize the dependent variable for success and failure in military occupations.  
Second, the chapter explains the independent variables used in the statistical analysis.  
Initially, I explain the coding for occupation aims and strategies of control. Then, I 
proceed to the remaining primary variables of interest that stem directly from military 
occupations, and introduce the control variables for the equations. In the third section, I 
test the principal-agent theory of international politics from chapter 3. The statistical 
analyses strongly support the primary hypothesis of the model: occupying powers that 
dictate the peace to the occupied elite are more likely to gain the compliance with their 
preferred peace, and ultimately succeed in the military occupation. I briefly evaluate 
these arguments further through two plausibility probes: the Chilean Occupation of Peru 
(1881-1883) and the initial phases of the Soviet Occupation of North Korea (1945-1948). 
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The remainder of the chapter interprets the associated independent and control variables 
along aside some historical examples to illustrate the causal effects. 
The Unit of Analysis: Occupying Powers in Military Occupations 
The unit of analysis in the study is the primary occupying power interacting with 
the occupied elite to make a commitment to the former’s preferred peace. Chapter 2 
discussed the criteria for including military occupations in the dataset. When the 
occupation has a single state holding the authority to govern, I include one observation 
for that particular occupation in the analysis. Here, I discuss how I identified the primary 
occupying power when an occupation included more than one state holding the authority 
to govern foreign territory, and whether the dataset has a single or multiple observations 
when the occupation has several states involved.  
 First, I only include states as occupying powers if they held authority to govern 
the territory, and not if they merely provided some assistance in the operations. For 
example, the Allied Occupation of France from 1815 to 1818 consisted of several 
different countries contributing troops to the Army of Occupation, such as Austria, 
Bavaria, Denmark, Hanover, Prussia, Russia, Saxony, the United Kingdom, and 
Württemberg.
188
 However, the four major powers – Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the 
United Kingdom – actually held the authority to govern French territory and made all of 
the decisions regarding the occupation regime. I do not include states that participated in 
an occupation regime – whether by contributing troops, money, or logistical support – 
without acting as a governing authority over the foreign territory. Hence, I do not include 
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Bavaria, Denmark, Hanover, Saxony, and Württemberg as being occupying powers in the 
occupation. Similar examples where I distinguish between occupying powers and 
participant states would be the occupation of Germany, Japan, and more recently, the 
occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 Second, in these cases involving multiple states holding the authority to govern, I 
then decided on whether to include a single observation for a primary occupier or to 
include an observation for each occupying power. In some instances I used a single state 
out of the occupying powers to represent the occupation when the states holding authority 
to govern were primarily cooperating with one another. In other cases, I did not treat the 
parties involved as engaged in a single occupation, but disaggregated the occupation 
according to participants based on the competing nature of parties involved. The main 
distinguishing characteristic between these cases concerns the level of coordination 
among the occupying powers involving their goals and strategies for the occupation.
189
 
The Dependent Variable and the Statistical Model 
The primary dependent variable for the statistical analysis is the outcome of the 
military occupation. The outcome of the occupation captures whether a state succeeded 
or failed to accomplish its intended political goals upon the termination of its status as an 
occupying power. This is a dichotomous measure that is equal to a one (1) when the 
occupying power succeeds, and a zero (0) when it fails to gain its preferred peace. Here, I 
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break down the dependent variable into the two primary categories to explain how I 




I define a success as an occupying power achieving a commitment to its primary 
goals at the termination of the military occupation.
191
 First, identifying success requires 
comparing the goals of the occupying power as established at the initiation of the 
operation to its achievements when the occupation terminates. Focusing on the initiation 
of the occupation allows us to establish the aims without any potential interference that 
might cause the occupier to alter their goals. For instance, the amount of time that passes 
between the initiation and termination of an occupation can vary greatly. As described in 
chapter 2, the shortest occupation is 4 months and the longest runs for 708 months. 
During that time, the occupying powers may raise, or more likely, lower their demands 
on the occupied elite. Second, that commitment may come in the form of a formal treaty/ 
an alliance, new domestic institutions, fulfilled payments, or territory incorporated 
without further immediate military challenges. A successful occupation might combine 
several of those aspects together depending on how the occupier structures it demands 
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Here, I focus primarily on goal obtainment as the main indicator of success and failure. See David A. 
Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,” International Security 24, no. 3 (1999-2000): 
80-107; and David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 3 (2000): 167-182.  
191 For similar approaches on defining success in foreign policy see, Terry L. Diebel, Foreign Affairs 
Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); for military 
interventions, see, Patricia L. Sullivan, Who Wins? Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed 




and what guarantees it insists on when terminating the operation. In order to be included 
as a success, then, the commitments made by the occupied elite must meet the demands 
of the occupying power.
192
 
The operationalization of the dependent variable here focuses on whether this 
success is achieved at the termination of the occupation by the primary occupying power. 
I do not attempt to evaluate whether the goals of the occupation endure past the 
termination of occupation.
193
 In the successful cases, the occupying state terminates the 
occupation when it has fulfilled the goals and the occupied elite have made a decision to 
comply with the postwar peace. At that point in time, following the information available 
to it, the occupier has succeeded in compelling its preferred terms from the occupied 
elite. If future events, i.e., activities that occur after the occupation, influence a change in 
commitment that goes against the occupying power’s interests, I do not use that change to 
                                                 
192 Some scholars might contend that I need to account for cost when defining success, in order to identify 
what David A Baldwin has referred to as ‘pyrrhic victories’ in foreign policy outcomes. Unfortunately, 
evaluating the cost of a military occupation is not that simple, especially in comparison to a political goal 
(Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,”, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,”). 
The political goals of an occupying power do not easily translate into monetary figures that we can then 
compare on a scale to determine whether it found a bargain or a money pit. For this point, see Arnold 
Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1962), 106;  David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old 
Tendencies,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979); 161-194. Only in a rare case can we actually present 
estimates and final costs to estimate the disparity between projections and expenditures. For example, 
initial estimates put the cost of the war with Iraq in the $50 billion to $60 billion range. In total, the Costs of 
War project argues that Afghanistan, Iraq, and related long-term economic expenses from these conflicts 
have cost the United States approximately 3,102 billion dollars from 2001 to 2013. On the initial estimates 
for Iraq, see, Elisabeth Bumiller, “Threats and Responses: The Cost; White House Cuts Estimate of Cost of 
War with Iraq,” The New York Times, 31 December 2002; and “Summary Costs of War in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan,” Costs of War. (2011), Accessed on 21 November 2014, Available from 
http://costsofwar.org/article/economic-cost-summary.  
193 As an assurance on my coding, I note that all of the cases that I have identified as successes endured for 
at least one year past the termination of the military occupation. Sullivan uses a similar metric for the 
outcomes of limited wars. See Patricia Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States 
Lose Limited Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 3 (2007): 510.  
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judge the occupation as a failure. To do so, would raise questions regarding how we can 
account for future activities as causing failure in past outcomes?  
As researchers, we can encounter several difficulties such as causality and 
hindsight bias when attempting to evaluate the outcome of an occupation based on events 
that occur after its termination. Both of these problems complicate any judgments 
concerning what the occupying power knew and whether it should have anticipated such 
actions given the available information at the time. The issue of causality suggests that as 
time passes between the termination of the occupation and the any future alteration in the 
commitment the less attenuated the influence of the occupation upon that subsequent 
change. Hence, one cannot code an alteration in the future as affecting the prior outcome. 
Too many extraneous factors can account for modifications to the victor’s peace as the 
amount of time between the end of the occupation and the actual violation increases. For 
example, one cannot assert that the Allied Occupation of France failed in 1818 because 
Prussia occupied French territory again in 1871. In a case like the occupation of Cuba in 
1898 and again in 1906, we have to address a number of counterfactual questions, such as 
whether the occupier could have anticipated the events leading to the second occupation, 
and whether those events resulted from some policy failure from the first occupation. 
More importantly, would the occupying power have terminated the occupation in 1902 if 
it foresaw the re-occupation in 1906?   
Furthermore, when evaluating the outcome of a military occupation one must 
always be careful of hindsight bias. We know what happens after the termination of the 
occupation while the decision-makers involved lack that knowledge for whatever reason. 
If those decision-makers perceived themselves as succeeding, and the historical evidence 
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supports their perceptions that the occupation met their primary goals, then we should 
evaluate that case as a success. Otherwise, we risk reinterpreting history in a way that 
makes for ‘odd reading,’ as noted by Robert Powell in the context of rationalist models 
and the termination of wars.
194
 In light of these concerns, I focus on evaluating the 





Two types of failure are relatively easy to identify: unilateral withdrawal and 
forced exit. In a unilateral withdrawal, the occupying power leaves the territory without 
gaining any commitment from the occupied elite that provides a guarantee of the 
former’s interests. The occupying power is not under any immediate coercive pressure to 
leave, but instead has decided that the costs of staying are too high and exits from the 
occupied territory. Some might refer to a unilateral withdrawal as an abandonment. An 
example of a unilateral withdrawal would be the recent exiting of the Israel from the 
Gaza Strip in September 2005.
196
 In a forced exit, the occupying power leaves the 
territory when its military can no longer maintain their position due to increasing 
coercive resistance from either an internal or external armed force. Here, the occupying 
power is under coercive pressure to leave. In the majority of cases that constitute forced 
                                                 
194 Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006): 169-203. 
195 That is not to say we cannot evaluate whether the goals of the occupation endure past its termination. 
Instead, I argue that is a distinct dependent variable from the outcome of a military occupation that requires 
a separate theoretical and empirical analysis.  
196 I recognize that there is some debate as to whether Israel actually terminated the occupation of the Gaza 
Strip in September 2005. I side with the scholars who argue that the occupation has terminated (See some 
of the sources cited for the case in favor of this argument). I do so because the conceptualization I 
discussed in chapter 2 also suggests that the occupation terminated in September 2005. 
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exit, the occupying power has fought and been defeated by an opposing army. Many of 
the German occupations in both Western and Eastern Europe would constitute examples 
of a forced exit. In both cases, the occupying power has failed to obtain a commitment to 
its interests when the occupation terminates.  
The more difficult cases to evaluate as failures are those that constitute partial 
compliance. In a case of partial compliance, the occupying power terminates the 
occupation with some commitment from the occupied elite in regards to the former’s 
preferred peace. The occupier has achieved some of its goals but fails to gain the full 
commitment. In these cases, the occupying power has likely confronted either the 
problem of increasing costs and marginal returns, or a mismatch in strategy in managing 
the elite. In either case, the occupier has had to lower its goals for the occupation given 
that it cannot achieve its original aims without significantly increasing the costs it will 
incur. In these cases, then, the occupying power has incurred greater costs as a result of 
the occupation than previously expected.  Rather than leave empty handed, the occupier 
makes due with a more limited commitment that meets some of its goals. For the 
empirical analysis here, I consider cases of partial compliance to be failures given the 
costs incurred in fighting the war, and subsequently establishing an occupation on foreign 
territory. 
Since the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of success and failure, I 
use a probit estimator to test the primary argument between an occupier’s strategy of 
control and the occupied elite’s decision to comply with the victor’s peace.
197
 There 
remains a concern, however, with the methodological issues that result from a process of 
                                                 
197 Expected Percentage Correctly Predicted comes from Michael C. Herron, “Postestimation Uncertainty 
in Limited Dependent Variable Models,” Political Analysis 8, no. 1 (1999): 83-98. 
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strategic interaction. The fundamental criticism is this: that the outcomes we observe are 
the result of strategic choice, thereby making the observations censored and complicating 
any efforts that attempt to directly examine the costs associated with going off the 
equilibrium path.
198
 The result is that our statistical findings are more than likely wrong 
given that the estimators used – such as probit – cannot sufficiently account for this 
process.
199
 The literature presents us with two options for addressing these problems. 
First, one could adopt an econometric technique to account for censored observations and 
strategic interaction. A typical estimator for international relations would be a Heckman 
two-stage equation. However, a number of the independent variables used here – such as 
the strategies of control, reimbursement, etc. – are endogenous to a military occupation. 
In the first stage of a Heckman equation, these variables would be either strongly and 
positively, or even perfectly, correlated with the initiation of a military occupation 
because these variables only occur when a military occupation is imposed. Without 
significant variation, the estimator would likely not converge, and any results produced 
would be highly questionable for theory testing. 
In this project, I follow the second approach: I devise a theory that incorporates an 
occupier’s prior beliefs into the argument, and then derive the hypothesis concerning the 
outcome of military occupations by assuming the presence of selection bias.
200
 Here, I 
                                                 
198 Kenneth A. Schultz, “Looking Audience Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 1 (2001): 32-60.  
199 For example, see, Curtis S. Signorio, “Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International 
Conflict,” American Political Science Review 93, no. 2 (1999): 279-297; Alastair Smith, “Testing Theories 
of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation,” American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 4 
(1999): 1254-1283; and James D. Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” International Interactions 
28, no. 1 (2002): 5-29. 
200 Vesna Danilovic, “Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
45, no. 1 (2001): 97-125.  
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concur with Edelstein that the sample of military occupations that result from interstate 
wars constitutes a set of hard cases.
201
 As I contend, states impose occupations when their 
beliefs lead them to suspect that the possibility for compliance is low. Given the partially 
observable nature of the elite’s intentions and the varying effects of the costs of 
compliance, this approach is particularly well suited for indirectly testing their 
relationship to the strategies of control and the outcomes of military occupations.
202
 
Furthermore, these concerns over strategic interaction and partially observable costs are 
mitigated when the statistical analyses are paired with the use of plausibility probes and 
case studies, as I do here and in chapter 5.  
Primary Independent Variables 
 Here, I explain the details for coding the primary independent variables to test the 
primary hypothesis, and also the information collected on additional variables of interest 
to the study of military occupations. The original independent variables for the analysis 
are: control strategies, occupation aims, reimbursement, reimbursement sans extraction, 
extraction, civilian coercion, insurgency, and duration of the occupation. The information 
to code each of these eight independent variables comes from the source materials listed 
with each occupation in the case appendix.  
Control Strategy – Dominating, Accommodating, and Dictating: The previous 
chapter identified three strategies that occupying powers may adopt in pursuit of gaining 
                                                 
201 David M. Edelstein, Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupations (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2008), 9-10. 
202 Schultz, “Looking for Audience Costs,”; Patricia L. Sullivan and Scott S. Gartner, “Disaggregating 
Peace: Domestic Politics and Dispute Outcomes,” International Interactions 32, no. 1 (2006): 1-25; 
Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes,” Who Wins. 
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a commitment from the occupied elite to their preferred peace: dominating, dictating, and 
accommodating. In dominating, the occupier minimizes the decision-making authority of 
the elite regarding the primary issue at stake, and likely uses threats when necessary to 
motivate them to implement its preferred policies. In some cases of dominating, the 
occupying power will unilaterally make decisions without attempting to motivate the elite 
to implement any policy. In accommodating, the occupier allows the elite to have or 
regain significant authority over the issue at stake, and offers concessions, or cooperative 
measures, to gain the commitment of the elite. To be sure, the elite still have to 
implement the former’s policies. Yet, the occupier tries using honey to gain that 
compliance than vinegar. The occupier does not completely sacrifice its position of 
authority as it likely withholds control over security issues. Otherwise, the occupier 
allows the occupied elite to manage the settlement of the peace. 
 In dictating, the occupier allows the elite some authority over the issue at stake, 
and holds its response with either concessions or threats contingent on the actions of the 
elites to make its preferred commitment. The occupying power establishes the goal it 
wants to accomplish, and the presses the elite to make a decision on implementing an 
action that would fulfill that goal. The elite’s actions will influence how the occupying 
power responds with either threats or concessions.  The key difference from domination 
is that the occupying power is compelling the elite to take actions that would fulfill its 
peace. The key difference in comparison to accommodating is that the elite are still 
significant constrained in their decision-making and no concessions are immediately 
forthcoming without meeting some criteria as demanded by the occupier. 
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 In order to identify which strategy an occupying power adopted, I examined 
numerous secondary histories and some primary documents that detailed the plans of the 
leaders in pursuing military occupations. I looked for two pieces of evidence in order to 
decide which strategy was adopted by an occupying power: 1) the amount of decision-
making the elite would have in the outcome of the occupation, and 2) the means of 
influence adopted by the occupying power. Of the two criteria, the means of influence is 
the more difficult to capture. The theoretical model suggests that unless elites are 
especially resolved, they will likely select into compliant behavior to avoid any possible 
repercussions when an occupier employees a dictating strategy. That makes it especially 
important to look at how occupying power structured their demands in terms of whether 
their use of influence was contingent on actions of the occupied elite. I also examined the 
evidence for whether the occupier had any suspicions or expectations regarding the 
behavior of the elite. This information is as not as crucial to coding the strategies, but it 
can help distinguish one approach from another in the coding decisions.  
Then, I examined the interactions of the occupying power and the elites across the 
course of each military occupation for evidence in favor of one strategy as compared to 
the others. I coded which strategy an occupying power employed based on this 
information relative to the initiation of the occupation. In some occupations, states do 
alter their strategies. However, as the theory stipulates, which strategy an occupier selects 
at the beginning of the occupation will likely affect subsequent interactions between the 
occupier and occupied elite during the course of the operation. Following that argument, I 
established which strategy the occupying power led off its interactions with the occupied 
elite based on my evaluations of the historical sources and texts available in the case 
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appendix. Each measure is a dichotomous variable equal to one (1) if a state pursues that 
particular strategy, and zero for the other two. In the statistical analysis, I included the 
dictating and accommodating strategies in the model while excluding the dominating 
strategy as the comparison category.  
Occupation Aims: In my research, I identified five possible aims for military 
occupations from 1815 through 2003: reparations, change in policy, foreign imposed 
regime change, state creation, and territorial gain.
203
 Here, I briefly describe each one. 
Reparations constitute the collecting of expenses incurred to the occupying power as part 
of the war as well as any damages inflicted on it as part of the fighting with the defeated 
state’s army. Change In Policy is forcing the occupied elite to renounce certain policy 
options and choices made prior to the initiation of the occupation. Foreign Imposed 
Regime Change
204
 comprises both changes in the leadership of a country and alterations 
to the domestic institutions of the government.
205
 State Creation involves creating a new 
                                                 
203 Initially, I coded all aims sought by an occupying power, and then selected the primary aim from that 
list. As part of this collection, I also collected information on treaty enforcement and disarmament as 
occupation aims. Though occupying powers pursued disarmament in twenty-four of the occupations in the 
dataset, it is rarely the primary goal and more often a secondary or tertiary goal. Hence, I do not include 
disarmament in the final coding of the occupation aims variable. I collapsed the aim for treaty enforcement 
into the aim for change in policy as only a handful of cases fit the description of the former. In all of those 
cases, the occupying power wanted the occupied elite to change their policy to meet the obligations as set 
forth in a prior agreement. 
204 I also compared my coding of foreign imposed regime change with five other datasets. See, John M. 
Owen, IV, “The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions,” International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002): 
375-409; Nigel Lo, Barry Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter, “Ensuring the Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime 
Change and Postwar Peace Duration,” International Organization 62, no. 4 (2008): 717-736; Henk E. 
Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, & Giacomo Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political 
Leaders,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 2 (2009): 269-283; Melissa Willard, “Making Friends Out of 
Foes: The Logic of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change,” (PhD diss., University of California, 2011); and 
Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change 
Rarely Leads to Democratization,” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 90-131. 
205 Recent scholarship has sought to further distinguish among the possible types of FIRCS, including 
installing new leaders, restoring old leaders, and establishing new domestic institutions. In my research, I 
found it difficult to distinguish among the possible categories. Frequently, the occupying power pursues 
more than one of these subcategories during a FIRC. For instance, both Austria and France sought to 
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state with the territory coming from either a former colony/protectorate or an established 
state to start a new unit in the international system. Finally, Territorial Gain consists of 
an occupying power seeking to incorporate the ownership rights of part or all of the 
occupied territory. Following the theoretical argument, the final variable is a 
dichotomous measure equal to one (1) when the highest aims of the occupying power 
constitute either a foreign imposed regime change, the creation of a new state, or a 
territorial gain at the initiation of the military occupation.
 206
 
Extraction: The extraction strategy captures when the occupying power removes 
resources – such as agricultural products, industrial equipment, produced goods, natural 
resources, etc. – from the occupied territory without providing any compensation to the 
population or the elites for what they take. A strategy of extraction is distinct from an 
indemnity. In the majority of cases, the indemnity is paid to the occupying state through 
some direct monetary means, i.e., cash, gold, silver. In some cases, a state did pursue the 
collection of an indemnity as well as a policy of extraction from the occupied territory, 
such as the Soviet Union in East Germany after World War II. In these incidents, the 
extracted resources are usually taken as compensation for damages suffered during the 
course of an invasion and occupation (in this instance, Germany’s multiple occupations 
on various Soviet territories). Furthermore, an extraction strategy goes above and beyond 
                                                                                                                                                 
restore the pope to his throne in the Papal States in 1849. Both states also sought to entice the Pontiff into 
making several institutional changes as well. The Papacy, however, rejected their incentives as interfering 
with his authority to govern. Capturing this FIRC as a leadership change misses planned, but failed, 
institutional changes. 
206 Some scholars might contend that paying reparations constitutes a form of exploitation and/or resource 
drain on the occupied country similar to taking territory or expropriating industrial equipment for a war 
effort. That is one possible interpretation, but it makes something of false comparison. Money is a fungible 
asset that the leaders can pay now through a variety of means and replace later in most cases. Loses in 
territory, raw materials, and industrial equipment are less fungible and extremely costly to replace, 
especially with regards to the first two. For a discussion on fungible nature of money, see David Baldwin, 
“Power Analysis and World Politics.” 
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compensating the military force stationed within the territory for the costs it incurred, and 
is pursued separately from reimbursement costs. States pursuing extraction policies are 
more likely taking advantage of their position as an occupier to exploit the natural and 
industrial resources under their control to further their gains from the war. In the dataset, 
this is a dichotomous measure equal to one (1) when the state pursues extraction as a 
strategy. 
Reimbursement & Reimbursement sans extraction: A state pursues a strategy of 
reimbursement when it requires that the occupied pay for the costs incurred in 
maintaining troops on foreign territory in addition to any other expenses that might result 
from the occupation. For the project, I focus on reimbursement strategies as both a direct 
monetary payment by the occupied elite to the occupying power and/or governmental 
agencies providing resources and provisions necessary for the troops. I excluded 
requisitions where the occupying power pays, or takes, supplies from local merchants and 
civilians in the occupied territory. I have included two versions of this variable to 
differentiate between two possible uses of reimbursement strategies during the course of 
a military occupation. The first instance suggests that reimbursement of occupation costs 
should increase the likelihood of compliance from the elite. The second instance, 
however, suggests that the use of an extraction strategy along with a reimbursement 
strategy might suggest that the occupying power is exploiting its position on occupied 
territory. In these cases, the occupying power is likely more concerned about the gains it 
can capture during the occupation, and less likely about influencing the elite. Therefore, I 
created two versions of this variable for the statistical analysis. Both variables are 
dichotomous measures. For the first variable, I code a one (1) when the primary 
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occupying power employees a reimbursement strategy at the initiation of the occupation 
on foreign territory.
207
 This first measure captures all instances of an occupier imposing 
the occupation costs on the occupied territory. For the second variable, I code a one (1) 
when the primary occupying power charges for the occupation costs without pursing an 
extraction strategy. This second measure captures those instances where the occupier is 
more likely using the costs to influence the elite, and less likely to be exploiting the 
territory for material gains. 
Duration: This variable measures the duration of the occupation from the month 
it initiated until the month that it terminated.  
Controlling for The Occupied Population 
 The primary focus for the dissertation has been on the occupied elite as an 
essential and understudied element in explaining how victorious states can establish their 
preferred postwar peace. When discussing military occupations, however, one cannot 
overlook the occupied population as a separate actor that can also influence the outcome. 
It is the specter of nationalism among the occupied population that can pose a serious 
threat to the occupier’s attempts to compel elites. Previous scholarship has identified 
nationalism as a powerful force that can unify and motivate individuals into making 
costly sacrifices to defend their homeland from foreign invaders.
208
 Unfortunately, there 
is no direct measure to control for the latent nationalistic tendencies of a population, and 
to approximate when a conflict will emerge. Here, I contend that the occupied population 
                                                 
207 I only code as a one (1) if the occupying power charged for the reimbursement of its occupation costs 
during the actual occupation. If the occupying power sought reimbursement after the termination of the 
occupation, I did not include that in the coding.  
208 For example, Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
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is a relatively neutral actor, one that is neither hostile nor supportive of the occupation of 
its territory, though they would slightly prefer no occupation to the presence of foreign 
troops. They might remain a neutral actor during the course of an occupation, and thereby 
generate no further costs to the occupying power. However, the actions of the occupier 
can influence the tendencies of the population away from such a neutral position and 
towards a more hostile evaluation of the foreign presence. The statistical analysis 
captures this hardening against the occupation in two ways: the use of civilian coercion 
and whether the occupier has to fight an insurgency.
209
 While neither strategy directly 
affects the elite, these two strategies can indirectly increase their costs of compliance 
while creating incentives to act on their more opportunistic preferences, thereby 
decreasing the chances of success. 
Civilian Coercion: A strategy of civilian coercion consists of a state engaging in 
violence against the population living in the occupied territory. Civilian coercion may 
include a number of activities, such as the forced recruitment of men into the occupying 
power’s armed forces, forcible relocation of certain peoples, compulsory/forced labor, 
mass arrests, mass hostage-taking, mass rape, and/or indiscriminate, mass killing of 
                                                 
209 It is important to acknowledge that there is likely some endogeneity between the variables for 
confronting an insurgency and the use of civilian coercion against the occupied population. That is, the use 
of civilian coercion by an occupying power can fuel a population’s incentives against the foreign invader 
by contributing to, or joining an insurgent movement. In addition, when states are fighting an insurgency in 
occupied territory, the population likely becomes a target for more aggressive actions. Targeting civilians 
might undermine the native support for an insurgency, thereby eliminating its base for supplies and such to 
wage a low-cost fight against an occupying power. Hence, the two measures likely influence one another in 
the model and the likelihood of endogeneity subsequently increases. Theoretically, it is important to control 
for both in any model investigating the outcomes of military occupations. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
identify ‘who shot first’ in these cases of civilian coercion and insurgencies in aggregate data analysis. 
Here, I do not attempt to distinguish whether the occupying power targeted civilians before or after an 
insurgency commenced. Instead, I contend that both the strategy of civilian coercion and fighting an 
insurgency during the course of an occupation decrease the likelihood of success. On this difficulty with 
aggregate datasets see, Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence 
from Chechnya,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 (2009): 331-362.   
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civilian populations during the course of the occupation.
210
 In order to qualify for coding, 
I place a few rules on the usage of civilian coercion. First, I only include violence 
directed against noncombatants. Following Alexander Downes, I identify ‘combatants’ as 
“[consisting] of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command 
responsible for the conduct of its subordinates.”
211
 Those individuals lacking membership 
in such institutions and who present no threat of harm to the occupier are treated as 
civilians or noncombatants for coding purposes. Second, the military forces of the 
occupying power must directly engage in the use of coercion against the civilian 
population. I exclude instances of the occupying power having local, or native, forces 
undertake any such measures regardless if they were acting as intermediaries. Third, a 
strategy of civilian coercion must be a sustained effort by the army of occupation that 
affects a sizable portion of the occupied population. Random acts of violence that 
occasionally occur between soldiers and civilians are excluded from the dataset, such as 
brawling, limited arrests, and dispersing protests against the occupying power (unless 
followed by mass arrests, killings, etc.). Fourth, a strategy of civilian coercion must have 
some support – whether openly acknowledged or tacitly communicated – from the 
                                                 
210 For a similar definition on civilian victimization, see, Alexander Downes, “Desperate Times, Desperate 
Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War,” International Security 30, no. 4 (2006): 156-157. 
Also see, for example, Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, “Draining the Sea”: 
Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 375-407, for a definition 
on mass killing of noncombatants. I do not, however, include as part of the civilian coercion strategy a 
precise number for what constitutes mass killing. Furthermore, I exclude curfews, limitations on freedom of 
assembly, speech, and collective fining from the list of coercion as many occupying powers use these 
strategies during the course of an occupation to control the population. For a defense of these strategies as 
deterrents to insurgencies, see Melissa Willard-Foster, “Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: 
Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany and Japan,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 40, no. 
1 (2009): 33-56. 
211 Downes, “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures,” 157. I do exclude violence against prisoners of war, 
even though their ability to inflict harm may be severely limited.  
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leaders of the state.  In the dataset, this is a dichotomous measure equal to one (1) when 
the state pursues civilian coercion as a strategy against the population. 
Insurgency: The second measure to capture the possible dangers of nationalism 
focuses on whether the occupying power had to fight an insurgency during any portion of 
the occupation. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson have established a dataset of 
counterinsurgency efforts by states from 1808 through 2002, defining insurgencies as:  
… a protracted violent struggle by nonstate actors to obtain their political 
objectives – often independence, greater autonomy, or subversion of existing 
authorities – against the current political authority (the incumbent). Two rules for 
defining a case where chosen. First, we imposed a minimum 1,000 battle death 
inclusion rule, with at least 100 casualties suffered on each side. Second, the 
nonstate actor must have adopted a guerrilla warfare strategy. Here, guerilla 
warfare is defined as a strategy of armed resistance that (1) uses small, mobile 
groups to inflict punishment on the incumbent through hit-and-run strikes while 
avoiding direct battle when possible and (2) seeks to win the allegiance of at least 




This is a dichotomous measure equal to one (1) when the state has to fight against 
an insurgency at any point during the occupation. The data on insurgencies comes from 
the code book for Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson’s work.
213
 
                                                 
212 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in 
Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 70.  
213 Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines,” in particular their code book for the project. I made a 
few changes to the coding scheme: first I add some insurgencies as detailed from Appendix A on interstate 
wars. Second, I include the extra-state conflicts in Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (since 2003). Scholars 
disagree on whether these conflicts constitute civil wars or insurgencies. For example, Peic and Reiter code 
both as civil wars. Resort to War and Valentino et al capture these two conflicts as insurgencies, or extra-
state wars. More than likely both conflicts have characteristics meeting the criteria for an insurgency and a 
civil war. See Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul K. Huth, and Sarah Croco, “Covenants without the Sword: 
International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War,” World Politics 58, no. 3 (2006): 339-
377; Goran Peic and Dan Reiter, “Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, State Power, and Civil War Onset, 
1920-2004,” British Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (2011): 453-475; Meredith Sarkees and Frank 




Military Forces: This variable measures the overall military personnel available 
to an occupying power. I use the information on military personnel for a state during the 
last year of the war and the initiation of the occupation. The data for this variable comes 
from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset.
214
 I expect that the 
greater the military resources available to a state, the more likely it is to succeed in 
compelling the elite to comply. 
Alliance Partners: States occasionally engage in military occupations with the 
help of their wartime allies. Alliance partners can reduce the costs of the occupation by 
distributing the necessary investment of resources among those involved, thereby freeing 
up some of each state’s limited resources for other projects. Allies can also increase 
available manpower and resources in order to enforce the postwar goals during the course 
of the occupation. Thus, bringing in allies could improve the overall course of the 
occupation by reducing the costs to the occupying powers while maintaining or even 
increasing the costs to the occupied elite. The price for including allies in the occupation, 
however, is not in material costs but rather in the risk of creating substantive 
disagreements over the pursuit of their interests. When alliance partners share the 
authority in governing foreign territory, each one involved brings her interests to the table 
regarding the peace.
215
 That creates two problems for succeeding in a military 
                                                 
214 J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer & John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power 
War, 1820-1965,” in Peace, War, and Numbers ed. by Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 
1972), 19-48; and J. David Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities 
of States, 1816-1985,” International Interactions 14, no. 2 (1987): 115-132.  
215 In the context of a principal-agent model, the inclusion of more than one principal can complicate the 
contract given that each could have differing interests. Typically, PA models assume that the principal is a 
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occupation. First, conflicting interests among allies will create internal disagreement over 
the aims of the occupation and how to enforce their interests, likely resulting in concerns 
over costly entanglements in ventures that have little to no benefits for the allied powers 
involved.
216
 Second, these disagreements among the occupiers over aims and strategies 
are often visible, especially to occupied elite. In turn, elites might try to exploit these 
disagreements to their advantage. For these two reasons, I expect that having alliance 
partners share in the authority to govern decreases the likelihood of compliance from the 
elite. To capture this variable, the alliance partners of the primary occupying power must 
share in the authority to govern the foreign territory, as described previously in the unit of 
analysis section. The data on alliance membership is from the Alliance Treaty and 
Obligations Project (ATOP).
217
 I code as a one (1) when alliance partners have joined the 
primary state in managing the occupation.  
Domestic Institutions – Democracy:  Since previous scholarship has found that 
democracies are more likely to win the wars they fight, the expectation here is the 
democracies should also be more likely to compel the peace they enforce. Democratic 
states, then, should be more successful in gaining a credible commitment from occupied 
elites in military occupations.  The literature has several mechanisms for explaining why 
democracies are more effectively at winning wars, ranging from the influence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
unified actor. For a brief discussion of this assumption, see Gary J. Miller, “The Political Evolution of 
Principal-Agent Models,” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 205-206. 
216 Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Tongfi Kim, “Why 
Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States,” Security Studies 20, no. 3 (2011): 350-377. 
217 Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara M. Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, “Alliance Treaty 
Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944,” International Interactions 28, no. 3 (2002): 237-260. 
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elections when selecting conflicts
218
, to the leaders engaging less rent seeking
219
, and to 
the ability of democracies to provide material capabilities for war.
220
 The statistical 
analysis presented here does not focus on the relationship between domestic politics and 
the outcomes of military occupations. Hence, I do not attempt to parse out which of these 
three mechanisms explains why democracies might perform better in military 
occupations as compared to all other types of domestic regimes. I simply accept the basic 
proposition that if democracies are more likely to win the war, then they might be more 
likely to win the peace. The data for this variable comes from the Polity IV Project.
221
 In 
the analysis, I use a dichotomous measure for Democracy. On the Polity scale of -10 to 
10, I code all states scoring 6 and above as democracies. 
Identity: I created a dichotomous measure to capture whether the occupying 
power was of a different racial or religious background from the occupied population that 
it governed. The coding of this variable was based on a comparison of general 
racial/religious heritage of the state in control of the occupation regime to the 
racial/religious heritage of the majority of the population residing in the occupied 
territory. The expectation here is that differences in religious or racial identities may lead 
to conflicts between the occupying army and the occupied population. In terms of racial 
                                                 
218Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,” American Political Science 
Review 92, no. 2 (1998): 377-389; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002). 
219 David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacificists: Democratic States and War,” American Political Science Review 
86, no. 1 (1997): 24-37.  
220 Bruce Bueno de Mesquitia, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of 
Political Survival (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003): Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, 
Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of 
War,” World Politics 56 no. 3 (2004): 363-388.  
221 Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2011: Dataset User’s Manual,” (University of Maryland, College Park, 2012). 
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differences, I include the following as possible racial archetypes: African, Asian, and 
Caucasian. Following previous research, I note that “[major] religions included 
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Shintoism, Hinduism, and a number of different 
major African religious groups.”
222
 For coding of this variable, I relied on the secondary 
historical sources to determine whether the occupied population had a similar race or 
religion to the occupying state’s military forces.  
Huntington’s Civilizations: In his work, Clash of Civilizations, Samuel 
Huntington suggested that emerging conflicts will occur along the fault lines of various 
civilizations across the world.
223
 Here, I examine whether his argument might offer some 
insight into why military occupations succeed, or fail when states impose occupations on 
territory outside of their civilization.
224
 Huntington designated eight civilizations in the 
world: Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and 
Japanese. Based off these civilizations, I created a dichotomous variable that is equal to 
one (1) when the occupying power and the occupied territory are from separate 
civilizations. 
Strategic Rival: If two rivals go to war, then one can assume that the victor of 
such a conflict has a higher level of uncertainty regarding the opponent’s intentions 
towards the peace. Rivals might be more likely to impose occupations to insure their 
preferred outcomes, and they might be more likely to succeed for two reasons. First, 
                                                 
222 Valentino et al., “Covenants without Swords,” 361. 
223 Samuel P. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2011). 
224 Valentino et al, “Covenants without Swords,” and Downes use a similar measure for examining cultural 
differences in targeting civilians during war. Also see Alexander B. Downes, “Restraint or Propellant? 




rivals imposing military occupations might be more likely to adopt more hard line 
policies that require reciprocated cooperation from their opponents.
225
 Second, as the 
costs of waging the war increase for the defeated state, the elite’s incentives from their 
domestic audiences to resist might subsequently decrease and thereby mitigate the likely 
domestic costs of compliance.
226
 The data on strategic rivalries between an occupier and 
the occupied elite comes Colaresci et al.
227
 This is a dichotomous measure equal to one 
(1) when the occupying power and the occupied territory were engaged in a strategic 
rivalry prior to the initiation of the military occupation.  
International Threat: In a system of anarchy, a major concern for states is 
whether an international threat will emerge and challenge their position in occupied 
territory. Third party actors could provide a basis for establishing a more cooperative 
relationship between the occupier and the occupied population if both actors share a 
similar perception of the threat. An international threat, however, could also provide an 
opportunity for the elite to engage in opportunistic behaviors against an occupying 
power. Similar to having allies involved in these operations, the presence of a third party 
actor interested in the occupation might offer incentives for the elite to favor non-
compliance with the occupier’s demands. 
Unfortunately, previous scholarship has not established a definitive measure for 
what constitutes ‘threat,’ especially for quantitative international relations research. 
                                                 
225 Michael Colaresi, “When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and 
Leadership Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 3 (2004): 555-570. 
226 Daniel S. Morey, “When War Brings Peace: A Dynamic Model of the Rivalry Process. American 
Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (2011): 263-275. 
227 Michael P. Colaresi, Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: 
Position, Space, and Conflict Escalation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
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David M. Edelstein’s work also provides relatively little guidance given that he does not 
conceptualize or operationalize what constitutes an international threat in his work on 
military occupations.
228
 Here, I use the strategic rivalries dataset from Colaresci et al. in 
combination with secondary historical research to identify whether a third-party 
constituted a ‘threat’ to the occupation.
229
 I use the strategic rivalry dataset as it 
establishes a conceptual identification of rivalries without relying on conflict density 
measures. Instead, the strategic rivalries dataset uses a more perceptual understanding to 
identify when states view each other threatening competitors.
230
 I used the following 
procedure to identify whether a strategic rival was a potential threat to the occupation. 
First, I identified the list of possible strategic rivals for the occupying power in a 
particular occupation. I only included rivals that had the potential to interfere in an 
occupation, generally based on geographic location. For example, in the American 
Occupation of the Philippines, I noted that Japan was a potential rival given its proximity. 
With the American Occupation of Cuba, I found that the United States had a rivalry with 
the United Kingdom, who still retained territories in the Caribbean. Next, I examined the 
secondary histories from the case list for whether the occupier recognized that strategic 
rival as a likely threat to its primary interest in the occupied territory. Following the 
examples, I found that American officials had concerns regarding the intentions of Japan 
throughout the occupation, but I did not find similar evidence concerning possible British 
                                                 
228 Edelstein, Occupational Hazards.  
229 Colaresi et al, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics.  
230 In international relations scholarship, Stephen Walt’s work on alliances provides a thorough 
conceptualization of the likelihood factors that contribute to identify a threat. The strategic rivalries data 
meets some of the criteria as established by Walt, which is why I use it instead of enduring rivalry data to 
identify possible threats to military occupations. See Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987). 
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interference in Cuba. The variable is a dichotomous measure that I code as equal to a one 




The Empirical Results 
Now, I turn to evaluating the full statistical model. The results in Table 3.1 
provide the full model for the success and failure of military occupations with the 
coefficients for each model in a column with the robust standard errors in parentheses. In 
Table 3.2, I present the predicted probabilities for the relevant independent variables 
based on results from Model 2 in Table 3.1 using the observed value approach to aid in 
the substantive interpretation of the results.
232
 I note here that I found no evidence of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables in these four models, as demonstrated 
by the auxiliary r
2




                                                 
231 In Edelstein’s model, he does propose that the occupying power and the occupied population should 
have a similar perception of a threat. Empirically, it is difficult to establish whether an occupied population 
shared a similar perception of threat to the occupier power. Historical records as to the perceptions of 
populations are often difficult to evaluate, especially given the possible distribution of opinions among the 
various segments. One could focus on the occupied elites to determine whether they shared a similar threat 
perception as the occupying power. This raises theoretical and methodological concerns with Edelstein’s 
work in terms of shared threat perceptions when we recognize the difference between the occupied 
population and the occupied elite. The occupying power is likely to favor elites that share their interests as 
well as fears. Such elites, then, are more likely to be brought into the operation. These elites are valuable as 
they can influence the nationalist tendencies of the population. If that holds, then the elites can likely 
influence the threat perceptions of the population, to a certain extent.  
232 For a full description of the observed value approach and a comparison to the alternatives, see, Michael 
J. Hanmer and Kerem Ozan Kalkan, “Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to Calculating 
Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited Dependent Variable Models,” American Journal 
of Political Science 57, no. 1 (2013): 263-277. 
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Table 3.1: Probit Analysis for Strategies of Control In Military Occupations 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
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Log Likelihood -47.71 -47.49 -47.67 -47.46 
Observations 134 134 134 134 
Pseudo R2 .4630 .4742 .4722 .4746 
Expected % Correctly 
Predicted 
77.01 77.38 77.34 77.67 
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered to War and Country 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 (one-tailed) 
Expected % Correctly Predicted from Herron (1999) 
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Dictating
†
   
No (0) 27.66  
Yes (1) 61.08  
Difference +33.41  
% Change +120.78%  
   
Reimbursement sans extraction
††
   
No (0) 36.60  
Yes (1) 51.92  
Difference +15.31  
% Change +41.83%  
   
Duration   
25th percentile 43.60  
75th percentile 39.62  
Difference -3.97  
% Change -9.10%  
   
Insurgency   
No (0) 45.40  
Yes (1) 16.99  
Difference -28.40  
% Change -62.55%  
   
Civilian Coercion   
No (0) 49.66  
Yes (1) 32.94  
Difference -16.72  
% Change -33.66%  
   
Democracy   
No (0) 36.12  
Yes (1) 51.12  
Difference +14.99  
% Change +41.50%  
   
All variables held at their observed values unless noted otherwise 
† Accommodating set to zero 




For the primary hypothesis under evaluation, there is strong support for the 
argument that states in a military occupation should approach the occupied elite as agents 
with adverse intentions towards the postwar peace, and engage in dictating the peace in 
comparison to the baseline strategy of dominating the former opponent.
233
 Occupying 
powers should anticipate that the elite will likely have incentives to engage in 
opportunistic behaviors. Therefore, occupiers should employee a strategy that allows 
them to screen their new agents during the course of the occupation. By engaging in a 
costly exercise of power via the strategy selected, the occupier can overcome the 
advantage that the elite have in regards their primary source of influence over the 
occupation. Specifically, occupying powers engaging in a dictating strategy to control the 
elite are at an advantage in terms of gathering information to evaluate the elite’s 
intentions. By compelling a choice, the occupier is engaging the elite in such a way as to 
reveal their preferences towards the postwar era and allow for an evaluation of whether 
they will comply with the former’s demands. Furthermore, by maintaining a strong 
position to influence the elite’s decisions, the occupier can more effectively manipulate 
the costs of compliance in its favor through the use of concessions or threats as necessary 
depending on the former’s behavior. In Table 3.1, the statistical result is positive and 
statistically significant in all four models. In Table 3.2, the predicted probabilities suggest 
that when the occupying power engages in a dictating strategy against the occupied elite, 
it increases the chances of successfully gaining its goals by approximately 120 percent as 
compared to either of the other two strategies.  
                                                 
233 If I run the models with the Dictating strategy as the comparison group, the results for both Dominating 
and Accommodating are consistently negative and statistically significant across all models.  
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Costly Delays and Popular Leaders: the Chilean Occupation of Peru (1881-1883) and 
the Soviet Occupation of North Korea (1945-1948) 
 
To reinforce these findings, I present brief plausibility probes into two cases. 
First, the Chilean Occupation of Peru as an instance of an occupying power dictating its 
demands for territorial concessions while pursuing a foreign imposed regime change. 
Second, I discuss the Soviet Occupation of North Korea as another instance of the 
dictating strategy, this time against a popular nationalist leader and his followers when 
creating a new state in the international system. In both cases, the occupying power is 
pursing demands that increase both the costs of compliance and the possibility for 
opportunistic behaviors.  
The Chilean Occupation of Peru illustrates the utility of dictating the peace, in 
particular the revelation of information about the adverse intentions of leaders. In January 
1881, the Chilean military captured Lima as the Peruvian government collapsed under the 
weight of its defeat in the War of the Pacific.  In order to gain their peace, the Chilean 
government required that Peru establish a new administration to take over the 
responsibilities of governing the country and, most importantly, to make the commitment 
to the former’s demands. The occupation authorities called for an assembly of Peruvian 
‘notables’ to convene and to select a new president for the country in February 1881. The 
assembly elected Francisco Garcia Calderon as the new president of Peru.
234
 The new 
commander of the Chilean army of occupation, Patricio Lynch, favored the election of 
Calderon, and awaited the official formation of the Peruvian government in June to 
                                                 
234 Bruce W. Farcau, The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884 
(Westport: Praeger, 2000), 172-173. 
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negotiate the final agreement over the disputed territories of Tarapacá, Tacna, and 
Arica.
235
 Two events occurred, however, that complicated the occupation. 
First, the American government admonished the Chilean government that 
territorial demands were only possible if Peru could not pay an indemnity for the war. To 
the Peruvians, that statement signaled that they would not have to accept any peace which 
would require them to relinquish territory to their adversary. Calderon likely decided that 
this signal, combined with the recent diplomatic recognition of his government by the 
United States, would allow him to delay in reaching an agreement with the Chileans. 
Once the façade of compliance from Calderon became increasingly evident, the Chilean 
occupation adjusted its policy from cooperative measures to more threatening actions. In 
September 1881, the president of Chile ordered Lynch to dissolve the newly installed 
government to pressure Calderon into complying with their demands. Calderon continued 
to withhold his acceptance of the Chilean terms, likely believing that the American 
government would take some action to support his efforts to not comply. When that 
measure failed to influence Calderon’s decision, Lynch “…arrested the former 
provisional president….in the hope that this icy shower of reality would prompt more 
flexibility in negotiations.”
236
 Calderon was eventually removed from power after Lynch 
had asked the president to resign his office.  
Second, the defeated military forces of Peru scattered into the countryside and 
two of the former generals separately initiated insurgent campaigns against the 
                                                 
235 Luis Galdames, A History of Chile Trans. by Isaac J. Cox (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1941), 334. 





 Lizardo Montero and Andrés Cáceres each gathered troops and supplies to 
fight the Chilean forces spreading throughout the country. Initially, the Chilean response 
was rather moderate to the insurgents’ attacks. When Calderon was forced from office, 
however, Lynch set out to decimate the guerilla forces. In the mean time, the Chileans did 
not find a new leader for Peru until April 1882 when Miguel Iglesias released papers 
calling for peace on the terms as set forth by Chile. Iglesias stated that “[Peruvian 
politicians] speak of a question of honor that impedes a peace agreement that would cede 
a piece of land. In order not to let it go, something that represents a mere handful of 
gold…we permit the banner of the enemy [sic] fly over our highest towers.” 
238
 Though 
the document demonstrated Iglesias’ strong anti-Chilean rhetoric, Lynch recognized a 
potential leader who could establish himself as head of Peru and tolerate the costs 
necessary to commit to Chile’s preferred peace. In December 1882, Iglesias was brought 
into political power along with some of his supporters. After defeating the main insurgent 




Throughout the spring of 1883, the negotiations between Chile and the Iglesias 
regime took place, reaching an agreement that strongly favored the former’s demands. 
Chile would permanently receive Tarapacá, and it would control the two disputed 
provinces for ten years before a plebiscite would decide their final ownership. 
                                                 
237 This insurgency is not included in the Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines,” dataset. 
However, I did include an insurgency for the occupation of Peru when coding the variable. See my notes in 
Appendix A on the War of the Pacific regarding its duration as an interstate war and its subsequent 
transformation into an extra-state conflict.  




Furthermore, the winner of the plebiscite would pay the loser a substantial indemnity.
240
 
In return, Chile recognized Iglesias as the official leader of Peru and agreed to begin the 
withdrawal of its army of occupation. The remaining insurgents surrendered in October 
1883 as the two governments concluded the final agreement.
241
 As the theory suggests, 
the costs of complying with the victor’s demands were high for Iglesias. Caceres, the 
former insurgent leader, remained active in politics following the withdrawal. He 
fervently accused Iglesias of orchestrating the defeat of Peru by accepting the Chilean 
terms. In November 1885, Caceres won a civil conflict against Iglesias and became 
president of Peru. Iglesias remained alive and returned to military service. Though 
Caceres had challenged Iglesias on being compelled to accept Chile’s peace, as president 
he took no actions to break that commitment.
242
 
 One possible contention to the Chilean case is that Calderon lacked strong support 
from the population. During the occupation, Calderon had to compete with another 
Peruvian ‘government’ that claimed to be the legitimate ruling entity over the territory in 
addition to the various insurgent forces that challenged the Chilean occupation. Hence, 
                                                 
240 Some might consider the plebiscite a significant concession by Chile. As Sater notes, however, “…the 
plebiscite was merely a device to gull the Peruvian public while allowing the Chileans to annex the two 
provinces.” William F. Sater, Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 2007), 330. Chile made no efforts to honor that portion of the agreement, but 
continued to exploit the two provinces for their natural resources. It was not until 1929 that the two 
countries resolved the official status of the two territories, thereby granting Chile over 40 years of access to 
the provinces’ resources and 30 years more than agreed to in the treaty. For a discussion on the history of 
the dispute following the War of the Pacific, see, Ronald Bruce St. John, “Chile, Peru and the Treaty of 
1929: The Final Settlement,” Boundary and Security Bulletin 8, no. 1 (2000): 91-100. Furthermore, during 
this time, the Chilean government generated a significant portion of its revenue – perhaps as much as half - 
via export taxes on the nitrates from these territories. On this point, see Richard Sicotte, Catalina Vizcarra, 
and Kirsten Wandschneider, “The Fiscal Impact of the War of the Pacific,” Cliometrica 3, no. 2 (2009): 97-
121.  
241 Farcau, The Ten Cents War, 186.  
242 Farcau, The Ten Cents War, 192-193; Sater, Andean Tragedy, 343. 
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some scholars might contend that as a leader, Calderon could not effectively mobilize the 
population to a single nationalist cause to resist the occupier’s demands. However, the 
theory would assert that politically valuable leaders do not have an advantage in 
bargaining – whether via audience costs or reputations – when the occupying power is 
dictating its conditions. In the Soviet occupation in North Korea, Cho Mansik was 
considered the most popular political figure in Pyonyang when the occupation initiated in 
August 1945. His prestige as a Korean nationalist was widely known, and the Soviets 
hoped to greatly benefit from that image to accomplish their postwar goals on the 
peninsula. In the autumn of 1945, a number of high-level meetings took place to discuss 
with Cho the terms of the occupation. Cho, however, refused to cooperate with the 
Soviets, and had decided to set out his own conditions for the occupation authorities. In 
order for him to work with the Soviet regime, Cho ardently demanded extensive 
autonomy in decision-making and policy implementation without Soviet consultation. 
The Soviets continually refused his demands. Yet, they retained Cho as the official leader 
of the new government in North Korea.
243
 In December 1945, the Soviet Union, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom decided that Korea would remain under a joint 
administration for five years to receive tutelage on how to govern their country.
244
 In the 
following January, the Soviet occupation authorities then demanded that Cho accede to 
                                                 
243 Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2002), 14. Lankov mentions that before January 1946, “Cho tried to use his position to 
conduct his own policy which often contradicted the plans of Soviet supervisors” (16). Such actions follow 
in line with the predictions of the model concerning the behavior of the elite. Unfortunately, Lankov 
provides relatively few details on the precise policies implemented by Cho, and the specific responses of 
the Soviet authorities in the fall and winter of 1945 to 1946.  
244 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, 23. It is not clear who arrested Cho and his supporters. Lankov 
contends that, most likely, even if the Koreans carried out the action it was done under the explicit orders of 
the Soviets.  
137 
 
the trusteeship and sign a declaration in support of the proposal. When confronted with 
the choice, Cho refused. Cho preferred immediate independence for Korea, as he “…was 
not the least bit interested in exchanging Japanese rulers for new foreign masters under 
the rubric of “trusteeship.””
245
 He then resigned from office. Cho and many of his 
supporters were arrested. Following this incident, the Soviet authorities promoted Kim Il-
Sung to the highest leadership position in the North. At the time, Kim was considered an 
ardent Korean nationalist, similar to Cho in terms of his preferences for favoring a 
country immediately free from all foreign influence. However, Kim had to reconcile his 
political ambitions with the Soviet demands. He now openly stated that Korea was not 
ready for immediate political independence and he accepted the international trusteeship 
in return for gaining access to highest political office in the new country.
246
 
Interpreting the Independent and Control Variables 
Now, I turn to interpreting the remaining primary independent and control 
variables found in Table 3.1. All four models demonstrate a negative relationship 
between the aims of the occupying power and the outcome of the military occupation. As 
the theory indicated, the higher the demands placed upon the occupied elite, the greater 
the costs of compliance that they will have to incur for fulfilling those terms. Thereby, 
the likelihood of the occupied elite choosing compliance decreases, and the likely 
outcome of the occupation shifts towards failure. This finding here corroborates some of 
the evidence from the FIRC literature regarding the difficulties in successfully imposing 
                                                 
245 Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 54. 
246 Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, 55-56. 
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new institutions and leaders.
247
 It also suggests that the goals alone for military 
occupations are not sufficient to demonstrate their utility as a commitment device, against 
some of the intuitions discussed in the war termination literature.
248
 This finding, 
however, is not statistically significant for any of the models presented in Table 3.1. The 
lack of significance results from an interaction with the strategy variables. As the theory 
predicted the aims of the occupation affect the incentives of the occupied elite to favor 
non-compliance and ultimately undermine the establishment of the victor’s peace. The 
occupier adopts its strategy of control as a means to counter the elites’ incentives and to 
influence their decision-making towards compliance. Hence, the argument expects that 
the strategy will ‘overcome’ the costs of compliance. 
Reimbursement of occupation costs is always positive, but not significant in 
models 1, 3, and 4. For Model 2, however, reimbursement of occupation costs is positive 
and significant when I remove those instances where a state is also pursuing an extraction 
strategy against the occupied territory. As Table 3.2 indicates, when the occupying power 
pursues a reimbursement strategy there is a 41.83 percentage increase in the likelihood of 
successful compelling the elite to make a commitment to the victor’s peace. The 
difference between the two results rests on the possible exploitative nature of extraction 
policies that some occupying powers might pursue. In these cases where an occupier is 
extracting industrial and natural resources, the costs of the occupation are likely not used 
as a means to influence the elite into making a commitment to the occupier’s peace. 
                                                 
247 For example, see, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, “Intervention and Democracy,” 
International Organization 60, no. 3 (2006): 627-649; Andrew J. Enterline and J. Michael Greig, “Against 
All Odds? The History of Imposed Democracy and the Future of Iraq and Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy 
Analysis 4, no. 4 (2008) 321-347: Downes and Monten, “Forced to be Free?” 
248 For example, Dan Reiter, How War Ends (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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Instead, the occupying power is exploiting its position relative to the elite to fuel its own 
foreign policy projects at the expense of the occupied territory. Though extraction 
policies – as conceptualized here – focus on the occupying power taking material goods 
from the occupied territory, the logic behind that action may suggest a more abusive 
policy that carries over into the pursuit of occupation costs. When an occupier is not 
pursuing an extraction strategy, the reimbursement of occupation costs is likely an 
extension of the dictating strategy to influence the behavior of the occupied elite. 
For example, the Allies in the occupation of France certainly used the occupation 
costs to influence the Duke of Richelieu. In 1816, the French government was confronted 
with an enormous deficit in the coming budget, a shortfall that was largely influenced by 
the indemnity payments required by the Second Treaty of Paris and the costs of the army 
of occupation. The Chamber had proved itself uncooperative in numerous matters, with 
the painful debates on the budget shortages further demonstrating its unwillingness to 
comply with its imposed financial burdens. Richelieu realized that a reduction in the costs 
of the army of occupation could improve his ministry’s position vis-à-vis the chamber. 
Without it, Richelieu understood that he would be out of office by the end of the year. 
Richelieu approached the Allied Powers with his request for a reduction in forces. He 
explained that it would decrease the deficit for the government and as a consequence, 
likely moderate the behavior of the Chamber. The Russia ambassador replied with a 
demand that the Chamber be dissolved immediately, and that the French hold new 
elections. The Duke of Wellington recognized that a reduction in forces was possible and 
likely valuable to Richelieu politically. Wellington, however, advised his government 
that such a reduction was only possible if there was an improvement in the French 
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political situation first. The Allies would not grant a reduction in costs as long as the 
current Chamber remained in power. As Frederick Hermann stated, “Richelieu finally 
realized he had no choice left and that the Allies had driven him into a corner.” Finding 
himself in such a difficult political position, Richelieu gave in to the Allies’ demands and 
dissolved the Chamber in July 1816.
249
  
The duration of the occupation is consistently negative, and statistically 
significant in all four models presented in Table 3.1. Staying longer on foreign territory 
reduces the likelihood of gaining a commitment by approximately 9 percent when the 
duration varies from an occupation that endures for 25 months (25
th
 percentile) to one the 
lasts for 97 months in total (75
th
 percentile). Effectively, extending the duration of an 
occupation is not necessarily useful way for the occupying power to influence the 
behavior of the elite. If anything, remaining in an occupation longer only further 
undermines the effort. One inefficient aspect of military occupations is that the occupier 
will likely err on the side of a longer occupation rather than a short one to insure that the 
elite are not undermining the former’s goals since the occupier does not fully know the 
intentions of the elite.
250
 Since the elite might have some incentives to misrepresent their 
intentions, the occupier likely decides to continue the occupation to keep the pressure on 
the occupied elite.
251
 Allowing the occupation to endure, however, can undermine the 
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occupying power’s efforts to compel the elite towards compliance as its costs continue to 
increase while the benefits remain constant. 
Next, I turn to the two primary variables representing how the occupier engages 
with the occupied population, the possibility of nationalism, and how the use of coercive 
measures influence the outcomes of military occupations. As the statistical results 
indicate, the use of civilian coercion undermines the ability of the occupying power to 
gain a commitment from the occupied elite. The measure is consistently negative and 
statistically significant across all four models presented in Table 3.1. The use of civilian 
coercion during the course of a military occupation decreases the likelihood of success by 
approximately 33 percent. The findings here strongly indicate that using coercion against 
civilian populations will only diminish the likely of successfully implementing the 
victor’s peace. I argue that occurs for two reasons. First, the result stems in part from the 
increasing costs of compliance for the elite thereby decreasing their willingness to 
comply with the victor’s demands. The occupied elite might confront increasing costs of 
compliance when the civilian population suffers at the orders of the occupier. If the elite 
are complicit, then civilian coercion might destabilize any future chance of survival, and 
likely tie their fate more directly to the occupying power. Second, the occupied 
population itself now has incentives to not remain neutral during the course of the 
occupation. When under threat from the foreign power, the population will now confront 
a choice on whether and how to resist. While most studies recognize the possibility of an 
insurgency, the occupied population can engage in both active and passive measures to 
                                                                                                                                                 
greater to the occupier than the compliance costs incurred to their agendas. Furthermore, the elite would 
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increase the costs that the occupier must bear to achieve its goals. That is, the occupied 
population has access to multiple paths to effectively resist the occupying power. I 
contend that using civilian coercion likely increases the use of all forms of resistance, 
thereby increasing the costs to the occupying power, and subsequently diminishing their 
chances for success. 
For example, in the French Occupation of Cilicia, atrocities committed by 
legionnaire troops may have ‘cowed’ the population initially in 1918, but their use of 
these vicious measures resulted in reprisals from the locals shortly thereafter in the 
occupation.
252
 The regular troops continued the use of coercion against the population in 
1919 in the form of mass arrests and deportations that did relatively little to help the 
French maintain neutral hearts or minds and only increased the suspicions of the 
occupied population as to the true intentions of the occupying power.
253
 Even if civilian 
coercion can mitigate the potential emergence of an insurgency, it might push the 
occupied population to adopt more passive measures of resistance as the Germans 
witnessed in the occupation of Belgium from 1914 to 1918.  
One possible criticism of this project’s attempt to measure civilian coercion is the 
lack of distinction between types of coercive measures. Both Stathis N. Kalyvis and 
Melissa Willard-Forster have differentiated between the use of sanctions and reprisals, 
and offer sound logical reasons why that differentiation would potentially affect the 
incentives of the population towards escalation.
254
 However, the project here has not 
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adopted such differentiation precisely because it does not matter to the occupied 
population. Here, I suggest that the distinctions – while analytically sound – make little 
difference to the occupied population as they come to focus more on the violence and less 
on its intended goals. Similar to the work of Max Abrahms on the credibility paradox 
with regards to terrorism, I argue that the occupied population will likely infer the 
preferences of the occupying power from the severity of their treatment while discounting 
or ignoring the actual goals it wants to accomplish.
255
 The occupied population likely 
sees only the actions of the occupying power, and then infers the latter’s intentions from 
those actions. Small incidents among civilians are likely not as problematic for occupying 
powers. Large-scale measures that target the population might diminish the likelihood of 
an insurgency emerging, but civilian coercion is not likely to be effective for a state to 
achieve its postwar goals. When witnessing such events, the occupied population is not as 
likely to infer the intention of deterrence, but more likely to perceive the foreign power as 
a threat towards their survival and that subsequently diminishes their incentives for 
remaining neutral. For its part, the occupier cannot expect that its distinctions in the use 
of violence will effectively communicate its intentions clearly and concisely to the 
population. 
When confronting an insurgency, the occupying power is significantly less likely 
to gain a commitment to its preferred peace from the occupied elite. In those occupations 
                                                                                                                                                 
a different vocabulary than Willard-Foster to distinguish between what he calls indiscriminate violence and 
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where a state has to fight an insurgent force, the coefficient is consistently negative and 
significant for all of the models. Following Table 3.2, when a state confronts an 
insurgency during an occupation the chances of successfully gaining a commitment to its 
peace decrease by over 62 percent. The power of an insurgency is not necessarily in 
driving the occupier from foreign territory. Rather, the effectiveness of an insurgency is 
in increasing the costs that the occupying power has to incur to maintain the occupation 
to achieve its postwar goals. Furthermore, it is the counterinsurgency efforts that will 
likely bring the occupier into conflict with the occupied population, since the insurgents 
can often hide among locals and occupiers have relatively few means to distinguish 
friend from foe in these circumstances. Fighting an insurgency, then, is likely to increase 
the occupier’s use of violence against civilians.  
The empirical findings appear to be mixed on whether differences in culture and 
identity between the occupier and the occupied population affect the outcomes of military 
occupations. First, in Model 3, the measure for the possible ‘clash of civilizations’ during 
the course of an occupation is negative as expected, but the result is not statistically 
significant. The second measure suggests that when the occupying power and the 
occupied population had differing religious and/or racial backgrounds, the possibility of 
success diminished. Specifically, the coefficient for this measure is negative and 
significant for Model 4 in Table 3.1. The results would suggest, then, that identity matters 
for whether the occupying power can compel compliance from the occupied elite as well 
as influencing its interactions with the occupied population. However, this finding that 
different religious and racial backgrounds might undermine the chances of success does 
not hold when explored further. I re-ran the analyses using Model 4 with a measure for 
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only religious differences and another model for only racial differences between the 
occupied and the occupier. The results were consistently negative, but not significant for 
either variable in these two robustness checks for identity. Upon further investigation, the 
reason for the significant result in Model 4 is the inclusion of the measure for whether an 
occupying power was a democracy. By removing that measure, and running the model 
again, the combined identity variable and the individual measures have negative 
coefficients but the finding is no longer statistically significant in the analysis.
256
 The 
underlying relationship is likely based on democracies more frequently engaged in 
occupations on foreign territories that have distinct cultural and religious backgrounds.  
The remaining control variables for success and failure in military occupations 
present a mixed picture regarding their influence on whether such operations succeed. 
The overall military personnel measure is positive and significant across the four models; 
however, the coefficient is quite small. Since the measure captures the total military 
personnel for an occupying power, I cannot draw any direct inferences regarding whether 
the number of troops committed to an occupation effect the subsequent outcome.
257
 
Instead, I can only assert that occupying powers with greater numbers of military 
personnel are more likely to succeed in military occupations. A more precise measure 
would be the inclusion of actual troops deployed for each occupation, perhaps in addition 
to the overall strength available to an occupying power. Next, the measure for having 
allied occupying powers is consistently negative, but does not reach standard levels of 
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statistical significance in any of the four models presented in Table 3. Occupying a 
strategic rival is positive across the models, but does not approach standard levels of 
statistical significance. Finally, the measure for international threat is consistently 
negative across the four models presented in Table 3.1, in contrast to David Edelstein’s 
arguments that a threatening international environment should increase the chances of 
success in a military occupation.
258
 However, the result is never statistically significant 
for any model. Thus, I cannot draw any definitively conclusions about whether the 
international threat environment affects the outcomes of military occupations in this 
project. The negative coefficient is at least suggestive, and further work could refine the 
quantitative measure for whether a threatening international threat decreases the 
likelihood of success. 
The final control variable explores whether democracies are more likely to 
succeed in military occupations. Across all four models, the findings strongly suggest that 
democracies are more likely to succeed in compelling a commitment from the occupied 
elite than all other types of regimes. The predicted probabilities in Table 3.2 suggest that 
a democratic state is approximately 41 percent more likely to succeed in gaining its peace 
from the occupied elite at the termination of a military occupation. Since I adopted a 
neutral approach on which mechanism might explain this relationship, I cannot draw any 
definitely conclusions to explain this empirical finding. This result is quite interesting, 
however, in that it presents something of a challenge to recent work that suggests 
democracies have no distinct advantage when attempting to compel their opponents, 
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particularly in crisis bargaining.
259
 The project adopts the perspective that military 
occupations are most effective when the occupying power compels the occupied elite 
favor compliance, and accept the victor’s peace. Some aspect of democratic states, then, 
makes them more effective in compelling a commitment when the autonomy of the 
opponent is constrained. If democracies are more likely to be successful, however, it 
raises further questions as to why the United States failed to achieve its primary goals in 
the recent occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examines the central question of the dissertation: when are 
occupying powers likely to gain compliance from the occupied elite, and ultimately 
achieve their postwar goals? To that end, I have empirically evaluated the primary 
hypothesis derived from the principal-agent model of international politics as developed 
in the previous chapter. The results have provided strong support for my theoretical 
argument concerning how occupying powers should engage the occupied elite in order to 
generate an effective commitment. The statistical results and plausibility probes strongly 
demonstrate that states engaging the elite via a dictating strategy are more likely to gain 
their preferred peace. In the next chapter, I will further investigate the primary 
implication of the theoretical argument against the American Occupation of Japan on 
how the occupier’s strategies of control affect the responses of the elite, and the outcome 
of the military occupation.  
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Chapter 5: Revisiting the American Occupation of Japan, 1945 to 1952 
 
“Forget the utopian notion that a brave new world without power politics will follow the 





The American Occupation of Japan (1945-1952) has long been heralded as an 
example on how former rivals and wartime opponents can move from conflict and 
competition to accommodation and cooperation in the international system.
261
 The modus 
operandi for that change came from the occupation, in which the two countries found 
their common interests in opposing the spread of communism and establishing mutually 
beneficial economic relations. The principal-agent model from chapter 3, however, 
suggests an alternative explanation for the outcome of the American Occupation of Japan 
that stands at odds with the more conventional thinking that accommodation led to 
cooperation. In investigating this particular case, the chapter will examine the two 
primary mechanisms as developed in the chapter 3: the costs of compliance for the 
occupied elite and the strategy of control employed by the occupying power.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the methodological approach 
employed in this chapter. Next, I address the three episodes in chronological order, 
beginning with the regime change starting in October 1945 when Japanese officials first 
met with Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur. Then, I move to examine how the 
emerging threat environment led the Americans to alter their goals, and to redirect their 
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efforts towards the economic stabilization of Japan. The final section presents the 
Japanese expectations for the post-occupation era, and how the American efforts dictated 
that they engage in more burden-sharing in the Cold War. With each episode, I establish 
the following conditions: the Japanese adversity to the demands made by the American 
officials and the Americans approach to the Japanese, in particular their efforts to dictate 
to the latter.  For each section, I also address Japanese efforts to either resist or act against 
the occupier’s interests, and American efforts to monitor the behavior of the Japanese 
politicians and to enforce their orders as necessary. Finally, I discuss that instance and the 
relevant observations in relation to the theoretical argument. These analytical sections 
draw out some of the finer points concerning how the empirical evidence relates to the 
theoretical argument concerning adverse agents and dictating the peace. The conclusion 
briefly addresses the overall findings of the chapter.  
Research Design and Methodology 
Rather than viewing the American Occupation of Japan as a ‘single’ case study, I 
contend that the case constitutes a dataset that contains multiple observations for testing 
the primary prediction of the theoretical argument. Here, I specifically focus on three of 
these observations that are generated based upon the demands of the American officials, 
and their subsequent interactions with Japanese politicians. I recognize that the 
observations here are not independent of one another as they do occur within the same 
occupation. However, the observations are generated by the variation in the demands 
made by the United States during the course of the occupation. This approach to large 
cases with variation in the demands can allow for an alternative approach to the 





  Hence, within each observation – for example, the initial section 
on regime change – I can subsequently examine multiple discernible implications of the 
principal-agent model relative to that particular interaction between the occupier and the 
occupied elite. One advantage to this approach is the strategy of control remains the same 
across each of the three cases to demonstrate that the Americans consistently dictated 
their peace and that it had the intended effect on the Japanese politicians.  
 Following the theoretical argument, each of the demands should generate some 
adversity among the elite towards fulfilling the conditions as set out by the occupying 
power. The Japanese politicians involved are resistant, given that they expected to incur 
the costs for complying with the American terms. Regime change and rearmament, 
however, differ from economic stabilization in an important way: the Japanese 
government concurred with the American officials on the end goal of an economically 
self-sufficient country. Officials from both governments had an interest in altering the 
status quo from a sluggish to energetic recovery program. However, the two did not 
necessarily agree on the cause of the poor economic performance, or how to implement 
the cure. The American officials pressured the Japanese into adopting policies that in the 
short term generated high compliance costs, and increased the latter’s hostility to the 
following the former’s prescriptions. With regime change and rearmament, the Japanese 
officials involved demonstrated their adversity to the end goals. The Shidehara and 
Yoshida cabinets did not want to remove the Emperor’s political authority. In terminating 
the occupation, Yoshida did not want assume a defense burden that he believed was 
unnecessary and potentially harmful to the economic recovery. A second advantage to 
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examining these demands is that there is almost no disagreement among policymakers 
and scholars on whether the Americans succeeded in their occupation of Japan following 
World War II. The outcome of this particular case is not in dispute in the literature or in 
this dissertation.
263
 Instead, my argument is a challenge to previous explanations on how 
the American occupation resulted in the success that we know today.  
An important reason to select the American Occupation of Japan is the 
availability of materials to demonstrate the fine-grained assumptions of the model and the 
causal mechanisms at play in how the two interact.
264
 The theoretical model assumes that 
the adversity of the occupied elite emerges from the demands made by the occupying 
power. The evidence in this chapter should lend itself to supporting that assertion. 
Though I cannot directly assume preferences from the behavior of strategic actors, the 
theoretical argument does set out the possible relations between actors’ preferences and 
their likely behaviors during military occupations. Applying those theories to the 
available evidence can help us reason out plausible inferences about the preferences of 
actors for their behaviors through a combination of historical materials and backwards 
induction.
265
 Thus, the abundance of historical material will allow for a thorough 
investigation of the evidence via process tracing. I can then identify the causal relations 
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posited by the theoretical argument between the resistance of the agents and the strategy 
of the Americans to explain the outcome of each episode investigated in this chapter.
266
 
Finally, I selected this case as it presents a significant challenge for the principal-
agent model. In international environments where the victor and the vanquished share 
similar threat perceptions of a third party, I contend that such occupations constitute most 
likely cases for the conventional wisdom on the emergence of cooperation through the 
use of accommodative strategies to induce compliance. In particular, the threat of 
communism from the Soviet Union should have pressured the Japanese politicians into 
accepting the demands made by the Americans. Conversely, the threat of communism 
should have driven the Americans to make efforts to gain Japanese trust by any means 
necessary, such as offering concessions and minimizing costs incurred as a result of the 
former’s preferred peace. In this case, the international environment provided for the 
possibility of cooperation among the occupier and the occupied elite given that the 
alternative would certainly lead to an outcome that was sufficiently worse off for both 
involved. Neither the Americans nor the Japanese wanted to see the Soviet Union 
involved in Japanese territory. Operating under this dynamic, one would expect that the 
evidence will demonstrate that the perceived threat from communism pressed both sides 
to moderate their behaviors during the occupation regardless of the costs incurred to 
achieve a more cooperative occupation and ultimately achieve a more compromising 
peace. A threatening international environment favors more accommodative arguments 
over the principal-agent theory presented in chapter three. This dynamic suggests that the 
Occupation of Japan will be a least likely case for confronting unfavorable agents and for 
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needing dictating strategies to control them given the presence of an international threat 
that would provide an environment more conducive to moderating behavior and 
encouraging cooperation. Thus, the American Occupation of Japan initially sets up a 




Retention of an Emperor and Constitution Reform 
On 4 October 1945, MacArthur issued one of the occupation’s most important 
directives. This particular American order began the process of liberalizing Japan through 
the establishment a bill of rights for Japanese citizens. First, the directive granted liberties 
to all citizens for political, civil, and religious freedoms as while as cancelling out all 
sentences for political prisoners currently held by the government. In particular, the bill 
allowed for Japanese citizens to engage in open discussions on the imperial system 
without threat of punishment. Second, the bill rights abolished the institutions that the 
Japanese government had created to enforce these restrictions on citizens. These included 
the elimination of the secret police forces and the Home Ministry in their entirety as well 
as prohibiting the enforcement of laws contrary to the above freedoms and liberties. The 
response from the Japanese government was underwhelming at best. Many Japanese 
officials saw this move as ‘foolish,’ especially since the Americans had allowed the 
communists to go free as well as other political prisoners. Even this early in the 
occupation, the threat from communists within Japan was seen as the significant danger 
to the political system. Yoshida Shigeru, then Foreign Minister, initially complained that 
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SCAP officials should have consulted with the Japanese government before issuing such 
orders. Later, he attempted to limit the extent of the order that was issued by the 
occupation authorities. Yoshida argued that it only applied to individuals with no 
connections to communism or members of the Japanese Communist Party. His efforts to 
restrict freedom and preserve some measures to discriminate on the basis of political 
beliefs failed.
268
 As a result of this directive by the occupation authorities and its political 
consequences, the Higashikuni cabinet resigned on the following day.
269
  
On the same day, MacArthur and Prince Konoe Fumimaro met to discuss what 
the occupier’s were demanding from the Japanese as their terms. Konoe knew that the 
Emperor was in danger as an individual and as a governing institution, and he attempted 
to protect them. Konoe intended to explain why the Japanese had fought in the war by 
shifting the focus away from the Imperial institutions. He tried to place the blame on a 
number of elements in Japanese society, and excluded the Emperor as one of those 
individuals who sought war with the United States. Instead, Konoe argued that the 
nationalists, militarists, and Marxists were responsible for Japan’s involvement in the 
Pacific theater. After denouncing these groups and their role in bringing about the 
conflict, Konoe came to the most pressing question he had for MacArthur: following the 
Potsdam Declaration, what reforms did the United States expect the Japanese to 
undertake in regards to their domestic institutions. Specifically, he wanted to know if the 
occupiers had any suggestions to offer on how to reorganize and improve the 
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government. MacArthur recognized the importance of this question as a central concern, 
and responded in a commanding military voice to Konoe’s inquiry: “First of all, the 
Japanese Constitution must be revised. It is essential to introduce into government 
sufficient liberal elements through constitutional revision.” MacArthur strongly 
emphasized the necessity of liberalizing the government, and Konoe realized the 
importance of this statement immediately as a key condition for ending the occupation. 
When Konoe hesitated, MacArthur compellingly stated: “I hope that a rational way can 
be found so that essential measures can be devised by the Japanese Government itself. 
And that must be done as quickly as possible. Otherwise, we ourselves are prepared to 
see that this shall be done, regardless of the friction that it may cause.”
270
 The prince 
moved quickly to organize a Japanese effort to revise the constitution to meet the 
American orders to redesign the country’s governing institutions and documents.
271
  
On 6 October, George Atcheson Jr., political advisor to MacArthur, met with 
Konoe and his associates to unofficially offer some advice on how the Japanese 
government should proceed with altering their domestic institutions. Konoe had fallen 
from power along with the previous cabinet, yet he wanted to press forward under the 
Emperor’s authority to initiate the revision of the Meiji Constitution. In the meeting, 
Atcheson suggested making both legislatures representative of the people through 
elections, eliminating all extra-governmental institutions, establishing greater protections 
for individual rights, and placing stringent limitations on the Emperor’s capacity to enact 
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On 11 October, MacArthur met with the new Prime Minister, Count Shidehara 
Kijuro, to instruct him in the process of domestic changes that the Japanese government 
would undergo in the following months. To that end, MacArthur presented Shidehara 
with five great reforms: “1) Give women the right to vote; 2) encourage labor unions and 
correct child-labor practices; 3) institute a more liberal education to make clear that 
government is “servant rather than the master of people”; 4) eliminate practices “which 
through secret inquisitions and abuse have held people in constant fear”; 5) promote “a 
wide distribution of income and ownership of the means of production and trade.”
273
 
Prior to this meeting, SCAP and Japanese officials had met to discuss a different path for 
constitutional revision. The Japanese officials, already aware of the demand, wanted the 
Americans to leave it out of the public statements. That would allow for the appearance 
of the Japanese government independently taking the initiative to revise the Meiji 
Constitution. Since MacArthur had ordered Konoe to implement the liberalization of the 
constitution previously, the occupation authorities consented to the request. SCAP 
announced publicly that the great five reforms would “unquestionably involve a 
liberalization of the Constitution” yet the occupation refrained from explicitly listing it as 
one of the five to be carried out by the new cabinet.
274
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After the meeting on 11 October 1945, Shidehara announced publicly that 
revising the constitution was not necessary, and made similar statements in private 
among fellow cabinet members. On 25 October, the prime minister and Matsumoto Jōji 
assembled a group of Japanese scholars and legal professionals to begin addressing the 
issues in the Meiji Constitution. The ‘Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee’ 
operated under the aim that the constitution did not require revision, and instead, “its 
investigation [was] to determine whether any amendment may be necessary, and, if so, 
what are the points to be amended.” The committee was largely under the direction of 
Matsumoto. Shidehara had prepared no formal instructions, guidelines, or such to direct 
the committee in its activities. Furthermore, neither Shidehara nor Matsumoto consulted 
with SCAP on the measures that they sought to change in the constitution, and how those 
ideas would mesh with the demands as set forth in the Potsdam Declaration.  
From October through February 1946, the Japanese involved in the project did not 
consult with their occupiers to determine their demands on how the country’s domestic 
institutions should be reformed. The majority of the members envisioned their project as 
an ‘investigation’ into the constitution, which might result in adjustments to correct for 
the previous wrongs. Otherwise, the committee did not take the goal as a serious demand 
that the Americans would enforce, and assumed that the constitution ‘revision’ was 
merely a “bee in the American bonnet.” The government also did not consult any of the 
numerous organizations in Japan that produced a variety of constitutions to replace or 
revise the old one. Instead, Matsumoto proceed with the constitution committee as if 
Japan was not under the control of a foreign power, largely acting under the committee’s 
own initiative. He assigned the committee its guidelines, adopting four guiding principles 
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for his attempts to ‘revise’ the constitution. On 8 December, when speaking before the 
House of Representatives, Matsumoto announced these four principles:  
1) no change in the fundamental principle that the emperor combined in himself 
the rights of sovereignty; 2) a broadening of Diet responsibilities and consequent 
limitation on the emperor’s prerogatives; 3) assumption of responsibility for 
affairs of state by cabinet ministers who in turn would be responsible to the Diet; 
and 4) strengthened guarantees of the rights and freedoms of the people, with 




In large part, Matsumoto was merely correcting the constitution to prevent further abuse, 
and continue along as the country had.  
On 11 January 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the final draft of State-
War-Navy Co-Ordinating Committee (SWNCC) 228 and transmitted the orders to 
MacArthur. Officials at SCAP had seen drafts of the document since at least the middle 
of October 1945, and most knew its contents well in advance of its official adoption as 
American policy for the occupation. SWNCC 228 called for several basic objectives 
concerning the political reform of Japan’s domestic institutions, including the expansion 
of suffrage and civil rights, the adoption of either a directly-elected executive branch or a 
parliamentary system that was representative of all Japanese citizens, and increased 
representation at the local level. The policy also confirmed that the imperial institution – 
in its current form and authority – was not acceptable, and had to be subordinate to the 
Japanese people. Finally, SWNCC 228 stated that the enactment of these reforms must 
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come from within Japan to establish their legitimacy, and to that end, SCAP should 
refrain from involvement. Whether the constitution was revised, or a new one adopted, 
that the document must be an expression of the will of the Japanese people.
276
 MacArthur 
met with Shidehara on 24 January to discuss some aspects of the political reforms that the 
United States expected of Japan. From the meeting, emerged four points on which the 
two appeared to agree: the adopting of a new constitution, acceptance of the sovereignty 
of the people, turning the imperial institution into a symbol for Japan, and the idea that 
Japan would renounce war as a means to settle international disputes.
277
 While Shidehara 
agreed to these positions with MacArthur, the work in the constitution committee did not 
align with these four points or the basic objectives laid out in SWNCC 228. Shortly after 
the meeting, MacArthur would learn that Matsumoto had not followed the basic 
instructions given to him as the necessary conditions for fulfilling the terms of the 
Potsdam Declaration and SWNCC 228. 
Revealed Designs and the American Response 
 On 1 February 1946, Mainichi Shinbun published a draft of  the constitution that 
it had secretly acquired from the deliberations of the Matsumoto committee. The draft 
constitution was not well-received by anyone in Japan. The reporting on the draft 
criticized it for being quite ‘reactionary’ given that it so closely resembled its 
predecessor, the Meiji Constitution. In SCAP, General Courtney Whitney aptly described 
the constitutional draft as being “extremely conservative in character,” especially since 
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the document made no substantive changes to the Emperor’s position.
278
 MacArthur 
decided that since the Japanese cabinet had not adequately addressed the American 
demands that SCAP would have to write a draft constitution. MacArthur gave the 
committee three broad principles on which to write the constitution, including revision of 
the Emperor’s position, the abolishment of war as a sovereign right, and no further feudal 
practices in politics. The Emperor would remain, but the position would only retain a 
symbolic role in the new political system. The draft also established the renunciation of 
war amendment (to become Article 9), limiting Japan’s use of military forces. The SCAP 
framers also include a number of civil liberties and human rights in the draft. At the 
institutional level, the Japanese government would shift to a unicameral legislature. 
SCAP officials also took care to make amending the constitution a difficult affair, by 
requiring that the Diet give 2/3 approval to any changes and those changes then had to 
pass a national referendum with a majority vote in favor. The committee met in secret for 
seven days, and completed their work before 13 February to present a draft to the 
members of the Japanese cabinet.
279
 
The meeting on 13 February included Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu Jiro as 
well as their interpreter. The four officials had come to the meeting with the expectation 
that they were to receive comments on the draft of the constitution from the Matsumoto 
committee. Instead, Whitney dismissed the Japanese draft constitution, stating that it was 
“wholly unacceptable to the Supreme Commander as a document of freedom and 
democracy.” He further emphasized that the draft had not demonstrated that the Japanese 
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had learned from their recent history. Whitney then presented the three politicians with 
the SCAP draft of a new constitution as the acceptable alternative that would address the 




Whitney then proceeded to lay out the decision that would confront these men and 
their associates concerning the new draft constitution. The occupation authorities 
expected the Japanese government to give its full attention to adopting the principles in 
the draft and in any revisions that might occur. He carefully walked them through the 
costs that their decision could incur, especially if they choose not to accept this draft 
constitution. The Japanese politicians were informed that the Allies were calling for the 
Emperor to face charges of war crimes along with the other politicians currently awaiting 
trial. Yet, MacArthur believed that voting on this constitution would diminish that risk. 
By accepting the basic principles of a symbolic Emperor and a demilitarization of the 
country, Japan could demonstrate its ability to function as a responsible member of the 
international community. The imperial institutions could then remain without further risk 
of trial. Whitney focused on this point, clearly stating that “acceptance of…this new 
Constitution would render the Emperor practically unassailable…[and] it would bring 
much closer the day of your freedom from control by the Allied Powers…”
281
 
Whitney, however, did not want Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu to think this 
was being forced on them. The Japanese politicians were under no ‘compulsion’ to accept 
this draft or act on its principles in any way. That was entirely their choice to either 
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accept or reject the SCAP constitution. However, if the cabinet chose the latter option, 
Whitney explained the consequences. He fully expected that MacArthur would respond 
by bringing the constitution before the people of Japan in a national referendum and 
allow them to vote on its acceptance directly.
282
 Evidently, MacArthur felt that  
this is the last opportunity for the conservative groups, considered by many to be 
reactionary, to remain in power and that this can only be done by a sharp swing to 
the left; and that if you accept this Constitution you can be sure that the Supreme 
Commander will support your position. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the 




Finally, Whitney raised concerns over what role the domestic politics of the United States 
could play in the coming decision. MacArthur had serious worries over the strong 
American opposition to the retention of the Emperor in Japan. If the Japanese did not 
accept the SCAP draft, Whitney explicitly stated, “GHQ could not answer for whatever 
might happen to the Emperor.”
284
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The Japanese politicians were astonished following the revelation of the SCAP 
draft constitution, and the implications that it held for their country: “Mr Shirasu 
straightened up as if he had sat on something…Dr. Matsumoto sucked in his breath. Mr. 
Yoshida’s face was a black cloud.”
285
 In rather stark terms, Whitney had laid out their 
choice, and the costs that non-compliance could bring. Whitney further explained to the 
Japanese that the draft before them was not the final version that they had to accept. 
MacArthur was amenable to suggestions and alterations from the Japanese government, 
as long as any such changes retain the basic principles. At this point in the meeting, 
Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu did not raise any concerns over the draft except to ask 
whether the unicameral legislature was a necessity. The participants decided that this 
meeting between the SCAP officials and the Japan politicians would remain secret.
286
 
Adversity to Demands and Enforcing the Draft Constitution 
Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu did not immediate notify the rest of the cabinet 
as to the outcome of the 13 February meeting. Instead, the three politicians searched for a 
way out of accepting the SCAP draft constitution over the course of the next week. 
Yoshida decided to act through Shirasu, as a means to distance his self from the 
consequences of being associated with the draft constitution. Initially, Shirasu presented 
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Whitney with the “Jeep way letter” on 15 February. Essentially, Shirasu tried to convince 
the Americans that the two draft constitutions were identical in terms of their principles, 
and that the only real difference was in the means by which the drafts accomplished those 
same goals. Shirasu emphasized that while the American draft took a direct route via an 
airplane, the Japanese draft took a more roundabout path through mountain roads on a 
jeep. The analogy failed. Whitney was not convinced that the two drafts were in fact 
similar as Shirasu contended. He simply repeated his warning from 13 February that the 
SCAP draft constitution was the last, best means by which the Japanese government 
could save the Emperor and by implication themselves.
287
 
 Matsumoto also appealed to SCAP for changes to the document. He countered the 
draft constitution along two primary lines of attack. First, he was concerned that the draft 
was written by amateurs, who did not understand the necessity of bicameral legislatures 
to insure checks and balances within a government. When Matsumoto explained the 
reasoning for a bicameral legislature, he thought that the Americans were ‘persuaded’ by 
his arguments. Whitney held that “if the cabinet feels strongly about the desirability of a 
bicameral legislature, and both houses are elected by popular vote, General MacArthur 
will interpose no objection.”
288
 Matsumoto thought he had taught the Americans an 
important lesson in constitutional design, and gained a significant concession. Instead, he 
had fallen into the American ploy. The drafters had specifically inserted the unicameral 
legislature into the constitution expecting the Japanese cabinet to ask for a change to a 
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bicameral one. When Matsumoto played into their hand, the SCAP officials appeared to 
concede the point to the Japanese in an effort to make the constitution acceptable. 
In a letter on 18 February, Matsumoto also attempted to explain that his draft of 
the constitution rested largely on the unique cultural and historical experiences of Japan. 
His draft of the constitution had taken these important processes in consideration during 
the committee’s debates, and it was absolutely necessary that the new constitution rest on 
these foundations so that it might succeed in their country. Similar to Shirasu, Matsumoto 
argued that the two draft constitutions actually accomplished the same underlying 
principles, just via different means. For Matsumoto, his draft had incorporated the more 
relevant measures and adopted a more sensitive approach to the political situation in 
Japan. Just as Shirasu failed, Matsumoto’s appeals did as well. Whitney responded that 
the Matsumoto draft required no further evaluation, and he wanted to know whether the 
cabinet had received the SCAP draft constitution. When Shirasu lied that the Cabinet had 
received the draft constitution, Whitney demanded that the cabinet members give a 
response to the draft within forty-eight hours.
289
  
 The cabinet finally met on 19 February to discuss the SCAP draft constitution. It 
was a heated debate among the members as to whether they should accept or reject the 
draft. Yoshida referred to the draft constitution from SCAP as “revolutionary” and 
“outrageous” for Japan.
290
 Matsumoto also did not favor the American revisions to the 
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constitution. Shidehara and others were also less inclined to favor the draft, and 
contemplated outright rejection of the document. In one of these meetings, Ashida 
Hitoshi recognized the consequence of the cabinet rejecting the SCAP draft constitution. 
He explained that “if at that point the present cabinet refused to accept responsibility and 
resign, it is certain that others who approve of the American draft would come forward. 
And the great influence this would have on the outcome of the coming general election is 
something about which we should be seriously concerned.”
291
 Ashida recognized that 
rejecting the draft constitution from SCAP would not solve their problems. Instead, it 
would only lead to their fall from office and the emergence of a new government that 
would likely be less adverse to the American demands. The cabinet finally resolved for 
Shidehara to meet with MacArthur and to discuss the SCAP draft constitution.  
 Shidehara met with MacArthur on 21 February, and the two discussed the 
Emperor’s role in Japan’s domestic institutions as well as the war renunciation clause. 
MacArthur adhered firmly to these two principles in the constitution, and assured 
Shidehara that as long as they remained the Diet could make adjustments elsewhere in the 
draft.
292
 On that same day, Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu met with Whitney, Kades, 
and other American officials to discuss the possible options for revising the SCAP draft. 
Matsumoto wanted to know whether any part of the Meiji constitution could be salvaged 
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and put in place of some of the less desirable portions of the new constitution. The 
American response to his request about using any portion of the old constitution was 
‘impossible.’ Matsumoto, irritated at the lack of possible alterations, then asked directly, 
“How many of the articles in the new Constitution do you consider basic and 
unalterable?” Whitney simply stated that “the whole Constitution as written is basic…Put 
in general, we regard this document as a unit.” Lieutenant Colonel Milo E. Rowell 
reaffirmed this position, adding that, “The new Constitution was written as an interwoven 
unit, one section fitting into another, so there is no one section or chapter that can be can 
cut out.”
293
 The Americans made clear their position that the Japanese cabinet would 
have to accept the draft constitution as a whole.  
On 22 February, the cabinet met again to discuss the SCAP draft constitution. As 
Richard Finn notes, “Some members of the cabinet felt that if the constitutional issue 
were taken to the people, as Whitney had threatened, the conservatives might lose 
strength and even be voted out of office.”
294
 The members recognized that they had to 
accept the draft, and reluctantly did so with a few ministers still protesting it. The cabinet 
decided that their struggle was not over yet.  They would continue to seek modifications 
in the draft where they could to achieve the constitution that was most appropriate for 
Japan. On the same day, Shidehara presented the SCAP draft constitution to the Emperor, 
and the latter approved of the document.
295
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For next phase in developing the constitution, the Japanese cabinet had to produce 
a translation of the SCAP draft and present it to the American officials before releasing it 
to the Japanese public. On 4 March, Matsumoto and Sato Tatsuo presented the Japanese 
translation to the American officials for inspection. As various officials examined the 
translated draft, it quickly became evident that the cabinet had not only translated the 
document but also made major substantive changes throughout. The occupation officials 
immediately set out to scrutinize the document – line by line – to identify and correct any 
deviations from the initial draft. Most notably, the current translation had removed a 
statement from the preamble that held the phrase ‘sovereignty of the people.’ The cabinet 
members had recognized that the SCAP draft implied that the people held sovereignty 
greater than the Emperor’s, and the conservative politicians could not abide by such a 
declaration. Instead of accepting the provision, they altered the formula when translating 
the draft SCAP constitution from English to Japanese in an attempt to retain the 
Emperor’s position.  
In addition, the members of the Shidehara cabinet made numerous other 
alternations throughout the document. The translated draft altered the institutional 
arrangements of the government, making the House of Representatives subordinate to the 
House of Councilors. Political authority was almost completely centralized as local 
autonomy was diminished. Almost all of the civil and political rights included various 
versions of the phrases “do not conflict with public peace and order” or “except as 
specifically provided by law” that would allow the government to qualify and limit the 
rights as it deemed necessary. These specific phrases came directly from the Meiji 
Constitution, which allowed the government great leeway in controlling and limiting the 
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rights of the Japanese people. Also a number of rights were simply deleted from the draft. 
Over the course of thirty hours, the American officials pressed the single Japanese 
negotiator to restore all but a few minor points to the translated draft thus bringing it back 
into line with the original SCAP draft. Once completed, the American officials stipulated 
the cabinet accept the newly translated draft the same day. With the Emperor in 




On 6 March, the Japanese government made the revelation of a new draft 
constitution with both the Emperor and MacArthur issuing statements in support. All of 
the actors involved wanted to hide the ‘origins’ of the new draft, and thus acted as if the 
cabinet had presented a new constitution for consideration by the Diet. The Japanese 
politicians wanted to maintain the appearance that they had acted independently to revise 
the sacred constitution, and the American officials wanted to maintain that fiction. 
However, it was difficult to hide the true power behind drafting the new constitution. 
First, the draft looked nothing like Matsumoto’s from February, which made it suspicious 
on why the cabinet had shifted from such a reactionary to a fairly progressive position in 
a relatively short period of time. Second, the Japanese language contained within the 
document read less like the native script, and more like an oddly done translation. SCAP 
retained censorship over the press, though the Japanese reporters found interesting ways 
to refer to the document’s “funny language.” Aside for the evidence indicating foreign 
involvement, the new draft constitution received a positive reception from almost all 
groups. The Japanese public responded optimistically to the progressive nature of the 
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rights contained within. Except for the communists, all other political parties favored the 
intent of the proposed document.
297
  
The Emperor ‘gifted’ sovereignty to the people on 20 June 1946 when he attended 
the opening of the Diet’s debate on the draft SCAP constitution. Yoshida – now Prime 
Minister –argued that in establishing a democratic government the Japanese people were 
fulfilling the one of the terms of the occupation, and bringing the country that much 
closer to regaining independence.
298
 The deliberations on the constitution initially 
involved every member of the Diet, and by 23 July shrank down to a secret committee to 
discuss changes to the draft. Across all levels of debate, SCAP played an influential and 
largely secretive role in the development of its draft constitution.  
All members of the Diet were free to propose alterations to the constitution, given 
that such proposals first gained acceptance from the occupation authorities. Even in the 
secret deliberations, the committee members would call for a halt to note-taking to 
discuss whether their proposals would meet the demands set forth by SCAP. For its part, 
the occupation officials did not directly intervene in these Diet meetings. Instead, they 
operated through members of the cabinet and presented their instructions verbally to hide 
their participation in drafting the new constitution. SCAP officials even secretly initiated 
some of their own changes through Japanese members of the Diet when they wanted to 
see amendments or adjustments to the draft constitution.
299
 
                                                 
297 Ward, “The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution,” 1003; Dower, Embracing Defeat, 383-387. 
The Japanese translation was sufficiently confusing that some members of the upper house resorted to 
using the English translation instead when discussing the new draft constitution.  
298 McNelly, The Origins of Japan’s Democratic Constitution, 16. 
299 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 391; McNelly, The Origins of Japan’s Democratic Constitution, 17. 
171 
 
The most pertinent examples of SCAP influence constitute an amendment to the 
renunciation of war clause, and the debate on the kokutai (the national polity). First, the 
renouncing of war clause – as known as Article 9 – generated quite the debate among the 
Diet members as to whether Japan could protect itself. Several politicians interpreted the 
initial phrasing of the article to suggest that Japan could not possess any armaments. By 
implication, then, Japan could not act in self defense if the country was threatened or 
attacked by another. To resolve the debate, Ashida introduced an amendment that 
allowed the country to maintain a military for self-defense purposes and not for the 
settlement of international disputes. This same amendment also opened the path for 
Japan’s eventual rearmament given that the country could maintain a force for self-
preservation. This amendment was approved by SCAP officials, knowing full well that 
the alteration implied the possibility of rearmament for Japan in the future.
300
 
During a discussion on the constitution on 28 June, one member noted that a 
discrepancy between the English and the Japanese versions. In the former version, 
sovereignty clearly lay with the people, yet the latter version was ambiguous on the loci 
in this relationship. This discrepancy led to a debate on kokutai, the concept of the 
national polity. The concept holds that the Emperor has the divine right to sovereign 
authority over his subjects. In discussing the Emperor’s new role, many Diet members 
were concerned how the draft constitution would alter the kokutai in Japan. The SCAP 
draft constitution had established that the Emperor would no longer hold political 
authority, and would serve a symbolic function for the government. Sovereignty now 
rested with the people. Yoshida and Minister of State Kanamori Tokujirō, however, 
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adamantly argued that the constitution made no such alterations. Instead, they contended 
that the new document would preserve and continue the old relationship between 
sovereign and subject into the new political system. The two politicians were appealing to 
certain Diet members that favored the maintenance of the imperial institution by playing 
on the ambiguity inherent in the Japanese translation.
301
 
These arguments, however, caused concern among the American officials. 
Colonel Charles L. Kades met with Kanamori on two occasions in July to discuss how 
these arguments appeared to favor the Emperor as the sovereign authority of Japan. 
Kanamori tried to explain that his position only reinforced the moral authority of the 
Emperor. Kades was not convinced. On 23 July, Kades said that the current phrasing in 
the constitution was open to multiple interpretations. He pushed for a clear statement that 
‘sovereignty resides in the people,’ made explicit in the constitution. Kanamori resisted, 
initially arguing that the current phrasing was acceptable, and then stating if such a 
change in the draft constitution was necessary he would be compelled to resign his 
position. Kades, however, was not dissuaded, and repeated his demand. Kanamori replied 
that the constitution did state that the “people’s will is supreme” before leaving the 
meeting. In a ruse on 25 July during a secret committee meeting, the Liberal Party in 
conjunction with the Progressive Party presented an amendment to place sovereignty 
with the people of Japan. By jointly sponsoring the bill, it relieved both Yoshida’s party 
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The Diet continued to review the draft SCAP constitution until it was accepted on 
3 November 1946. The acceptance of the constitution did not end the political reforms 
that the Americans demanded, nor did it prevent further attempts to preserve the imperial 
institution by some politicians.
303
 Many of the political reforms required further pressure 
from SCAP as the Diet attempted to alter the intention of a law, or sometimes the former 
would force it through when members refused to pass such measures. SCAP would 
continue to pursue further reforms to the political system in Japan, though many of these 
were not quite as consequential as altering the role of the emperor and designing a new 
constitution. Even with the adoption of the constitution, the conservatives did not see the 
document as having a long life. As Yoshida himself stated, “There was this idea at the 
back of my mind that, whatever needed to be revised after we regained our independence 
could be revised then…but once a thing has been decided on, it is not so easy to have it 
altered.”
304
 On 3 May 1947, the new constitution for Japan went into effect. As the new 
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punishment for violence against individuals, and then ordered that all crimes against the imperial institution 
be removed from the law. Interestingly, Yoshida later pleaded with American officials again to restore the 
lese majeste crime to punish a newspaper for its sarcasm directed towards the Emperor. SCAP refused his 
request. These two crimes were subsequently removed from the legislation in July 1947. For a discussion 
on the importance of the imperial institutions and the revisions to the criminal code, see Koseki The Birth 
of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, 228-233. 
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legal system emerged, the American occupation began to reevaluate its postwar priorities 
in Japan.  
Analysis: A Concession to Accommodate or the Power to Enforce 
As the evidence demonstrates, Japanese cabinet members would have preferred 
not to alter the Meiji Constitution, the imperial institutions, or the kokutai in the postwar 
era. The committee agreed that minor adjustments to the constitution seemed appropriate, 
but the officials involved decided that the Meiji Constitution was sufficient in its current 
state and that the individuals in charge of Japan over the last two decades had merely 
subverted its purpose. Hence, the Japanese politicians had no intention of changing the 
status quo in Japanese domestic institutions during the occupation. As if they were 
reviewing the constitution for no particular reason, the politicians involved did not take 
the American orders to revise the country’s domestic institutions seriously from October 
1945 through the exposure of the Matsumoto draft in February 1946. In part, this 
apparent disregard for constitutional revision resulted from their presumed understanding 
that the Americans would not enforce their demands. In fact, the lack of consultation by 
the Japanese politicians such as Matsumoto indicates that the Japanese thought that the 
Americans would accept whatever solution the former presented as ‘reforms.’ In a way, 
Matsumoto, Yoshida, Shidehara, and many others simply could not accept that the 
demands being made by the occupier were serious in terms of revising the imperial 
institutions and altering the basic structures of the Meiji Constitution. How could they 
undo the country’s most important political institutions, especially when those same 
institutions often worked to their benefit in implementing their preferred policy choices. 
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 The serious nature of the American demands became clear in February 1946.
305
 
Following the theoretical argument, the Americans interpreted the Matsumoto draft 
constitution as a clear instance of the Japanese politicians failing to follow through on the 
orders given to them by MacArthur and other officials. The Supreme Commander and 
others had ordered the revision of the domestic institutions, and granted the occupied elite 
the authority to do just that. The agents had been given the task of drafting a new 
constitution that would meet the American demands, and those agents demonstrated their 
adversity to that outcome by following their political agendas in retaining a political 
system that they believed was sufficient for their interests. The Americans recognized 
this behavior as a demonstration of non-compliance with one of the most important goals 
for establishing their preferred peace. The occupiers could not trust that their agents 
would draft a suitable replacement given their obvious disregard for altering the imperial 
institutions. The Americans had dictated their orders while the Japanese had the decision 
to comply and the latter had chosen to not fulfill the demands of the occupying power. 
That failure to follow the American demands led directly to SCAP drafting its own 
constitution for Japan.  
 By drafting their own constitution, the occupation officials decided that they 
would enforce their demands in response to the non-compliant behavior from the 
Japanese cabinet members. If the Americans had accepted the revision of the Meiji 
Constitution, the Japanese politicians would essentially have retained the status quo given 
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that their position would be the default by which any changes were measured. In doing 
so, then, the Americans might have confronted difficulties in moving the Japanese away 
from that point by simply criticizing or responding to the revised Meiji Constitution. 
Given that any alteration would have to compete with the established point in the 
revision, the occupiers would have encountered difficulties in following through on their 
demands to democratize the country. Instead, by creating a new draft constitution, the 
Americans essentially removed that status quo from the set of available options to the 
Japanese politicians and subsequently created a new position that strongly favored their 
interests in the reforms that would be implemented for the country’s governing structures. 
The Americans allowed for the retention of the imperial institutions as an incentive for 
Japanese compliance, but the SCAP draft clearly eliminated any political role for the 
Emperor. The Japanese were not necessarily accommodated here, since the politicians 
involved wanted an emperor with political authority to remain a part and parcel of their 
domestic institutions.  
When confronted with the demands, the Japanese realized the seriousness of the 
American orders for revision and recognized the possible consequences for complying 
with those demands. The Americans had presented their draft constitution which altered 
every domestic institution and would undermine their formers’ preference for retaining 
an emperor with political authority. Immediately, the Japanese politicians had two 
reactions that follow from the theoretical argument concerning the agent’s behavior when 
confronted with the costs of compliance. First, the politicians demonstrated a concern for 
complying with the American demands on constitution reform. The secrecy surrounding 
the initial meeting in February and that carried throughout the remainder of the revision 
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of the constitution demonstrates their strong concern for incurring the political costs of 
complying with American demands. The Japanese (and to an extent, the Americans) went 
to great lengths to cover up the details of the pressure they were now operating under to 
revise the constitution. Their immediate fear was that the opposition parties and the 
population would discover the nature of the meeting, the orders that had been issued, and 
their reluctance to resist the American dictation to reform the domestic political system. 
The Japanese members hid the meeting in February, and presented the SCAP draft as the 
new cabinet sponsored constitution, attempting to erase any trace of the influence of 
SCAP during the hearings. The Japanese politicians especially members of the ruling 
party and the cabinet were keen to avoid any possible evidence of their compliance with 
the occupying power’s commands. 
Second, the Japanese politicians might have accepted that SCAP held the upper 
hand, but they continued to demonstrate their hostility to new draft constitution through 
1947. Their initial efforts focused on persuading occupation officials that essentially the 
foundations of the two drafts constitutions were accomplishing the same goals albeit with 
different means. When persuasion failed, the Japanese made numerous efforts to alter the 
draft constitution without acknowledging or providing SCAP of any forewarning of these 
changes. From the initial Japanese translation to the attempt to avoid mentioning the 
source of sovereignty, the agents pursued several possible avenues to actively undermine 
the occupation’s efforts to establish the American peace. In light of this evidence, it is 
difficult to qualify the American Occupation as ‘accommodating’ the Japanese elite. 
These officials demonstrated their adversity towards the costs they would incur in 
complying with the orders of the occupation domestically and engaged in opportunistic 
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actions that would have pursued their interests to the detrimental of the victor’s peace 
when fulfilling those postwar goals. 
The American officials responded to these opportunistic behaviors as the 
theoretical argument expected, they dictated the terms to the Japanese and enforced those 
orders as necessary when the latter demonstrated non-compliant behavior. When the 
Americans confronted the Japanese regarding issues of non-compliance, the latter would 
often profess an alignment of their interests to downplay non-compliance or simply avoid 
acknowledging that their actions went against the former’s orders. Occupation officials 
put pressure on Japanese officials as necessary, and these individuals would then 
subsequently alter their actions to match up with the orders that had been given. In this 
case study, none of the politicians involved were removed from political office for not 
complying with the dictates of the occupying power.
306
 Hypothetically, if the Japanese 
had taken further measures to undermine the American efforts it is possible that the 
occupation officials would have removed one or more politicians from office. However, 
such measures were not necessary.   
Aid, Economics, and Reviving the Workshop of Asia 
By 1947, the United States had begun to rethink its policies of democratization 
and demilitarization in Japan. This reorientation came in response to the emerging 
international situation as the Soviet Union crystallized as the most powerful threat to 
American strategic interests in Europe and Asia. The occupation would no longer pursue 
policies that enforced political reform in Japan with regards to de-concentration of 
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corporations, purges of nationalist elites involved in the war, and industrial reparations 
for formerly occupied countries. According to American policymakers, these policies 
were weakening Japan, undermining the country’s political and economic stability at a 
time when every member of the free world was necessary to meet the rising challenge of 
communism. Continuing with this course of action would inhibit a full recovery for 
Japan, repress productivity of the country’s Asian neighbors, and all the while deplete 
precious American resources. The resulting economic vulnerability would be ripe for the 
Soviet Union to exploit against the Japanese.
307
 Hence, political reform would not be 
sufficient if Japan remained susceptible to economic exploitation. In what became known 
as the ‘reverse course,’ the United States would pursue a policy of stability in politics and 
economics towards occupied Japan. As a result, the peace efforts in 1947 ground to a halt 
as the Truman Administration realized that terminating the occupation would only expose 
Japan to internal instability and external threats. The Americans now had new plans for 
their former opponent: Japan would serve as bastion against Soviet Expansion in Asia. In 
order for the policy of containment to succeed, Japan had to become a bulwark against 




This new policy to bring Japan to the side of the free world centered on creating a 
country that was self-sufficient. Following the end of World War II, the Japanese 
economy had suffered a loss of approximately 25% of its physical wealth while industry 
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had fallen to less than 20% and agriculture to 60% of the averages experienced between 
1934 and 1936.
309
 A self-sufficient Japan meant overcoming these obstacles to restore 
production to reduce the need for American aid to maintain its economy. To carry out this 
plan, the American officials had to now focus their efforts on engineering a recovery 
program for Japan that would address both the domestic and international challenges that 
the occupied country confronted. Such a program could establish a stable Japan by 
restoring production and initiating economic growth. The issues confronting the Japanese 
economy were quite formidable.  
After World War II, a dollar shortage, or gap, had emerged in the trading relations 
among of states, such that the value of goods exported from the United States vastly 
outpaced the dollars that foreign states held to pay for such goods. The primary problem 
to balancing international trade for many countries was the shortage of dollars they could 
earn abroad to subsequently spend on purchasing materials from the Americans. For 
Japan, the dollar gap was especially difficult to redress as the country primary relied on 
the import of raw materials and export of goods to fuel its economy. Japan could not 
support itself through exporting in 1947. As Jeremy Cohen notes, “Japan will require 
about $1,575,000,000 of exports each year…to pay for essential imports of food and raw 
materials…to maintain a tolerable food ration and standard of living at home. During 
1947 imports into Japan were $526,130,000 and exports were $173,568,000.”
310
  
 Japan could not export more to make up for its trade imbalance for two reasons. 
First, Japanese goods were not attractive to Western markets at this time. As Ronald 
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McGlothlen notes, “in 1947, US trade accounted for 92% of Japan’s imports and only 
12% of its exports.”
311
 Without access to Western markets, Japan had to look to Asia for 
markets to sell its manufactured goods. Second, the goods Japan did produce were high 
priced because of their reliance on American imports to provide the necessary materials 
for production. The country was importing most of its raw materials from the United 
States, who sold these necessary inputs at prices that were significantly greater than 
companies traditionally had paid when trading with other markets in Asia. Relying on 
American imports subsequently raised the prices of the goods produced by its 
manufacturing companies. Unfortunately, most companies were expected to export these 
goods to non-dollar areas in Southeast Asia. The Asian economies had relatively few 
dollars to earn, and could not afford large amounts of the high-priced Japanese goods. 
These high prices meant both that the Asian countries bought less, and that Japanese 
companies earned relatively smaller profits from these exports. In addition, trade with the 
other countries in Asian was mostly through non-convertible currencies. Japan was not 
earning back the dollars it spent on acquiring American raw materials at a time when it 




To solve the dollar gap crisis, American officials were pushing for increased trade 
between Japan and the countries in Southeast Asia. By increasing trade, the Americans 
would simultaneously reduce the need for further aid to implement the economic 
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recovery of Japan and in turn, Japan would provide the Asian countries with an 
opportunity to develop and modernize their industries. In effect, the American policy 
would tie the recovery of Japan to the economic development of the other Asian 
economies. If the Japanese could replace American products with materials from the 
countries of Southeast Asia, it could reduce the current trade imbalance and strengthen 
international trade within the region.
313
 Accomplishing this trading scheme meant that the 
American officials had to address the primary problem in establishing the Japanese 
economy as the exporter of international capitalism: rapid, massive inflation. To the 
Americans, inflation was undercutting Japanese exports to the region given that the prices 
were rising beyond what the markets in Asia could bear. If the occupation could halt 
inflation, then the price of manufactured goods would stabilize and become more 
attractive.   
While MacArthur and SCAP were busy reforming the domestic political 
institutions, the Japanese economy received little attention in terms of a recovery 
program until 1947. As MacArthur was instructed, “You will not assume responsibility 
for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy. 
You will make it clear to the Japanese people that…you assume no obligation to 
maintain…any particular standard of living in Japan.”
314
 MacArthur had initially 
informed the Japanese that they had to maintain strict controls over prices and wages to 
prevent economic instability and internal unrest. The Japanese government, however, 
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took no measures to administer either in 1945. Instead, the Japanese government focused 
on the problem of reviving its economy following the losses and destruction of the war. 
Initially, the Japanese government had paid out indemnities to war production companies, 
in order that these companies could pay on bank loans and these banks would use the 
incoming currency to reduce their obligations to the Bank of Japan. In February 1946, 
SCAP had terminated indemnity payments that corporations received for following the 
orders of the Japanese government during the war for production, investment, or 
relocation. This termination of indemnities was carried out in opposition to the 
government’s promise to financially cover the costs incurred as part of the war. 
Companies then entered into a cycle of liquidation, absorption, and merger that caused 
instability in production until 1949. The Japanese government responded to this cycle 
with the creation of the Reconstruction Fund Bank (RFB) in 1947 under the new priority-
production system, which sought to increase funds available to under-utilized industries 
to increase production.
315
 In essence, as Nakamura Takafusa notes, the RFB was “a 
pipeline for government and Bank of Japan funds being channeled into the industrial 
sector.” RFB would raise money for projects by selling bonds, which the Bank of Japan 
would purchase. Unfortunately, the RFB was not independent of the government, and 
politicians often pressured it to engage in less than preferred loans. The unintended 
outcome of the RFB and its financing measures was to rapidly increase inflation.
316
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On 22 March 1947, MacArthur issued a letter to the Japanese cabinet. In it, he 
demanded that the government take actions to mitigate the rapidly increasing wages and 
prices, or else he would terminate any further distribution of aid to the country. The 
Japanese government initially ignored this letter, but in July 1947 they did create the 
Emergency Economic Measures to update the pricing structure on necessary goods as a 
means to stabilize prices at prewar levels.
317
 The goal being that that stabilization of 
prices in conjunction with the priority-production system would work to sufficiently 
contain inflation. The measures, however, failed to stop significant increases in inflation 
by June 1948. The government again responded with the restructuring of prices while the 
RFB provided increased funds via loans to a number of industries involved in the priority 
program.
318
 The measures eventually achieved a limited victory on slowing down 
inflation, but the subsidies on goods and the money from the bank further contributed to 
the problem rather than acting as a cure. Inflation continued to rise. According to the 
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calculations of Herbert B. Schonberger, the prices of goods had risen more than 700 
percent from the first full month of the occupation in September 1945 to August 1948.
319
 
Prior to this, the American officials had merely wanted a stable Japanese 
economy to effectively manage the political changes they were demanding of the 
government. The aid programs had provided basic necessities while granting the Japanese 
some credit to buy goods in dollars. American officials had understood that such 
measures would be a relatively short-term solution while the economy recovered from the 
war. From September 1945 through June 1948, Japan had received approximately 1 
billion in aid, and the demand for further support showed no signs of relenting in the 
coming years.
320
 While the US wanted Japan as an ally against the emerging communist 
threat, the country was economically vulnerable. This vulnerability had – in part – 
resulted from the policies pursued by the various Japanese governments since August 
1945. The Cold War had not destabilized the Japanese economy, and it had not directly 
contributed to the postwar failure of a recovery. Instead, the United States recognized that 
the economic vulnerability was a direct result of policies adopted and implemented by the 
Japanese government over the course of the occupation.  
With the changing nature of the occupation, the Americans did not see a strong 
likelihood of success in how the Japanese were essentially spending the victor’s national 
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 Allowing the Japanese to handle their economic recovery had proved to be 
too expensive to continue as the postwar recession now hit the US economy. The current 
Prime Minister, Hitoshi Ashida, and his cabinet likely avoided the problem as stabilizing 
the Japanese economy would require increasing taxes and large budget cuts that would 
politically undercut the position of his government. The continuation of economic aid 
was difficult to justify domestically in the United States since many individuals saw it as 
failing to achieve its intended goals in Japan and the evidence did not suggest that further 
aid would improve the country’s economy without American intervention. As the reverse 
course emerged in 1948, American officials became worried about whether the Japanese 
government had either the intentions or determination to solve their economic 
problems.
322
 The American officials realized that now the economic stability of Japan 
was the issue of upmost prominence for the occupation to address. That would require 
minimizing the country’s vulnerability internally by directly altering the economic 
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recovery policies to improve the international trading position of Japan, and thereby 
establish an ally that could contribute to the maintenance of the free world. 
The Japanese had responded quickly to the rising threat of communism, or at least 
to the emergence of a persistent perception among American policy makers that 
communism was a potential threat to the occupied country. In March and April 1948, 
multiple Japanese government officials realized that the threat presented an opportunity 
for the occupied to exploit its weakened position as a defeated major power. These 
officials vigorously appealed to the United States for more resources to combat the ever 
growing threat of communism in East Asia that was imminently prepared to overtake 
Japan. As Yoneyuki Sugita notes, “The Cold War meant a danger to Asia while it gave an 
opportunity to Japan to exercise ‘intimidation by the weak’: Japanese officials tried to 
exploit the American Cold War mentality in order to induce more generous aid to 
Japan.”
323
 In essence, the Japanese saw the threat of communism as bargaining leverage 
that they could use to improve their occupied position, and potentially exhort funding 
from the American officials towards any number of projects that could benefit the 
country. For some Japanese officials, however, neither the proximity of the Soviet Union 
nor the establishment of a communist regime on the Chinese mainland constituted a true 
danger to country’s interests. To these officials, the actual menace to the recovery of 
Japanese economy came from Washington, D.C. They recognized that the emerging Cold 
War and the reverse course would increase the risk that the occupying power would 
terminate the stream of aid currently propping up the economy unless the government’s 
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administration of these resources led to some demonstrable and lasting improvements.
324
 
Now that the Americans had decided to make economic stabilization a priority of the 
occupation, the Japanese worried what new policies the occupying power might demand 
that they implement.  
Following the investigation of the economic conditions in Japan in 1948, the US 
National Advisory Council realized that it had to take a different approach to managing 
aid now that the country’s interests demanded stability in the occupied territory. The 
Council decided that further distribution of economic aid beginning in 1950 to the 
occupied territory would be conditioned on the policies adopted by the government and 
whether those efforts contributed to the stabilization of the Japanese economy. In April 
1948, the National Advisory Council officially approved of aid contingent on 
enforcement of a stabilization program. Future contributions by the United States to the 
economic recovery would then be contingent on the measures that Japanese government 
took to implement the newly devised nine point stabilization plan.
325
 On 13 June 1948, 
the National Security Council altered the occupation policy towards Japan, and the 
economic recovery became “the prime objective of United States policy in Japan for the 
coming period.”
326
 President Truman approved the Nine-Point Stabilization Plan on 10 
December 1948. The ambitious program to revitalize Japan’s economy called for a 
balanced budget, improvements in tax collection, tighter credit controls, wage 
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stabilization, expanded price control, expanded foreign exchange control, expanded 
production, better allocation of materials, and improvements in food allocation.
327
 
MacArthur delivered the nine-points to Yoshida, holding that “the prompt 
economic stabilization of Japan is a primary objective common to both the Allied Powers 
and the Japanese people.” The program would entail “…increased austerity in every 
phase of Japanese life” to achieve its long-term objectives. MacArthur went further, 
explaining to Yoshida that in the implementation of the program there would be no 
“place for ideological opposition as the purpose to be served is common to all of the 
people, and any attempt to delay or frustrate its accomplishment must be curbed as 
menacing the general welfare.”
328
 MacArthur made it clear that the Japanese government 
was now ordered to abide by these policies and that only if they demonstrated compliance 




Yoshida had only just returned to office as prime minister in October 1948, and in 
January 1949 his party had captured a majority of seats in the Diet. Enacting the nine-
points would fall to his administration then, and American officials were particularly 
worried about whether his government could achieve success in stabilizing the Japanese 
economy. Following the discussion with MacArthur, Yoshida likely realized that he 
would be expected to discipline and align his fellow party members behind the American 
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demands, and his cabinet would be responsible for complying with the orders issued. As 
noted by the State Department in February 1949, “unless economic recovery program 
gives early promise of success, and does so without patently inequitable distribution of 
burdens on major economic group [sic], there is no guarantee of continuing political 
stability under the Democratic-Liberal leadership.”
330
 As the report recognized, the 
potential costs for failure to comply would be the loss of political office by the 
Democratic and Liberal parties, most likely at the hands of the Japanese citizens who 
would suffer if the country did not maintain the continuing flow of American aid.  
The Dodge Line and the Emerging Political Consequences 
 The Truman administration had selected Joseph M. Dodge to implement the nine-
point stabilization program. Dodge’s objectives in Japan were “(1) to balance the 
consolidated national budget, (2) to establish the U.S. Aid Counterpart Fund and to 
terminate lending by the Reconstruction Finance Bank, (3) to establish a foreign-
exchange rate, and (4) to decrease the scope of governmental intervention into the private 
economy, especially with respect to subsidies and price controls.” These objectives 
became the austerity package commonly referred to as the Dodge Line.
331
 The goal of the 
Dodge Line involved removing the two “stilts holding up the economy”: terminating the 
need for further American aid to maintain the Japanese economy and to reduce, if not 
eliminate, domestic subsidies on wages and prices as previously established by the 
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 Knocking down the two stilts would effectively put an end to 
the priority-production system that the Japanese government had developed, and then 
consequently allow the Americans to control the debate over which policies the country 
would implement during its economic recovery. In doing so, the American expectation 
was that the austerity program would halt any further growth in the rate of inflation, 
thereby allowing Japan to establish a more competitive export industry and to increase its 
ability to acquire imports from the United States without having to rely on credit or loans 




The Americans and the Japanese shared the common goal of economic recovery 
for the war torn country. The Japanese politicians especially did not protest the notion of 
further American assistance in improving their sluggish economic recovery. What they 
did oppose was the nature of the policies that the occupying power was ordering them to 
implement to achieve economic self-sufficiency.
334
 The political consequences of 
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complying with the Dodge Line began to emerge early in the execution of the economic 
stabilization program. As part of their election campaign in January 1949, Yoshida and 
his party had promised to reduce income taxes, remove sales taxes, and increase funding 
to public building projects.
335
 Having won a significant political victory at the ballot box, 
members of the Liberal Party expected to realize their policy preferences with relative 
ease. During the initial phases of reviewing the budget with Dodge, Finance Minister 
Hayato Ikeda intended to secure specific exemptions in favor of these public 
commitments. He informed Dodge that some small concessions were necessary in 
designing the new budget to accommodate the promises made by him and his colleagues 
during the elections. Dodge said no. He refused to grant any concessions to reconcile the 
stabilization program with the election promises made by Yoshida and his fellow party 
members. Dodge did not want to set an undo precedent that might influence the course of 
occupation. As James D. Savage notes, Dodge likely believed that “If [he] did concede 
on taxes…it would appear that SCAP had succumbed to political pressure and that Japan 
needed to stop living beyond its means, contract consumption, and beat inflation.”
336
 On 
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the latter point, Dodge firmly believed that the Japanese government had brought about 
the inflationary crisis, and that they would now have to assume the consequences. As 
Herbert B. Schonberger notes, Dodge told Ikeda that the Japanese government had to 
stop “ducking the issues… The history here showed a continued series of concessions 
made on promises that have not been performed; what we needed was a record of 
performance.”
337
 Dodge would not grant any concessions. 
Upon hearing Dodge’s rejection, Ikeda realized that his political position was in 
danger. He would have to concede the campaign promises made by his political party 
during the recent elections as the Americans pressed for compliance with their preferred 
economic policies. In designing the budget, Ikeda adhered to Dodge’s response and did 
not indulge in any concessions to account for the Liberal Party’s public commitments. 
Ikeda realized that he could not likely remain in office without gathering a political 
backlash from his own party, and possibly from opposition parties who would exploit 
compliance with the occupier’s demands as a sign of political weakness. Ikeda offered to 
resign from his position as finance minister, to demonstrate the inadequacy of his actions 
and likely to mitigate any potential costs his political compatriots would subsequently 
suffer as a result of his actions. Yoshida allowed Ikeda to remain in the cabinet post, even 
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though other members of their party sought the finance minister’s immediate removal for 
sacrificing the campaign pledges and caving into Dodge’s demands.
338
 
The budget became the primary concern in fixing the inflation problem in Japan, 
and no public spending was spared under Dodge’s scrutiny in February 1949. Yoshida’s 
government had difficulties embracing the policies that Dodge executed as they as well 
as other politicians recognized the likely political consequences. First, the Dodge Line 
severely reduced funding for public works projects such as schools thereby depriving 
numerous localities of facilities and accompanying resources. Second, the new budget 
would require the government to terminate hundreds of thousands employees, most likely 
in a relatively abrupt and quick manner. Third, Dodge wanted to eliminate all rationing 
programs for items such as gas and alcohol for individuals, and to substantially reduce 
subsidies to the private sector, if he could not entirely have such items removed from the 
budget. Fourth, the new budget discontinued RFB’s authority to issue new loans and 
thereby terminated the priority-production program for those corporations benefiting 
from its measures. Fifth, Dodge opposed any additions to the budget for unemployment 
assistance programs for the forthcoming layoffs in the public and private sector that 
would result from the policies the Americans demanded. Sixth, Dodge implemented 
policies that would also increase the amount of revenue available to the government. To 
generate that additional revenue, he required that individuals incur significantly increased 
fees across a number of basic services, and, as a result of decreasing the rate inflation in 
the economy these efforts would effectively increase real taxes for individuals. Dodge 
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allocated and pushed debt repayment as a high priority for the government, and he would 
not any allow transfers of money from the general account to cover any special accounts 
as a measure to prevent further deficit spending. In addition to balancing the budget, 
Dodge pursued two other major changes that would have serious consequences for the 
Japanese economy. He created the US Counterpart Fund to manage incoming aid from 
the United States with the initial goal to repay old RFB debt and once complete, to 
distribute funds to businesses for various projects, this time under American discretion. 
Unlike the previous setup with the RFB, the Japanese government was not trusted with 
significant authority over the allocation of aid, and the counterpart fund was placed 
directly under SCAP control. Finally, Dodge established a single exchange rate for the 
yen. This action devalued the yen considerably resulting in an anticipated reduction for 




Dodge and Ikeda sent the budget proposal to the Diet in March 1949. The Diet 
merely had the formality of approving the budget, though it generated significant 
discontent among many members. Several politicians expressed their concerns that the 
combined effect of tightening credit and balancing the budget in a weak economy would 
only increase the risk of pushing the country into a recession, or worse, a depression. 
“Some members demanded that SCAP directly order them to adopt the budget, so that it 
would appear they accepted it against their will.” Members of the Diet sought to amend, 
or revise, portions of the budget, but their efforts failed. SCAP retained the authority to 
approve the budget proposal, and would only do so if the Japanese government adopted 
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the bill as it was drafted by Dodge.
340
 The Diet subsequently adopted the budget 
proposal.  
While the budget presented opportunities for the current conservative cabinet to 
purge Leftists and disrupt the activities of labor organizations in the public and private 
sectors, the swiftness with which the Dodge Line was implemented disturbed many 
supporters. The Yoshida government came to oppose these policies and the budget for the 
political consequences they began to suffer from the massive layoffs across the entire 
economy, the increased taxes that hit almost every individual and the resulting losses that 
businesses incurred. The political nature of implementing the Dodge Line became so 
acute that by the middle of 1949, Yoshida and his cabinet had “adopted a policy of 
refusing to carry out orders not to its liking without a formal written instruction from 
GHQ. This [action] relieves Yoshida’s party of the responsibility for unpopular measures 
[and requires GHQ to] assume an openly greater degree of direct control of Japan’s 
internal affairs – particularly in connection with the [stabilization plan]. It also places the 
blame for resulting hardship and difficulties more directly upon the occupation.”
341
 The 
occupation authorities had to maintain constant pressure on the Japanese government to 
carry out the stabilization program as the political costs of complying with the policies 
ordered by the American government continued to rise as the economic situation 
deteriorated. 
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After passing the budget through the Diet, Dodge began to criticize the Japanese 
government for shirking on its responsibilities and violating the principles of the 
stabilization plan. Dodge privately accused Yoshida and his cabinet of manipulating the 
budget to undermine the recovery program before it could take full effect.
342
 For instance, 
the government targeted individuals employed in statistical offices for layoffs in order to 
remove those responsible for providing data to monitor implementation of the 
stabilization program. In addition, the Economic Stabilization Board frequently reported 
on the negative consequences of the policies, arguing that their analyses had predicted the 
consequences and that much worse was to come if the government continued to pursue 
the policies prescribed by the Dodge Line. The most significant violation came from the 
Bank of Japan. Initially, the Bank of Japan had followed the Dodge Line, restricting 
access to credit for businesses to reduce inflation. Eventually, it had to act to moderate 
some of the more stressful aspects of a balanced budget and new tax program. 
Effectively, the Bank of Japan lightened the impact of these policies by allowing 
companies to access much needed credit though it was contrary to the stabilization 
program. The bank encouraged commercial banks to help companies as well, thereby 
allowing the commercial banking system in Japan to defect from the Dodge Line.
343
 The 
authorities in SCAP and Dodge agreed that measures had to be taken to mandate reserve 
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levels for commercial banks to prevent over-loaning and reign in credit before such 
actions undermined the efforts of the stabilization program. However, no actions were 
taken against the commercial banking industry during the implementation of the Dodge 
Line in either 1949 or throughout 1950. It is likely that Dodge was aware of the acts by 
the banking industry in Japan. He allowed the banks to act as a safety valve to mitigate 
the possibility of the more disaster consequences that might emerge from pursing his line 
rather that pushing through legislation to alter their policies.
344
 
The Dodge Line had an immediate effect on the Japanese economy. The rapidly 
rising inflation was ground to a halt in 1949 and for the first time since the early 1930s 
the government had a large budget surplus.
345
 These positives, however, were diminished 
in light of consequences of the implementing stabilization program. By April 1949, all 
other indicators on the health of the economy had dropped. As a consequence of 
tightening credit, many small and medium businesses had to declare bankruptcy. The 
bankruptcies and the reduction in subsidies combined also resulted in massive layoffs in 
the private sector in addition to the attrition in the public sector. Unemployment had 
reached a new high as the public and private sector cut over two million jobs between the 
implementation of the Dodge Line until the middle of 1950.
346
 As a result of the rising 
unemployment and the reduction in available jobs, suicide rates also increased across the 
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country in response to the lack of work. Unexpectedly, durable goods production dropped 
in Japan, suggesting that the reduction in domestic consumption was not shifting 
resources over to capital investment.
347
 In November 1949, William Sebald, 
Representative of the State Department to SCAP,  wrote about the effects of the Dodge 
Line, stating that “the Nine-Point Stabilization Program is perhaps the most unpopular 




More importantly, the American’s expectation that by reducing inflation the 
prices for exports would fall and Japan would then increase its trade was not working out 
as planned. International trade initially collapsed, which Dodge had expected, but the 
subsequent increase in exports did not follow as quickly as some policymakers had 
hoped. Japan did not experience much change in its trade during 1949, and only a small 
shift upward in early 1950.
349
 The economies of Southeast Asian were not buying up 
Japanese exports. Japanese goods were cheaper but the American policymakers had 
assumed that when the prices fell there would be markets for these goods in the world. In 
1949 and the first half of 1950, there were not, and the country was developing a massive 
supply of unsellable goods.
350
 At this time, these countries lacked both political stability 
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In March 1950, the Diet began discussions on the budget for 1950.  Dodge 
returned to Japan to enforce the prerogatives of the stabilization program, knowing that 
many politicians were urgently seeking some type of relief to mitigate the gloomy 
economic situation. Dodge continued to call for a balanced budget with significant 
resources spent on further reducing the debt. Dodge also advocated freezing the pay of 
the civil service in the coming year. Yoshida and his government were unsure of whether 
the economy could take another year of the austerity program. The members of the 
Liberal Party were especially concerned about opposition parties exploiting the dismal 
aspects of the economic stabilization program against them. The Japanese government 
asked again for concessions from the occupiers to reduce the amount spent on debt 




In May 1950, Yoshida sent Ikeda to Washington, D.C. on a secret trip to ask 
Dodge for concessions on continuing the economic policies that were devastating Japan. 
Yoshida had Ikeda issue a subtle threat as part of the request for concessions as to the 
consequences of refusal. Ikeda informed Dodge that the current economic policies were 
endangering American interests in Japan. Several opposition parties had recently taken a 
unified stance against the Yoshida cabinet for allowing the occupation to continue 
without a peace settlement in the foreseeable future, and attempted a no-confidence 
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measure to remove it from office.
353
 Fortunately, the Liberal Party held a strong majority 
and stopped the measure in the Lower House. Likely, Ikeda meant to imply that further 
such challenges would emerge, and could gain more support if the economy did not 
improve. Ikeda explained that if the Yoshida cabinet lost office, that none of the 
remaining political parties could obtain a similar majority position. Through this 
statement, Ikeda was suggesting that the occupation had to accommodate the 
government’s position; otherwise the United States would risk of losing the only political 
force in Japan that could meet American interests. Ikeda stated that the Yoshida 
government needed concessions in the upcoming budget for 1950 to accommodate 
certain portions of the Japanese population in addition to increased American aid, similar 
to what other countries were now receiving. Dodge refuted their requests by informing 
the officials that any changes in the economic stabilization program must be addressed to 
the authorities at SCAP. The Liberal Party would receive no concessions or any increases 
in aid. Instead, the Diet had to accept another budget following the prescriptions of the 
Dodge Line. The Diet adopted the proposal in late May.
354
 
Ikeda’s mission had changed nothing in the implementation of the Dodge Line, 
though it might have signaled the emerging weakness in Yoshida’s position and the costs 
he was incurring for following the austerity policies. The Americans had already found 
the current economic trend concerning, as “a secret State Department report of May 1950 
outlined how “every major power element in the Japanese body politic considers itself 
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injured and its interests jeopardized” by the enforcement of the stabilization plan.”
355
 The 
Dodge Line had brought the economy to at best a draw, and Japanese politicians were 
searching for the means to overturn its effects. As William S. Borden notes, “Spurred by 
the end of the American recession, the consequent easing of the world dollar crisis, and 
the spurt of sterling exports, the indices crept up through June, but Japan’s position was 
so grave that far more dramatic improvements were necessary to set up the economy on 
the path of modernization and recovery.”
356
 Without redress, the possibility of Japan 
entering a recession, or a depression, seemed likely in June 1950. 
In July 1950, as the politicians were growing restless under the rising costs from 
complying with the Dodge Line, North Korea invaded the South and initiated the Korean 
War. The unintended impact of the war on Japan was immense in terms of reviving the 
economy. Yoshida himself recognized the Korean War as a ‘Gift from God’ in turns of 
the economic benefits that it showered upon the staggering Japanese economy. The war 
brought a number of positive benefits that addressed many of the problems confronting 
the country. The military procurement for the war effort was massive. Goods and services 
were needed in Korea, and Japan was in the geographic proximity to provide almost 
everything that the participants needed to fight the North Koreans and then the Chinese. 
In August 1950, US procurement officers signed contracts for 60 million in goods and 
services. In 1951, receipts from the proceeds of military procurement had reached almost 
1 billion.
357
 In addition, once the fighting began to subside, South Korea needed further 
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goods and services to rebuild its war-torn country. Again, Japan would benefit 
enormously from the procurement efforts to refurnish its neighbor. As Tatsurō Uchino 
noted, from 1950 to 1955 the Japanese economy received orders for procurements in the 
magnitude of 2.4 billion to 3.6 billion.
358
 The dollar gap had largely dissipated from the 
military procurements. Furthermore, the war brought a substantial amount of foreign 
currency to Japan. The American troops passing through Japan to and from the Korean 
conflict became an excellent source of dollars to further stimulate the economy.
359
 At this 
point, the Japanese government had relatively few reasons to not implement the 
Americans preferred economic policies. The exporting of goods had greatly increased 
while the signs of an emerging depression had disappeared, and was replaced by the new 
demands for the continuing war effort. These large procurement orders had restored 
Japan’s trade levels to those of the prewar years of 1934 to 1936 and quickly surpassed 
that benchmark for economic recovery. Labor also substantially benefited as private 
corporations sought to increase their hiring efforts while simultaneously offering better 
compensation to current and new employees.
360
 Japan had at long last achieved a position 
at which economic self-sufficiency seemed possible.
361
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Analysis: Economic Recovery with High Compliance Costs 
 As noted in the introduction, this aspect of the occupation focuses on a goal – 
economic recovery – that both the American and Japanese officials favored as a preferred 
outcome for the postwar era. All of the cabinets and most members of the Diet wanted to 
repair the destruction that the country had suffered during the war, and to re-establish the 
economy as a major contributor and beneficiary of international trade. The United States 
wanted a bulwark against the rising tide of communism in Asia, a Japan that would serve 
as a defender of free markets and promoter capitalism in the region. If both countries 
wanted to accomplish a similar end, why did the victor order the vanquished to 
implement the economic stabilization program? The importance of recognizing this 
agreement on goals is that it reinforces the American distrust of the Japanese government 
to implement the necessary policies to affect an economic recovery. The occupation had 
provided aid initially as a means to stabilize the economy while pursuing political change 
in the country. By altering the political institutions, the Americans thought, the economic 
recovery would subsequently follow. As the international environment shifted, the 
Americans no longer thought the political reforms would be sufficient to create a stable 
ally. Many officials believed that the Japanese would not succeed in an economic 
recovery as their government was responsible for the rapidly rising inflation that brought 
about economic instability. The Americans would have to pressure the Japanese into 
accepting costly measures to achieve a goal that both considered beneficial to their 
postwar interests, but that the latter could not accomplish if left to its own devices. For 
their part, the Japanese recognized that the American economic policies would have 
consequences that imposed high political costs for complying with the demands. 
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As the evidence suggested, many politicians within the government worried about 
the costs of complying the American economic policies. The Japanese government 
wanted to restore the country’s economy, but the prescriptions sought in the stabilization 
program and implemented by Dodge could come back to haunt them. As agents, they 
became increasing adverse to the emerging political consequences of the economic 
policies implemented by the United States to achieve a stable economy. As the 
consequences of the policies began to affect the population, the politicians involved 
became increasingly resistant to continuing with the Dodge Line.
362
 Eventually, Yoshida 
and Ikeda went as far as to circumvent MacArthur and SCAP officials to plead secretly 
with Dodge for some type of relief – not only to mitigate the effects on the population, 
but to reduce the costs that they anticipated incurring from their supporters for complying 
with the American demands. 
Following the arguments concerning the high costs of compliance, the 
government officials did take steps to mitigate or contradict American orders. Removing 
bureaucrats in an attempt to hide information, and potentially encouraging the Bank of 
Japan to extend credit in opposition to the Dodge Line likely did not alleviate American 
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concerns on whether the Japanese government could achieve economic stability if left to 
its own devices. Dodge and others knew of these acts, and allowed the Bank of Japan to 
continue as a means of relieving some of the pressures in complying with the economic 
program.
363
 The Japanese, however, had to be careful not to completely undermine the 
economic stabilization policies, or they would risk losing the aid that the country 
desperately needed to maintain its current status. It is possible that the Dodge Line 
inadvertently increased that reliance on aid – albeit temporarily. This increased reliance 
would have further pressured politicians to adhere to the American prescriptions as a 
means to gain the relief that the economy and the population needed to survive the 
economic downturn in 1949 and 1950. Without the Korean War, it is not clear whether 
the Japanese economy would have improved as quickly as it did and effectively mitigated 
the costs of complying with the American economic program.  
However, the Korean War was a mixed blessing for the American policies and the 
Japanese economy, and not quite the gift from god that Yoshida praised. The level of 
inflation once again started to rise as the procurement orders flowed to the industrial 
sector, quickly approaching the same rates as during the initial phases of the occupation. 
The increase in trade led to a subsequently larger demand for shipping exports, making it 
profitable. Yet, the run on raw material resources as a part of this economic expansion 
increased the costs of Japanese imports, and reduced overall competitiveness of its 
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manufactured goods, especially to target markets in Southeast Asia. Japan was not 
receiving the expected capital investment to account for modernizing or expanding their 
factories. Instead, the resulting economic boom was increasing the dependency of the 
economy upon the demands of the United States and its imports rather than on exploring 
and developing further trade relations with Southeast Asia. Japan was now fully 
entrenched in the free world and in particular, the economy of the United States. The 




  The Americans had changed their focus from political reform to economic 
recovery as a result of the shifting international environment. The lack of an effective 
recovery in Japan was due to the failure of several Japanese governments to adequately 
address the underlying problems that prevented the emergence of stability. When the 
economic stabilization program was announced, the occupation officials recognized that 
their agents were less than enthused about cooperating, especially given the large 
political costs they expected to reap domestically from the increasing failure of 
businesses and rising unemployment.
365
 The Dodge Line would not have been 
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implemented without the Americans ordering the Japanese politicians to comply with the 
stabilization program to continue receiving aid for their economic recovery. The harsh 
consequences – rising unemployment, reductions in social programs, and lack of benefits 
from increased international trade – certainly made the Japanese government question the 
utility of the program and likely they anticipated significant political costs in coming 
elections. The Japanese would certainly have undermined the program if they thought it 
possible. SCAP authorities had to enforce the policies necessary to meet the economic 
stabilization program and the Japanese, under pressure, complied with what the 
Americans had dictated to them.  
Peace, Security and Rearmament 
 The United States had abandoned a peace conference in 1947 since the unstable 
financial conditions in Japan would have left the country exposed to the growing 
communist threat in the region.
366
 By May 1949, the State Department issued a report 
that suggested though the occupation was a success thus far the operation was 
approaching ‘the point of diminishing returns’ in terms of the goals it could achieve. The 
Japanese population had not engaged in overt resistance yet, but the report suggested that 
policy makers should be concerned with a growing restlessness among the occupied.
367
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The United States government was pursuing its options on how to design the settlement 
for Japan when the Korean War brought new political concerns to the forefront about the 
continuing occupation for the victor and the vanquished. John Foster Dulles, the primary 
negotiator for the peace treaty, believed that the attack on South Korea could become a 
direct threat to Japan, and thereby the regional interests of United States. Dulles also 
recognized an opportunity in the new conflict, in that “the Japanese people have been 
in…a postwar stupor. The Korean attack is awakening them…[the United States can] 
take advantage of this awakening to bring them an insight into the possibilities of the free 
world and their responsibility as a member of it.”
368
 
 The conflict in Korea also served to spark Japanese interest in renewing 
negotiations, and to bring an end to the occupation as well as settle the remaining 
disputes from World War II. Prime Minister Yoshida was especially eager to renew 
negotiations, given his thought that country’s bargaining position had improved vis-à-vis 
the United States with the recent conflict in Korea in July 1950. Previously, in May, 
during a visit with Dodge to discuss the economic policies, Financial Minister Ikeda 
raised a secret offer from the prime minister to entice the Americans into considering the 
renewal of negotiations over a peace treaty to end the occupation. The offer held that if 
the US could not raise the issue on retaining military bases in Japan after the occupation 
ended, then the Japanese government would do so to expedite the settlement. This secret 
offer for retaining bases was made in the context of a rising domestic threat against the 
American occupation and its interests in Japan. Yoshida believed that anti-Americanism 
had grown stronger among the population in recent years as a result of continuing 
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American control, and he firmly believed that now was the time to stem the problem 
before it led to more serious political consequences for the United States and the Japanese 
government. By initiating negotiations immediately, the Yoshida government was also in 
a strong position to issue its demands given its majority in the Diet, which indicated that 
it could deliver a peace on terms acceptable to the Americans if the latter provided certain 
concessions for the former’s compliance.
369
 
 Following the initial performance of the United Nations forces in the Korean 
conflict, Yoshida decided that he would publicly rescind the notion that his government 
would provide bases to the Americans after the occupation.
370
 In late July, Yoshida 
publicly testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors.
371
  At 
that meeting, he stated his opposition to providing Japanese territory to any foreign 
country to use for basing arrangements. He affirmed that the, “Allied powers do not 
intend to present such a demand, as it is the desire of the Allied powers to keep Japan out 
of war.” In the following days, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ichiro Ohta explained to 
William Sebald the unexpected shift in the government’s stance on basing arrangements 
after the occupation. Ohta informed Sebald that the UN’s performance in protecting 
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South Korea indicated that the international organization was sufficiently reliable to 
provide for Japan’s future security needs.
372
 
The prime minister had significant domestic concerns on his mind when publicly 
renouncing bases, and more generally regarding the future security arrangements for 
Japan. The Japanese government was persistently pursuing peace with the Americans to 
end the occupation, though the acceptable terms of any such arrangement were a matter 
for serious debate. If one thing united the political parties of Japan, it was their resolve to 
establish a peace that left no infringements on the sovereignty of their country.
373
 The 
political parties on the Left had formed a coalition called the ‘United Front’ to challenge 
Yoshida’s government with a vote of no-confidence in April 1950. The following month, 
Butterworth met with Shirasu to discuss the question of Japan’s future security. Shirasu 
confided that public support for the prime minister and the Liberal Party was diminishing 
as a result of the political opposition engaging in an “uncompromising attack on the US 
base issue.”
374
 In addition, the rearmament of Japan had become a tense debate among 
the political parties. The Left actively opposed any abrogation of the new pacifist 
constitution while the Democrats wanted to both revise Article 9 and immediately begin 
rearming the country. Yoshida himself did not favor the rearmament of Japan at this time, 
given the possible consequences it would pose for the recovery of the country’s still 
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 The prime minister had strong domestic incentives to state his 
opposition to any possible basing relationship, and to avoid any entanglements in the 
rearmament issue.  
 In private, Yoshida held a different view on the possibility of the Americans 
retaining bases in Japan. He favored the Americans remaining in Japan, perhaps under an 
arrangement with the UN or even a bilateral treaty among sovereign equals. He had 
informed the Sir Alvary Gascoigne, Head of the British Liaison Mission, that the 
continuing presence of US forces was necessary to maintain the country’s security given 
the deteriorating situation across East Asia.
376
 For the moment, Yoshida thought Japan 
had gained an upper hand for the coming negotiations with the US, and hoped for 
significantly improved terms in the resulting agreements. Specifically, Yoshida thought 
that “Japan and the United States had to approach the [security treaty] as independent 
countries on an equal footing.”
377
  
Though still under occupation, Yoshida had expected an increase in his 
bargaining leverage in the forthcoming negotiations. By virtue of its location Japan had 
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become indispensible for the Americans to fight the Korean War, especially now with the 
Chinese intervention. The United States needed Japan to maintain its presence and defend 
its interest in Asia. As Kenneth Pyle notes, Yoshida “…reasoned that Japan could make 
minimal concessions of passive cooperation with the Americans in return for an early end 
to the occupation, a long-term guarantee of its national security, and the opportunity to 
concentrate on all-out economy recovery.”
378
 The prime minister expected that Japan 
would be exempt from any contributions to collective defense beyond providing the 
country’s industrial capacity to the free world.  
Yoshida also tried to demonstrate that the opposition in Japan had radically 
different ideas on what was appropriate for a peace treaty. In June 1950, he had Dulles 
meet with several opposition party leaders, many of whom demanded a full peace 
including the Soviets and the Chinese, the complete removal of all US military forces 
from Japanese territory, and no rearmament as per Article 9 of the new constitution.
379
 In 
effect, Yoshida thought the value of Japan had increased significantly, and that only he 
could deliver an acceptable peace to the Americans. He expected that the US would see 
no alternative but to pay his price for gaining a peace treaty as well as continued access to 
Japanese territory. With those advantages in mind, Yoshida looked forward to the 
negotiations.  
On 8 September 1950, President Harry Truman approved NSC 60/1 for the 
United States to commence the preliminary negotiations with Japan for a peace treaty. 
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The arrangement called for a number of stipulations, including that the resources of Japan 
to be denied to the Soviet Union and that the mainland would host no foreign forces that 
were unacceptable to the United States. The resulting peace treaty would provide rights to 
the United States to maintain its armed forces in Japan, and to retain strategic control 
over certain islands. The security arrangement should also establish that the United States 
could not be forced out of the country, and yet that American officials had the option to 
exit if new security guarantees emerged. Furthermore, the US military would face no 
limitations on its ability to act against civil unrest within the country, should the Japanese 
government request its assistance. Finally, any arrangements between the US and Japan 
must acknowledge the latter’s right to self-defense, and to possess the necessary 
capabilities to act on that right.
380
 On the following day, Dulles held a press conference, 
during which he made clear that the forthcoming treaty would place no restrictions upon 
the Japanese government in regards to remilitarization.
381
 
Dulles was prepared to initiate negotiations in November. By the end of that 
month, however, the tide had turned in the Korean War. The Chinese had intervened and 
the American forces were retreating deep into South Korea. Under the provisions of NSC 
60/1, the negotiations were postponed until January 1951. Truman then decided to 
reinitiate the peace talks, even though the conflict in Korea had reached something of a 
stalemate. Dulles had two policy objectives: establish a defensive commitment to protect 
Japan, and to begin Japanese rearmament immediately.
382
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In January 1951, the Japanese government believed that their bargaining position 
had further improved following the unexpected downturn in the war and the emerging 
stalemate. The American negotiators would pursue a quick peace to direct their efforts 
towards ending the stalemate on the Korean Peninsula. Yoshida had planned on offering 
the bases to the United States as a concession during the peace talks in 1951. That is, he 
did not see the bases on the islands, or on the mainland, as a given that the Americans 
would retain following the termination of the occupation. Instead, Yoshida thought that 
the basing arrangements were something that had to be purchased from Japan in the 
course of the negotiations for a peace settlement. His underlying assumption was that the 
talks would be among equals haggling over an equal partnership for the postwar era. The 
United States wanted access to Japanese territory to maintain its strategic position in East 
Asia, and that could be done, for the right price. The prime minister had just such a price 
in mind when preparing for the upcoming negotiations: in return for access to the bases, 
Japan would remain unarmed under the protection of United States through a collective 
defense arrangement under the auspices of the UN.
383
 For Yoshida, what mattered most 
was gaining a commitment from the Americans to defend Japan against any possible 
threats that might emerge without having to rearm the country and risk endangering the 
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current pace of the economic recovery.
384
 Yoshida recognized that the current war 
presented a window in which the United States could call upon Japan to rearm and 
possibly then demand that the country’s new military contribute to fighting in Korea. The 
country would incur significant costs in establishing the military force, placing a drain on 
its economic resources that would undermine its recovery. Then, Japan would incur 
further costs in terms of causalities lost in the fight when the United States would call for 
its assistance through troop contributions to the Korean conflict.
385
 During this window, 
the prime minister would resist any such demands. 
Negotiations among “Equals” 
The peace negotiations began on 29 January 1951. Dulles immediately set in on 
discussing how Japan intended to provide for its security in the emerging international 
environment. Yoshida responded that any rearmament of the country must proceed 
slowly for two reasons. First, Yoshida stressed that the possibility remained for the 
militarists to reemerge from hiding and overpower the civilian government.
386
 The 
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Japanese government would need to take legal steps to avoid these possibilities, such as 
implementing measures that would insure civilian control while removing the possibility 
of the military taking over again. Second, the Japanese economy was still weak and 
recovering from the war. Financially, any attempt at rearmament now would likely undo 
the progress that had been achieved thus far and undermine future economic growth by 
redirecting precious resources away from the industrial sector to remilitarizing the 
country.  
Dulles wanted to know whether the prime minister saw these two reasons as 
preventing Japan from taking action, or simply as hurdles that the latter would have to 
clear domestically. He reminded Yoshida that the United States and the rest of the free 
world were contributing to the emerging system of collective security. Dulles further 
stated that, “no one would expect the Japanese contribution at present to be large but it 
was felt that Japan should be willing to make at least a token contribution and a 
commitment to …collective security.” Dulles was not demanding a full and immediate 
rearmament at the moment.  However, he made it clear that the United States expected a 
demonstrable commitment from Japan to the emerging system of collective security. 
When confronted with the question, Yoshida responded that of course Japan would make 
a contribution. The prime minister, however, refrained from offering any specifics on 
what the country would offer, and that he wanted to avoid a ‘definitively commitment’ 
for the moment.
387
 Yoshida persisted that the discussion on restoring Japan’s sovereignty 
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   On 31 January, Dulles and Yoshida met again to continue the negotiations. 
Yoshida presented a memorandum that pressed the point that Japan was not in a position 
to undertake rearmament. The country was confronted with a scarcity of resources to 
begin such a program, and had to carefully consider where to invest its limited 
capabilities. The economy certainly was not in a condition to divert valuable materials 
away from more crucial recovery programs. The document also held that both domestic 
and international opposition would emerge against any rearmament program. There 
would be increased domestic unrest towards the government’s policy change, especially 
since the population had enthusiastically embraced Article 9 of the new constitution. In 
addition, neighboring countries would likely suspect that rearming Japan would most 
certainly lead to renewed attempts at aggression by the defeated power. The risks 
inherent in rearmament were simply too high, contended Yoshida, while protecting the 
economy remained the more paramount concern for the immediate future. The 
memorandum also touched on the future basing arrangements and security cooperation 
that would be included in the peace treaty. Japan wanted to define the duration of the 
American control for its strategically valuable islands, and establish a shared division of 
authority between the countries. Turning to the issue of security cooperation, the 
memorandum held that Japan would manage her internal affairs exclusively. Externally, 
the document laid out the expectation that the American troops would be stationed in 
Japan as the primary means for protection from any potential international threats to the 
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country’s security. The memo further emphasized that the peace treaty would set out the 
terms for “providing cooperation for mutual security between Japan and American as 
equal partners.”
389
   
Dulles responded by discussing the issue of Japanese rearmament first. Dulles 
made his case clear to Yoshida regarding the contribution that the United States expected:  
The thing that I worry about in the short term is that Japan will not recreate 
adequate defense forces. There is no worry in our minds about an unduly large 
naval or air forces…Americans can envision our troops being indefinitely 
committed to defending an unarmed Japan: America is not willing to station 
forces in Japan for very long unless the Japanese do something on their own 
account. If Japan should be incorporated into the orbit of the Western 




Dulles stressed that a Japanese contribution – via rearmament – was a vital component of 
the American plan to restore the balance of power in East Asia against further communist 
expansion. He made explicit that such a contribution should not place an undue burden 
on the Japanese economy. 
However, the United States expected and required that Japan make a 
demonstration of providing for its defense in return for any type of defensive obligation. 
Again, Dulles mentioned that the expectation was not that Yoshida sacrifice the 
economic recovery for the immediate and full rearmament program. Instead, he indicated 
that Japan would have to bear some costs of rearmament now to demonstrate its 
commitment to collective security and to receive an American obligation for the island’s 
                                                 
389 Undated Memorandum by the Prime Minister of Japan, 1951 FRUS Vol. VI Part 1, 833-835. Yoshida 
also sought arrangements in negotiations to allow the government to begin ‘reforming’ some aspects of the 
laws. Dulles unequivocally stated that these matters had to be addressed through SCAP, and not in the 
course of the negotiations. Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 
31 January 1951 FRUS Vol. VI Part 1, 836. 
390 Quoted in Umetsu, “Dulles’s Second Visit to Japan,” 67. 
220 
 
defense. The United States had wanted 300,000 to 350,000 men in the Japanese armed 
forces eventually as the optimal number to protect the islands, but it would accept a 
smaller figure as a solid commitment to the process of remilitarization. At the moment, 
Dulles was prepared to accept a lesser contribution from the Japanese government given 
their economic position but that contribution had to signal that Japan was on its way 
towards building up its strength to aid in the defense of the free world. Yoshida 
reaffirmed that Japan could not undertake any type of rearmament program at the 
moment. He preferred that Japan continue to rely on the United States to supply 
protection while the Japanese provided its labor and industrial resources as its initial 
assistance to maintaining the free world. Stationing of the American military on Japanese 
soil would provide sufficient means to insure the country’s external security.
391
  
 At this point, Dulles was being unequivocal that Japan had to provide for its self 
defense when Yoshida shifted the conversation to discuss the basing arrangements. 
Specifically, he wanted to negotiate over the leasing arrangements for the Ryukyu and 
Bonin Islands. Dulles simply stated that this was ‘undesirable’ given the terms of 
unconditional surrender that Japan had conceded to at the end of World War II.
392
 Dulles 
declared that the US would retain control over the islands, and that “the United 
States…had no reason to consider Japanese wishes regarding the sovereignty of those 
areas.”
393
 As Chihiro Hosoya notes, “Dulles…considered the right of the United States to 
retain her forces in Japan as an obvious pre-condition for any peace settlement, not a 
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Japanese concession for which the United States should pay a price.”
394
 In essence, 
Dulles understood the basing rights of the United States as a given demand that it would 
issue, and was now informing Yoshida that he would comply as part of the peace 
settlement. As Michael Yoshita further explained, Dulles “defined American security in 
terms of a Japanese promise to rearm, and assumed a peace settlement would permit the 
United States to keep bases in Japan and have control over the Ryukyus and Bonins.”
395
 
That the United States considered these issues resolved was a ‘surprise’ to Yoshida, and a 
significant decrease in the country’s bargaining power in the negotiations.
396
  
The negotiations shifted to staff level meetings rather than continue along this 
path between Dulles and Yoshida. On 1 February, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sadao Iguchi and Director of the Treaty Bureau Kumao Nishimura presented Japan’s list 
of terms for a security treaty. They wanted to negotiate an American guarantee for 
Japanese security on behalf of the UN. In particular, the United States would act against 
any external aggression against the country through its maintenance of strategic bases. 
The United States and Japan would consult one another when threats emerged to their 
interests to coordinate policy beforehand. Representing the United States, John Allison, 
Assistant Secretary of State Earl Johnson, General Carter Magruder, and Colonel Stanton 
Babcock addressed the Japanese draft. The Americans consented to some the points 
addressed by their Japanese counterparts, but raised serious questions concerning the 
specific details of several provisions. Without a similar agency to the Department of 
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Defense, the Americans were not clear on who they would consult with when threats 
emerged. They noted that Japan should create a defense agency for the purpose of 
coordinating responses with American forces. In regards to the UN and the country’s 
security, the Americans wanted to know explicit details on how the Japanese would 
contribute to repelling an invasion from its territories. The Americans wanted specific 
commitments on what actions Japan would take, namely how the government would 
pursue rearmament to provide for its security when its sovereignty was restored.
397
 In 
shifting the negotiations, the Americans remained fixated on the issue of rearmament 
while the Japanese officials continued to elude the choice presented to them.  
On 2 February, the American side presented its draft arrangement for a security 
treaty with Japan to discuss the articles concerning the military’s rights and privileges on 
Japanese soil in the postwar era. Hiroyuki Umetsu has noted that the document “defined 
Japan’s post-treaty role as an offensive strategic base in the cold war from which to 
mount aggressive warfare against the Soviet Union and China.” The entirety of Japan’s 
territory would become a staging area for further conflict in the region, if and when 
necessary as decided by the United States. The agreement provided broad powers to a 
commanding officer to determine what the Japanese would need to provide in terms of on 
the ground resources for the American military. The document also presented the terms 
for when the United States could use its forces to intervene in the civil affairs of the 
country when internal threats emerged. Upon reviewing the draft arrangement, Iguchi and 
Nishimura “realized that the U.S. terms for the continued stationing of American armed 
forces had been firmly and unilaterally formulated without leaving any room for meeting 
                                                 





 Protecting the world from the emerging threat of communism was 
deemed greater than any domestic concerns that the Japanese government might have 
regarding the terms of the peace that the United States was currently demanding. 
Furthermore, the terms demonstrated that the American officials did not yet trust Japan to 
act independently, and that the former wanted some concrete assurances that the latter 
would remain committed to the free world.
399
 The Japanese diplomats now understood 
that their perceived bargaining strength was not only ineffective, but simply non-existent 
in the so-called ‘negotiations.’ They realized that the Americans were presenting their 
terms to compel a commitment for continued compliance after the occupation terminated. 
Both negotiators emphatically protested these terms, realizing that accepting such an 
agreement would generate sharp and divisive domestic debates on Japan’s role in future 
conflicts and its sovereign status as an independent country.
400
  
The Japanese officials were extremely worried that the negotiations had gone in 
the wrong direction, and that the government was in danger of having to accept the terms 
without gaining any significant concessions. The Americans had made relatively minor 
indulgences on the terms that they stated in the security treaty, to make it more palatable. 
Other than that, the negotiators for the United States demanded strict adherence to their 
draft arrangements as the peace settlement that Japan would have to comply with in the 
postwar era. For the Japanese negotiators, the defense commitment seemed elusive at this 
point with the occupying power continuing to press for the initiation of rearmament as the 
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main priority for any peace settlement that would include such an obligation. Dulles and 
his fellow negotiators had set the demands and now waited for the Japanese government 
to decide on how they would comply.  
Iguchi and Nishimura met with Yoshida to discuss whether they should now 
consider rearmament under some limited capacity. Otherwise, the Americans would have 
the basing rights without any negotiation, and the Japanese government would have 
gained nothing in return. Yoshida finally relented to his subordinates, and asked them to 
prepare a draft response, entitled “Initial Steps for Rearmament Program” to meet the 
demands of the United States. Yoshida agreed to submit to the terms set forth by the 
Americans, and he sought the smallest possible burden that he thought Japan could bear 
in terms of rearmament. The program contained two initiatives. First, Japan would 
establish a 50,000 man defense force separate from existing security forces with superior 
fire power. Second, the government would create two new organizations: the Peace 
Preservation Agency and a Defense Planning Office. The former would coordinate with 
the American military and the latter would function as a general staff headquarters for the 
new Japanese military.
401
 Yoshida expected that the US negotiators would now grant the 
defense obligation that his government wanted.  
Upon receiving the plan for rearmament, the Americans presented their final 
drafts of the peace treaty, security agreement, and the administrative arrangement to the 
Japanese negotiators, who eagerly reviewed them. The documents contained no reference 
to any obligation on reparations that the country would have to pay or to any further 
restrictions on sovereignty once the occupation officially terminated. These constituted 
                                                 
401 Hosoya, “Japan’s Response to U.S. Policy,” 25; Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace 
Settlement, 60-61.  
225 
 
two terms that the Japanese had been anxious about in the lead up to negotiations.
402
 The 
documents, however, did not make the primary concessions sought by Japan in the 
postwar era: the protection of Japan by the United States from external attack. 
Specifically, Nishimura and Iguchi realized that the security agreement had “merely 
“implicitly” incorporated Japan within the American nuclear umbrella” without providing 
any type of guarantee or obligation to defend the country should the need arise.
403
 In 
response, the negotiators immediately sought any possible mention of an equal 
cooperative security relationship between the two countries to be inserted into the draft 
arrangements that would follow the UN Charter.
404
 The Americans, however, continued 
to withhold such an explicit clause in the security agreement. The offer of limited 
rearmament had been accepted by the Americans, but the proposal was not sufficient to 
gain the security guarantee.  
On 3 February, the Japanese submitted a revision to the draft security 
arrangement, again calling for the United States to adopt a defensive obligation on behalf 
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of Japan’s international security. In addition, the memorandum contained the Japanese 
response to the three documents, in particular Chapter VII of the security arrangement. 
The details of this chapter made it explicit that Japan would undertake measures to 
initiate rearmament and restore its military power. It established the purpose of the 
Japanese armed forces in terms of protecting the home territories. Chapter VII also 
specified that, in times of emergencies, the United States would designate a commander 
to lead a unified American and Japanese military force.
405
 The Japanese officials realized 
that this aspect of the security arrangement would make it explicit to both international 
and domestic audiences that the country was now remilitarizing. Public 
acknowledgement of Japan’s acceptance of the American demand for rearmament was 
out of the question. The Japanese officials asked that the entire chapter and any further 
references that indicated or suggested rearmament be removed from all three draft 
documents. Yoshida would reinforce the necessity of secrecy regarding rearmament to 
MacArthur on 6 February and Dulles on 7 February, asking that the three documents 





The American officials agreed to remove the clauses in the peace treaty, the 
security agreement, and the administrative arrangement. The secrecy that Yoshida and 
the negotiators wanted, however, came at a price. Upon reviewing these new revisions on 
5 February, Dulles fully rejected the Japanese appeals for some type of explicit 
commitment. Under these conditions, Dulles noted that the US would only seek basing 
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rights and it would not assume any obligations to defend Japan. He clearly stated to his 
fellow negotiators why the United States could not offer the defensive commitment that 
the Japanese government was demanding, stating that:  
Until Japan is in a position to undertake corresponding obligations of its own the 
US would want rights rather than obligations. The US cannot press the Japanese 
to assume military obligations until they have dealt with their Constitutional 




While the Americans recognized the costs Yoshida could incur from a public acceptance 
of their demands for rearmament, without that explicit guarantee providing the exact 
nature of the contributions Japan would make to a collective security arrangement the US 
would not make one in return. Dulles had decided that the commitment from Yoshida 
was not a sufficient contribution to collective security. The secrecy required may have led 
him to further question whether the Japanese government had any intentions to honor its 
proposal for rearmament.
408
 More likely, Dulles had simply given Yoshida the choice on 
how the Japanese government would comply with the American demands, and the 
subsequent demonstration – while following the demands as set forth – was judged as 
insufficient to warrant the incentive offered.  
Yoshida had hoped to gain an American commitment to defend the islands, to 
demonstrate that the former opponents were now sovereign equals. He was convinced 
that the shifting international environment had provided him with an advantage in the 
negotiations, and yet the Americans had not come to negotiate per se. The prime minister 
had decided to commit to the American demands, and did so without gaining the prized 
defense obligation. As Michael Yoshita notes, “The prime minister had assumed that 
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these facilities [bases] were vital to US interests in the Far East, and concluded that the 
right to maintain “strategic dispositions” would elicit an unarmed Japan” as 
compensation.
409
 Yoshida had failed to gain a commitment from the United States to 
defend Japan in the event of an international conflict. Dulles was prepared to make such 
an arrangement. That commitment, however, was conditioned on Japan agreeing to 
significantly larger rearmament program. Yoshida had resisted the American demands for 
300,000 to 350,000 soldiers immediately as part of a rearmament, and Dulles more 
‘moderate’ position on remilitarizing the country presented in the negotiations. Yoshida 
recognized the costs he would pay for complying with the American demand for such a 
rearmament program, especially in such a quick and abrupt manner. Now, the prime 
minister realized the political consequences of not achieving this arrangement during the 
negotiations: any subsequent agreement would reflect the inequality of the relationship 
between the two countries even upon the termination of the occupation.
410
  
 Though the Americans had retained control of the islands, gained their preferred 
basing arrangements, and established that the Japanese government would contribution to 
its own security, the last component fell short of its expectations. Yoshida had complied 
with the demands as presented by Dulles, but he had done so by meeting what he 
believed was the minimum burden possible to Japan. Dulles, however, had expected a 
moderate, and public, demonstration by the Japanese government. The United States had 
won the war and now was moving forward with imposing its peace. On 9 February 1951, 
the representatives for Japan signed the three draft documents.  
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Analysis: Dictating Rearmament over Recovery  
The resulting three agreements from the negotiations in 1951 have received 
dismal evaluations in terms of what Japan gained, and what was dictated to it, from 
scholars and policymakers alike. As Michael Schaller notes, “the peace treaty served as a 
sweetener for the less equitable security treaty. The security treaty, in turn, screened 
criticism of the still more controversial administrative agreement that Yoshida planned to 
ratify by executive agreement.”
411
 Secretary of State Christian Herter later remarked on 
the treaty in 1960, “There were a number of provisions in the 1951-1952 Security Treaty 
that were pretty extreme from the point of view of an agreement between two sovereign 
nations.”
412
 By including the secret provision for rearmament, Yoshida incurred several 
commitments in the three treaties that would be costly to him domestically and Japan 
internationally after the occupation terminated. 
Following the logic of the theory, Yoshida was unfavorable to incurring the costs 
of complying with American demands for Japanese rearmament. Internationally, the 
prime minister thought that rearmament might harm Japan’s efforts to make amends for 
the war atrocities that it had committed. In particular, he worried that neighboring Asian 
countries would not see a defensive force, but rather a resurgence of an offensive military 
power in Japan.
413
 Yoshida recognized that these countries’ suspicions would undermine 
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their current and future trading relations, something Japan desperately needed to continue 
its economic recovery. Yoshida knew that the Americans wanted the Japanese 
government to create a force that would eventually measure between 300,000 and 
350,000 troops. He worried about what would happen when the Japanese army reached 
that size: would the Americans press the Japanese government into using that new army 
in conflicts throughout Asia such as the Korean War?
414
 Such efforts would only further 
undermine the country’s pacific reputation internationally, and would certainly rile 
domestic concerns over the constitution. 
Acting as the American representative during the negotiations, Dulles followed 
the dictating strategy as described in the argument. Dulles presented Yoshida with a 
choice: engage in rearmament at an appropriate level, publicly declare the intention to the 
world, and Japan would receive the full protection of the United States. Yoshida resisted, 
but Dulles and the other American officials established their position and ordered the 
Japanese government to make a decision on how to comply. Dulles compelled Yoshida to 
make a choice on how to commitment to rearmament, thereby removing Yoshida’s 
preferred outcome of not rearming from the table and pressuring him into committing to 
the American demand for remilitarizing the country.  
This choice should have increased Japan’s confidence that the Americans would 
honor their part of the bargain if the former consented to the latter’s terms. Dulles and the 
other negotiators granted the Japanese multiple opportunities to comprehend the nature of 
                                                                                                                                                 
410. For a discussion on the security concerns of New Zealand in relation to a remilitarized Japan, see Ann 
Trotter, “San Francisco Treaty Making and its implications for New Zealand,” Japan Forum 15 no. 3 9 
(2003): 411-423. 
414 Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 293. For the Japanese involvement in the Korea War, see 
Reinhard Drifte, “Japan’s Involvement in the Korean War,” in The Korean War in History ed. by James 
Cotton and Ian Neary (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), 120-135. 
231 
 
their demands and to understand the importance of compliance as a necessary condition 
to gain the defensive obligation. The combination of the American officials pressuring 
the Japanese negotiators combined with the assurance that they would receive the defense 
obligation pushed them towards agreement. In essence, Dulles and the other American 
negotiators compelled Yoshida to make a commitment to rearmament. However, the 
Americans did not follow through given Yoshida’s minimal commitment to rearmament 
combined with the necessary secrecy of the project. This raises the question as to whether 
Dulles achieved what the Americans wanted?  
John Welfield has noted, that in this regard, “the American refusal to give Japan a 
clear-cut guarantee of protection was not the result of Japanese capitulation before 
overwhelming American pressure. … On the contrary, it was a result of the United States 
having failed to impose its view on Japan in one critical area”
415
 That assertion, however, 
misses the subtleties of the relationship between the United States and Japan in 
‘negotiating’ the peace arrangements. Dulles had stated that the United States now 
demanded that the Japanese government carry out a rearmament program as the condition 
for receiving the defensive commitment. He was not bargaining with Yoshida on this 
point, but ordering the prime minister to decide on how Japan would comply with this 
term. During the course of the negotiations, the option of pursuing an economic recovery 
without rearmament became increasingly clear as the American officials continually 
pressed for a decision. Yoshida would have to incur the costs of sacrificing some 
resources to the rebuilding of the country’s military. If he wanted the commitment, and 
the termination of the occupation, he would have to accept the costs of complying with 
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the American demands. Dulles left the decision on how to pursue rearmament to Yoshida 
as a means to demonstrate the American commitment to the agent’s following orders. 
Yoshida’s decision, however, was insufficient to demonstrate compliance. Even though 
Dulles withdrew the American offer, Yoshida realized the Americans still expected Japan 
to incur the costs of rearmament.  
 Did Yoshida avoid compliance with the American demands given his minimum 
offer on rearmament? In making the commitment to rearmament a secret, Yoshida may 
have hoped to delay fulfillment of the condition. Specifically, he might have expected 
MacArthur to support his efforts to slow down or even halt remilitarization after the 
negotiations with Dulles. MacArthur might have agreed to this, as he was not entirely 
convinced that Japan should begin rearmament immediately. If that was part of Yoshida’s 
plan – to play MacArthur off Dulles, and attempt to elude the commitment to rearmament 
– it failed. In April 1951, MacArthur was removed from his position as the Supreme 
Commander of SCAP. His replacement, General Matthew Ridgway, did not adhere to 
MacArthur’s beliefs about a pacifist Japan, and likely supported the restoration of the 
country’s military power to balance out the communist threat in the region.
416
 General 
Ridgway would eventually present Yoshida with the US plans for the necessary size of 
the defense force, approximately 300,000 to 350,000 soldiers. This figure was well above 
the commitment initially made by the prime minister to Dulles in the negotiations. 
Yoshida opposed these numbers, admitting that providing for the country’s security was 
important but that the pacing of such programs mattered. The Japanese government had 
to educate their people on the necessity of remilitarization, with Yoshida arguing that 
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“the people, understanding the Communist threat, would themselves demand that Japan 
provide its own protection by rearming.” Otherwise, Yoshida feared that proceeding too 
quickly would arouse domestic opposition from both sides of the political spectrum.
417
  
Rearmament, however, was already a political problem as Yoshida began 
incurring the costs for complying with the American demands to end the occupation. As 
John Dower notes,  
Yoshida was accused of selling the country to the United States by bartering true 
independence for nominal sovereignty, and in Japanese parlance the settlement he 
gained for Japan became widely characterized as “dependent independence” or 
“subordinate independence.” The phrase was infuriating to the old patriot, and 
also effective in undermining his political authority, for its appropriateness was 





Domestically, Yoshida would confront opposition from both the Left and the Right 
towards his compliance with the American demands for rearming the country.  
The Left in Japan adamantly opposed any kind of rearmament, and even had 
doubts about a bilateral peace arrangement with the United States, especially one that 
included the retention of American bases on Japanese soil. The members vocalized their 
support for a Japan that adopted neutrality as its stance in the ongoing Cold War. The 
country could not afford to make commitments to either side in the conflict given the 
associated costs. Various left-wing parties claimed that working with the United States to 
rearm the country would ultimately undermine the economy and democracy. The 
economic recovery was far from complete, and every resource taken away from 
production or consumers was a loss overall. Furthermore, the Japanese people had 
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expressed support for the pacifist constitution, and undoing that measure in favor of 
American demands would diminish their support for government policies. Thus, the Left 
harshly criticized the Yoshida government for complying with the Americans, who 
represented the strongest threat to the country economically and democratically. The 
issue of rearmament caused a divisive split among the conservatives in Japan. Yoshida 
refrained from discussing the issue, except to make occasional comments concerning the 
country’s need to ‘increase defensive peace.’ The former leader of the Liberal Party, 
Hatoyama Ichiro, did not take such a subtle approach. He openly called on the party to 
support rearmament, and to revise the constitution, especially Article 9. Other 
conservative parties also favored the establishment of a Japanese military, to end the 
country’s dependence on American power, and establish an equal partnership between 
two independent sovereign nations. These pro-rearmament conservatives broke rank with 
Yoshida and the Liberal Party’s more cautious approach towards the issue. The combined 




The elections that followed immediately in 1952 and 1953 did not bode well for 
Yoshida, the Liberal Party, and the conservatives more generally. The Left effectively 
packaged its stance on neutrality in the Cold War, a peace among all former war 
participants, opposition to the continuing presence of American forces, and especially the 
population’s opposition to the rearmament issue to increase their representation in the 
Diet. Yoshida and his cabinet did not appeal as successfully to the masses. The 
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dissonance between the announcements of the cabinet and the actual emergence of a new 
military within Japan did not resonate well with a public that was as yet undecided on 
whether to support or oppose the controversial policy. Furthermore, the divisions within 
the conservatives’ ranks over rearmament had sufficiently weakened their coordination 
and led to a declining share of the electorate, subsequently erasing the majority that 
Yoshida’s party had enjoyed since 1949.
420
 
Even with the costs confronting Yoshida, he would carry out the secret 
commitment to rearmament by establishing a navy, army, and air force in addition to a 
defense agency to coordinate their actions. In August 1952, the government created the 
National Safety Agency and charged it with providing policy for Japan’s defense. In 
October 1952, the National Police Reserve would almost double in manpower as Yoshida 
tried to convince the public and the opposition that it only served as a police force.
 421
 
The Maritime force would have its size limits removed in 1952 and shortly thereafter in 
1953, the Japanese would gain full control over the emerging naval force. In July 1954, 
the Japanese government finally created an air force to support the army and navy units 
already in commission. During this time, the United States also pushed the Japanese to 
accept armaments for the rising military force. For the Navy, the Americans provided 
several frigates and landing craft in October 1951 while the army received weapons, 
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 In addition, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement would 
deepen the ties between Japan and the United States in the Cold War. The agreement, 
however, came under strong domestic opposition in the lower house of the Diet for the 
increased burden that Japan would bear to further its rearmament efforts, though 
eventually it did pass.
423
 In March 1954, the Diet began debate on two bills to establish 
the Defense Agency and the creation of the Self Defense Forces. Similar to the Mutual 
Defense Agreement, the two bills encountered strong debate in both the lower and upper 
houses before finally passing into law. In July 1954, the National Safety Forces 
transformed into the Defense Agency along with the establishment of the respective 
Ground, Air and Maritime Self Defense Forces.
424
 For his part, Yoshida complied with 
the commitments he made to Dulles in February 1951.  
 The costs of complying with the American demands caught up with Yoshida 
shortly after the establishment of the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces. By 
November 1954, Hatoyama had established a new conservative party that opposed 
Yoshida and his policies, in particular the slow, cautious rearmament of Japan. As a 
result of this split within the conservative ranks, Yoshida would lose his position as 
leader of the Liberal Party shortly thereafter. On 6 December, the opposition parties 
pushed for a no-confidence vote against Yoshida. It is likely that he sought to resist this 
latest challenge to his political survival, but the cabinet ministers left their positions in 
response to the no-confidence measure. The prime minister, now without a government, 
                                                 
422 Harries and Harries, Sheathing the Sword, 238-241; Schaller, Altered States, 45-46. 
423 I. H. Nish, “The Japanese-American Security Treaty, 1960,” The Australian Quarterly 32, no. 3 (1960): 
8-9. 




wanted to press for new elections, but he found that the fractured Liberal Party would not 
support his efforts to remain in office. Yoshida resigned on 7 December 1954.
425
 
Once out of office, Yoshida would later contend that he actually had gained the 
defense obligation when the Americans agreed to keep bases on the islands. By agreeing 
to maintain the forces on Japanese territory, he effectively gained the protection and 
security the country needed via the continuing presence of the United State military. 
Thus, he succeeded in the negotiations.
426
 That interpretation from the former prime 
minister, however, overlooks a number of important aspects of the negotiations, including 
the American refusal to negotiate over the bases and the Japanese commitment to 
rearmament as a failed attempt to secure the defensive commitment. Yoshida was 
genuinely surprised that the Americans were not bargaining over the bases, and he 
adamantly opposed rearmament during the economy recovery. When confronted with the 
choice on whether to comply, Yoshida was compelled to accept the American demands to 
gain the defense obligation and to end the occupation. That acceptance, however, did not 
completely soothe American concerns over Japan’s compliance. As Allison remarked in 
1952, “there was an element in risk in trusting the Japanese, but that there was no 
alternative.”
427
 Even after almost seven years, the Americans still had doubts about 
whether the Japanese intended to comply with its preferred peace.   
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The American Occupation of Japan (1945-1952) offers strong empirical support for the 
theoretical argument made in the principal-agent model presented in chapter 3. Across 
each of the three episodes, the Japanese politicians resisted the American demands given 
the costs they expected to incur for compliance. Japanese politicians recognized that their 
compliance with American demands risked their political positions whether through 
changing preferred domestic arrangements, adopting poor economic policies, or diverting 
resources to rearmament. In each instance, the American officials dictated a choice to the 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 






The project developed here results from a normative desire to understand the most 
recent occupations by United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why did the American 
efforts in these two operations result in failure? How could a powerful country fail to 
achieve its goals? That normative drive for understanding, for knowledge, for truth, is the 
primary reason to undertake a study that follows the scientific method to ask and answer 
a serious question in an objective manner. One must balance the motivation for truth with 
rigorous attention to detail and thorough analytical work to reach a solid conclusion that 
ultimately satisfies the ideas of scientific discovery and simultaneously satiates the 
normative aspiration. To accomplish that, the dissertation has subsequently grown into a 
much broader project on the use of military occupations as a tool of foreign policy, and 
its relation to the larger questions on war and peace in the international system since 
1815. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I summarize the primary theoretical and 
empirical findings of the dissertation. Next, I examine the implications for scholars and 
policymakers that can be derived from the theoretical argument and empirical findings in 
this dissertation. Finally, the dissertation closes with some thoughts on future directions 
for research into military occupations.  
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Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Discoveries 
This dissertation sought to address the following question: How can victorious 
states transition from war to peace and obtain their objectives via a military occupation? 
More specifically, why do some states win a war only to lose the occupation whereas 
other states can successfully impose their preferred outcome via the control of foreign 
territory? For example, compare the recent failures of the United States in Afghanistan 
and Iraq to the successes the Allied Powers in France (1815-1818), the Allied Occupation 
of Paraguay, or the American Occupation of Japan. What accounts for that variation in 
achieving the victor’s peace? Furthermore, the dissertation also indirectly addresses the 
question concerning why victorious states impose occupations on the vanquished 
following interstate wars. Given that over half of the military occupations that follow 
from interstate wars result in failure, why did states decide to engage in these operations 
initially? Before answering these questions concerning the outcome of military 
occupations, the project first turns towards understanding what constitutes the subject of 
this investigation.  
In Chapter 2, I sought to establish the foundations for a new conceptualization of 
military occupations based on the political aspects of the operation. The investigation 
here focuses on the demands that occupying power made of the occupied elite as the 
conditions under which the occupation would terminate. I distinguished these cases from 
those occupations that simply represent a military advantage for one side as part of 
conducting the war effort. This conceptualization allows me to distinguish coercive 
political occupations from more cooperative and military efforts that constitute part of the 
universe of possible occupations that have occurred since 1815. The chapter then 
241 
 
proceeds to place that conceptualization of military occupations into the broader 
distribution of sovereign rights in the international system. I use the distribution of rights 
to ground the concept of military occupations into how states engage their military forces 
and alter political relations with other units in the international system based on who 
governs and who claims ownership. In doing so, the project recognizes that there are four 
possible distributions of rights that might occur when states deploy their military forces 
for operations on foreign soil. T. Clifton Morgan illustrates the value in doing so, stating 
that, “…only after identifying the full range of values for a variable can we hope to 
account for a phenomenon by identifying the factors that determine which value of the 
variable holds.”
429
 Conceptually, military occupations are one value for the distribution 
of sovereign rights in an anarchic international system. A ‘purgatory’ that vanquished 
opponents may languish in for an indeterminate amount of time as the victor attempts to 
gain its preferred peace.  
Through a rigorous developed conceptualization, a research project can identify 
the appropriate cases for investigation and offer generalizable findings to understand the 
phenomena itself as well as its role in the larger context of international politics. The 
project here limits itself to occupations that result from interstate wars, a limitation that 
some might find too narrow given the occurrence of such events outside the context of 
war as acknowledged in Chapter 2. In particular, some might criticize the study for 
adopting the Correlates of War Resort to War project given its requirement that a ‘war’ 
constitutes an armed conflict with 1,000 or more battle deaths. While limiting the sample 
affects the conclusions, it allows for a more systematic and rigorous investigation on how 
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states engage in military occupations as a transition period between war and peace. 
Identifying military occupations requires knowledge on the political relations among 
units that is sometimes difficult to find and interpret given the incentive to misrepresent 
by many involved. By focusing on a relatively smaller sub-sample of cases, the project 
can offer several insights to understanding the use of occupations as part of interstate 
wars and the establishment of a preferred outcome. Building off this initial project can 
provide for a stronger foundation for future work to investigate the broader use of 
occupations that have occurred since 1815 as a result of any type of conflict between 
states.  
Turning to the theoretical argument, the principal-agent model focuses on 
strategic interaction between the occupier and the occupied elite as a contributing factor 
in the transition from war to peace. Based on that interaction, the project identifies two 
components that are significant to understanding military occupations: the costs of 
compliance for the occupied elite, and the occupying power’s strategy of control to 
manage the former into complying with their demands. I am not discounting the 
importance of civilian coercion, insurgencies, etc., by focusing on this interaction 
explicitly in the theoretical argument. Both the costs of compliance and the strategies of 
control are important to understanding occupations, yet they are only two in a host of 
factors that can affect the outcome. Instead, I am offering an explanation for the often 
overlooked relationship between the occupying power and the occupied elite as a 
contributing factor to understanding why states can succeed or fail to establish their 
preferred peace following an interstate war. An inherent limitation in model building is 
that we have to abstract away from many important and interesting elements to focus on a 
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few, or a singular, aspect of a phenomena to gain some theoretical and empirical 
leverage. The argument here presents a probabilistic statement regarding how that 
relationship – under the specified conditions – can increase the likelihood of success for 
an occupying power to achieve the victor’s peace.  
The dissertation attempts to explain the variation in the responses of the elite to 
the demands of the occupier when assessing their likelihood of compliance or non-
compliance. Theories that simply assume the incentive for non-compliance as a constant 
leave us with an incomplete explanation. In part, recognizing that the elite’s adversity 
varies depending on the demands of the occupying power required identifying the 
appropriate universe of cases to recognize the difference between how the French 
responded to the Prussian Occupation (1871-1873) and the German reaction to the Allied 
Occupation of the Rhineland (1918-1930). Theoretically, the difference in the demands 
establishes when the elite will select compliance over non-compliance during the course 
of an occupation if left to their own choices. Understanding that the motivation varies 
across the cases, however, only illuminates part of the picture regarding military 
occupations. How does the occupying power respond? I argue that the occupier knows 
that the elite are likely hostile to the former’s peace, but the extent of the adversity 
remains unknown.  
Thus, I introduced the strategies of control: the means by which the occupying 
power can influence the elite into complying with the victor’s peace. The principal-agent 
argument indicates that those occupying powers who dictate the peace are more likely to 
succeed in their efforts to compel the occupied elite into complying with the victor’s 
peace. The dictating strategy constitutes something of a hybrid between the more 
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aggressive and conciliatory approaches that have been previous identified in the 
literature. It draws on the notion of issuing an order, and then attempting to evaluate the 
intentions of the elite based on their behavior to assess whether they are in compliance. I 
contend that dictating manipulates the choice set of the elite, altering incentives and 
disincentives to influence their decision-making into favoring compliance, even though 
that decision is costly to the elite.  
Both chapters 4 and 5 provide the empirical examination of the principal-agent 
model. In writing a scientific work, I acknowledge that the empirical evidence presented 
in these two chapters is not sufficiently conclusive proof regarding the principal-agent 
model from Chapter 3 to accept it as fact. However, I will argue that the combination of 
the empirical findings from the statistical analyses, the plausibility probes, and the case 
study of the American Occupation of Japan indicate that there is strong support for the 
argument. The mixture of these approaches for empirical evaluation increases confidence 
in the validity of the causal argument presented in chapter 3 as well as several of its 
implications regarding how the occupied elite and the occupier will act in the 
establishment of the victor’s peace. The statistical analysis from Chapter 4 presents 
support for the theories main contention across a variety of cases. The plausibility probes 
in that chapter and the analysis of the American Occupation of Japan in Chapter 5 
provides evaluations of the causal mechanisms that support the primary hypothesis. Both 
chapters demonstrate strong support for the mechanisms in play and the primary 
hypothesis from Chapter 3.  
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Implications for Scholarship and Policymaking 
This dissertation offers some recommendations for scholars and policy makers 
when considering the option of imposing a military occupation. Initially, I believe that a 
note of caution is in order for individuals looking to interpret the theory as offering 
simple insights into managing and succeeding in an occupation following an interstate 
war. The dissertation presents the principal-agent model as a challenge to the 
understanding how military occupations can result in success, based on the strategic 
interaction of the occupier and the occupied elite. Even though this project offers an 
argument for winning the peace, scholars and policymakers should note the first and 
perhaps more important empirical finding: that occupying foreign territory tends to result 
in failure more often than not over the last two hundred years. In the dataset, 
approximately 40% of the cases terminated with the victor achieving its preferred peace. 
The remainder of the cases – approximately 60% percent of those investigated as part of 
this dissertation – resulted in failure for the occupying power. There are two implications 
to this result. 
First, the project corroborates previous empirical work that military occupations 
are more likely to result in lost blood and treasure for a state.
430
 Losing an occupation 
implies a state loses the resources spent to win the war and to control the territory in 
addition to any benefits it expected to incur from success. Though I disagree with other 
scholars on the reason why failure occurs, the dissertation confirms the notion that 
military occupations are difficult and costly ventures for accomplishing a state’s foreign 
                                                 
430 For example, see David M. Edelstein, Occupation Hazards: Success and Failure in Military 
Occupations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
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policy goals. Second, the evidence demonstrates that winning on the battlefield does not 
simply translate into the victor’s peace. In every case, the occupying power had to 
capture territory which it accomplished through an invasion. That most states fail to 
achieve their preferred peace suggests a divergence in performance between 
accomplishing military objectives as part of combat and political objectives as part of the 
occupation. Leaders – political and military alike – should realize that engaging in 
military occupations is much more complicated than simply defeating the opponent and 
imposing one’s preferred outcome. 
A military occupation is an effort to compel compliance after an opponent has 
openly resisted through war. The reason states impose military occupations is that they 
suspect the opposing power will not comply with the former’s preferred designs for the 
postwar era. A central contention here is that the occupied elite are adverse to the peace 
demanded by the occupying power – especially so when the latter aims to impose new 
domestic institutions, make territorial gains, or establish a new state in the international 
system. Fulfilling the principal’s demands is costly for the elite as they will have to 
sacrifice political opportunities, ruin their reputations, or risk their political survival when 
complying with the victor’s peace. Even in cases of foreign-imposed regime change, the 
new elites will not have an obligation to establish the victor’s peace when it conflicts 
with their political ambitions.   
This insight is especially important for attempts to impose democratic institutions. 
Even in emerging democracies, the newly-elected leaders are not somehow made pure 
through elections and representative institutions. Being elected by the people does not 
make the leader ‘loyal’ to the occupying power or its postwar goals. Furthermore, these 
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institutions do not make such agents transparent in terms of their adversity towards the 
goals of the occupying power. Instead, electoral institutions can allow for the revelation 
of voter preferences, which may favor less compliance and more opportunistic actions by 
the occupied elite.
431
 Newly-established and emerging democracies under foreign control 
may be susceptible to voters electing politicians who adopt policy positions that diverge 
with the occupier’s demands. During the process of institutional change, elites can 
attempt to play on the suspicions of the population against the occupying power 
especially as a means to gain political office and to consolidate their position to the 
detriment of establishing a democracy. Whether an honest divergence, or a vote winning 
trick, the occupying power has to realize that establishing a democracy has its risks. If 
anything, imposing democratic regimes can be hazardous to the victor’s peace if left 
unchecked.  
 I further suggest that the arguments on the hostility of the elite would also hold 
when scholars and policymakers consider how to deal with the problem of failed states in 
the international system. The security concerns associated with failed states – such as 
training grounds and safe havens for terrorist organizations – have taken on greater 
importance for policymakers. The scholarly community has responded. Authors have 
presented new ideas on how to share sovereignty and offered ideas like ‘neotrusteeship’ 
to focus on multiple actors involved in rehabilitating these deteriorating entities.
 432
 In 
addition, nation-building has received significantly more theoretical and empirical 
                                                 
431 Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 237. 
432 For example, see. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak 
States,” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 5-43; Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New 
Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 85-120.  
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attention in the last decade.
433
 My work suggests that these arrangements are insufficient 
to address the basic concerns on how to deal with elite. The leaders of failed states likely 
have political arrangements that benefit them, even in crumbling infrastructures and 
poorly-performing economies. Removing these leaders will introduce a new set of elites, 
but pressuring those individuals to carry out international community’s demands might 
be comparable to a foreign-imposed regime change. The new elites might not want to 
share power and will certainly engage in opportunistic behaviors that are beneficial to 
their interests, but perhaps highly detrimental to the goals of the international community. 
For example, Hamid Karzai has not been a faithful agent to the American attempt and 
international efforts to develop a democracy in Afghanistan. He has been accused of 
allowing corruption to run rampant, engaging in nepotism, and expending resources in a 
manner that has neither improved nor developed the new domestic institutions of the 
country.
434
 As a politician, Karzai had his own interests to protect during the course of 
the occupation, and those interests have conflicted with the American goals of providing 
political stability to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the American occupation accommodated 
Karzai’s regime and the tribal warlords in Afghanistan without stringent commands or 
directions on implementing the former’s demands. If the international community decides 
to become more active in failed states, they should understand the potential problems in 
                                                 
433 Gary T. Dempsey, “Fool’s Errands: America’s Recent Encounters with Nation Building,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 12, no. 1 (2001): 57-80; James Dobbins, et al., America’s Role in Nation-
Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: Rand National Security Research Division, 2003); 
Cynthia Watson, Nation-Building: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, Inc., 2004); Katie 
Jenkins and William Plowden, Governance and Nationbuilding: The Failure of International Intervention 
(Northhampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2006);  James L. Payne, “Does Nation Building Work?,” 
The Independent Review 10, no. 4 (2006): 599-610; Jason Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build,” World 
Politics 59, no. 2 (2007): 314-340. 
434 Ahmed Rashid, “How Obama Lost Karzai: The Road out of Afghanistan runs through two Presidents 
who just don’t get along,” Foreign Policy (22 February 2011). 
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dealing with political elites.
435
 Simply engaging in occupation-like operations with 
multiple actors and attempting to impose good governance on a population is not likely to 
succeed if such recommendations overlook that elite’s adversity. 
Next, the theoretical argument suggests how the occupying power should 
approach the occupied elite, especially when the latter is not complying with the demands 
set forth by the former. Unfortunately, some scholars have suggested that the appropriate 
sanction against the occupied elite would be to threaten a withdrawal as an attempt to 
compel a change in behavior.
436
 By leaving the territory, as the argument goes, the 
occupier is threatening that the likelihood of political instability would subsequently 
increase, thereby decreasing the elites’ chances at survival. That, however, is a hollow 
threat for two reasons. First, abandoning the occupation might actually increase the 
political standing of the elite that remained non-compliant in front of the ‘foreign enemy.’ 
Instead of removing the elite from power, domestic elements might rally to those 
individuals that successfully defied the foreign presence on their territory. Second, the 
credibility of the occupier’s threat depends on its willingness to throw away all the blood 
and treasure spent on the occupation. A sunk costs perspective might support this line of 
action, suggesting that the resources are already spent and that the occupier should not 
remain simply because of the costs incurred. Relatively few leaders would be 
comfortable wasting resources in such a manner to demonstrate their credibility. If the 
                                                 
435 Barnett and Zürcher draw a similar conclusion, though with a differing theoretical model. See, Michael 
Barnett, and Christoph Zürcher. “The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces 
Weak Statehood,” in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace 
Operations eds. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (London: Routledge, 2009), 31 
436 For an example of the withdrawal threat, see Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and Kenneth M. 




occupier has to demonstrate the credibility of its threat, withdrawing from the occupation 
hinders its ability to pursue its interests. The threat is a bluff, and the occupied elite will 
realize it.  
As the theory presented here ‘dictates,’ a more effective sanction would 
specifically target the elite rather than risk abandoning the entire operation. If a leader 
fails to comply, the occupying power should then consider options to sanction or remove 
that individual from political office rather than engage in threats to abandon the 
operation. The latter threat is something that the occupied elites want to achieve given 
that the occupation interferes with their ability to freely make policy. Threatening to 
leave is what the elite would prefer as it might demonstrate their non-compliance with the 
occupation’s aims. Occupiers should threaten the elite’s ability to remain in office since it 
is something that the politicians’ value. The victor can then give the occupied an 
opportunity to respond by either fulfilling its demands or demonstrating further non-
compliance. 
Directions for Future Research 
Following this project, there are three general areas where further research can 
expand on the developments made here and add further support to the theoretical as well 
as the empirical arguments presented throughout the dissertation. First, I purpose 
expanding the dataset to including cases of military occupations that involve the 
intervention of a state into a civil war between a government and some section of its 
population.
437
 In some instances, these occupations emerge as assistance to the 
                                                 
437 For a discussion on these types of cases, see, Meredith Sarkees, and Frank Wayman, Resort to War, 
1816-2007 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010). 
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government in power, which would not fall into the dataset. In other cases, the occupying 
power enters the civil war as opposed to the government. For example, the Allied Powers 
captured and controlled several pieces of territory during their intervention into the 
Russian Civil War (1917-1922). These incidents in particular constitute coercive political 
occupations as described in Chapter 2 given that the occupying power is directing its 
efforts against a government. The theoretical argument developed in Chapter 3 should 
offer some insight into understanding whether states intervening in civil wars to impose 
occupations will succeed or fail in their efforts.  
A second area for further research would focus on strategy changes by the 
occupying power in how they deal with the occupied elite. The dissertation has assumed 
that the strategy of the occupying power remains unchanged during the course of the 
military occupation. In the vast majority of the cases in the dataset, the occupying power 
is consistent in its approach to dealing with the elite. However, occupiers can and do 
sometimes engage in strategy shifts. I believe that there are two questions regarding shifts 
in strategy that would be of interest. First, explaining why the occupying power shifted its 
strategy could prove a fruitful inquiry for investigation. Following the theoretical 
argument, such shifts might follow from a change in beliefs regarding the likelihood of 
compliance. The possibility of outside interference or in recognizing internal sources of 
failure might pressure occupying powers to change their approach in an effort to maintain 
their control of foreign territory. Second, examining how the shifts in strategy affect the 
outcome of the occupation could lend further support to the arguments presented in 
Chapter 3. I posit that the initial approach towards the elite is the most influential to 
gaining a peace, though an occupying power could ‘gamble for resurrection’ and alter its 
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approach in attempt to achieve the victor’s peace.
438
 This would also offer further 
confirmation regarding some of the implications from the theoretical arguments on the 
duration of occupations, and their subsequent outcomes.  
Finally, I purpose examining the effects of the costs of compliance on a leader’s 
political survival. I theorized that the leaders were unfavorable to the victor’s demands 
given the costs of compliance that they would incur. Empirically, the statistical results 
combined with the plausibility probes and case study demonstrated that as the aims of the 
occupation increased the likelihood of success subsequently decreased for establishing 
the victor’s peace. This adversity during the occupation is found in the costs that a leader 
expects to incur from complying with the demands of the occupying power. Domestic 
groups will likely attribute these costs incurred to the individuals who complied with the 
occupier’s demands. Some leaders – such as Miguel Igelsas and Yoshida Shigeru – 
ultimately lost office as a result of their following the orders of the occupying power. 
This assumption raises some interesting questions: after the occupation terminates 
successfully, how do the occupied elites fare in terms of political survival? What 
consequences will these leaders confront for complying with the occupier’s demands 
when the latter withdrawals?
439
 Can the elite adopt strategies to mitigate the costs of 
compliance incurred? Furthermore, in the project, I theorized that compliance costs affect 
the leadership’s decision-making regardless of domestic institutions. Future work could 
                                                 
438 For a discussion on gambling for resurrection in war, see George W. Downs and David M Rocke, 
“Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War,” The 
American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 2 (1994): 362-380.  
439 For example on how war outcomes affect a leader’s fate, see H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The 
Causes of War Termination and the First World War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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expand on the differences between various political arrangements as mitigating or 




                                                 
440 Looking for direct evidence on compliance costs might be difficult given that such a study could 
encounter problems similar to those found in the audience costs literature: partial observability and the 
strategic nature of political leaders. For a discussion on this type of research, see, Kenneth A. Schultz, 
“Looking Audience Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 1 (2001): 32-60. 
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Appendix A: Interstate Wars under Investigation for Military Occupations 
 
The Correlates of War Resort to War publication provides a list of interstate wars 
from 1816 through 2003.
441
 The dataset used here makes some modifications to the list as 
presented in the Resort to War compendium. First, the COW Interstate War Dataset 
designates the year 1816 as the initiation of a new international system and contends that 
the first interstate war in the new system is the Franco-Spanish War of 1823. I argue that 
the fundamental change in the international system occurred earlier, in 1814 with the first 
defeat of Napoleon in the War of the Sixth Coalition of 1813 to 1814. Subsequently, a 
new international system emerged following abdication of Napoleon on 11 April 1814 at 
the conclusion of the War of the Sixth Coalition, the signing of the first Treaty of Paris on 
30 May 1814, and the opening of the Congress of Vienna shortly thereafter.
442
 Hence, a 
new international system emerged in 1815. I include all interstate wars that occur 
between states that initiate hostilities on or after 1 January 1815. This one year change for 
the initiation of the modern international system results in the introduction of two new 
interstate wars into the dataset: the Neapolitan War of 1815 and the War of the Seventh 
Coalition. Below, I present the list of wars reviewed for military occupations. In addition 
to the list of wars, I include notes concerning some additional modifications made to 
certain wars as a result of my research.  
  
                                                 
441 Meredith Sarkees, and Frank Wayman, Resort to War, 1816-2007 (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 2010). 
442 R Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the 
Present 2nd Revised (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 763. 
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War Name Included Occupation 
-- 1 First Neapolitan War of 1815443 Yes Yes 
-- 2 War of the Seventh Coalition of 1815444 Yes Yes 
1 3 Franco-Spanish War of 1823 Yes No 
4 4 Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 Yes Yes 
7 5 Mexican-American War of 1846-1848 Yes Yes 
10 6 Austro-Sardinian War of 1848-1849 Yes Yes 
13 7 First Schleswig-Holstein War of 1848-1849 Yes Yes 
16 8 War of the Roman Republic of 1849 Yes No 
19 9 La Plata War of 1851-1852 Yes No 
22 10 Crimean War of 1853-1856 Yes No 
25 11 Anglo-Persian War of 1856-1857 Yes Yes 
28 12 War of Italian Unification of 1859 Yes No 
31 13 First Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-1860 Yes Yes 
34 14 Italian Roman War of 1860 Yes No 
37 15 Second Neapolitan War of 1860-1861445 Yes No 
40 16 Franco-Mexican War of 1862-1867 Yes Yes 
                                                 
443 The following sources were used to code this war: Annual Register: A View of the History, Politics, and 
Literature of the Year. London: Longmans, Co. [For the following years: 1815.]; Robert Batty, An 
Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815, Illustrated by Plans of the Operations and of the Battles of 
Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo. 2nd Ed. (London: Rodwell and Martin, and W. Clarke, New Bond-
Street; and T. Egerton, Whitehall, 1820); British And Foreign State Papers. London: James Ridgway and 
Sons. Vols. 2& 4; Pietro Colleta, History of the Kingdom of Naples, 1734-1825 Trans. S. Horner. Vol. II. 
(Edinburgh: T. Constable and Co, 1858); Isaac Butt, The History of Italy from the Abdication of Napoleon I 
Vol. II. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1860); Edward Cust, Annals of the Wars of the Nineteenth Century 
Vol. IV. (London: John Murray, 1863); Robert Matteson Johnston, The Napoleonic Empire in Southern 
Italy and the Rise of the Secret Societies Vol. 2. (London: MacMillan and Co, Ltd., 1904); A. Hilliard 
Atteridge, Joachim Murat: Marshal of France and King of Naples (New York: Brentano’s, 1911); 
Martinengo Cesaresco, Evelyn, The Liberation of Italy, 1815-1870 4th Ed. (London: Seeley, Service & Co., 
Ltd, 1915); Digby Smith, The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book (London: Greenhill Books, 1998); 
Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 
1500-2000 2nd Ed. (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2002); John A. Davis, Naples and Napoleon: 
Southern Italy and the European Revolutions (1780-1860) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
444 The following sources were used to code this war: William Siborne, The Waterloo Campaign, 1815 4th 
Ed. (Birmingham: The War Library, 1894); Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1815-1832 (New 
York: Harper, 1934 [1963]); Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1946); M. D. R. Leys, Between Two Empires: A History of French 
Politicians and People between 1814-1848 (New York: Longmans, Green and CO, 1955); Guillaume de. 
Bertier de Sauvigny, The Bourbon Restoration Translated by Lynn M. Case (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1966); Walter Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe: A Study of the European 
Alliance, 1813-1823 as an Experiment in the International Organization of Peace (New York: Noblet 
Offset Printers, 1966); Andre Jardin and Andre-Jean Tudseq, Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848 
Translated by Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Smith, The Greenhill 
Napoleonic Wars Data Book; Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts. 
445 I have renamed this war as the ‘Second’ conflict, whereas Resort to War refers to it as ‘The Neapolitan 
War of 1860-1861.’  
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43 17 Ecuadorian-Colombian War of 1863 Yes No 
46 18 Second Schleswig-Holstein war of 1864 Yes Yes 
49 19 Lopez War of 1864-1869446 Yes Yes 
52 20 Naval War of 1865-1866 Yes No 
55 21 Seven Weeks War of 1866 Yes No 
58 22 Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 Yes Yes 
60 23 First Central American War of 1876 Yes No 
61 24 Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 Yes Yes 
64 25 War of the Pacific of 1879-1881447 Yes Yes 
65 26 Conquest of Egypt of 1882 Yes Yes 
67 27 Sino-French War of 1884-1885 Yes No 
70 28 Second Central American War of 1885 Yes No 
73 29 First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 Yes Yes 
76 30 Greco-Turkish War of 1897 Yes No 
79 31 Spanish-American War of 1898 Yes Yes 
82 32 Boxer Rebellion of 1900 Yes Yes 
83 33 Sino-Russian War of 1900 Yes Yes 
85 34 Third Central American War of 1906 Yes No 
91 35 Fourth Central American War of 1907 Yes No 
94 36 Second Spanish-Moroccan War Yes No 
97 37 Italian-Turkish War of 1911-1912 Yes No 
100 38 First Balkan War of 1912-1913 Yes Yes 
103 39 Second Balkan War of 1913 Yes No 
106 40 World War I Yes Yes 
107 41 Estonian War of Liberation of 1918-1920 Yes No 
108 42 Latvian War of Liberation of 1918-1920 Yes No 
109 43 Russo-Polish War of 1919-1920 Yes No 
112 -- Hungarian Adversaries War of 1919 No448 -- 
115 -- Second Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 No449 -- 
                                                 
446 The COW Resort to War publication suggests that the Lopez War lasted until 1870. However, the last 
major confrontation between the opposing armies occurred in August 1869. After that point, the military 
forces of Argentina and Brazil searched through Paraguay for Lopez, with only minor skirmishes against 
some irregular troops. I code the conflict as ending and the occupation as beginning in August 1869. See 
the following sources, Charles J. Kolinski, Independence or Death: The Story of the Paraguayan War 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965); Chris Leuchars, To the Bitter End: Paraguay and the War 
of the Triple Alliance (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002); Gilbert Phelps, Tragedy of Paraguay (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975); Harris G. Warren, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The Postwar 
Decade, 1869-1878 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978). 
447 The COW Resort to War publication suggests that the War of the Pacific lasted until 1883. However, the 
last major confrontation between the opposing armies occurred in January 1881. No further fighting 
occurred between the Chilean military forces and a Peruvian military, as the latter disintegrated into 
competing factions that spread throughout the country and initiated guerilla war campaigns against the 
occupier. See the following sources, Bruce W. Farcau, The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the 
War of the Pacific, 1879-1884 (Westport: Praeger, 2000); William F. Sater, Chile and the War of the 
Pacific (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986). 
448 The Romanian Occupation of Hungary began prior to the initiation of the conflict. The fighting was an 
enforcement measure by Romania when Hungary refused to comply with its demands. 
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116 -- Franco-Turkish War of 1919-1921 No450 -- 
117 44 Lithuanian-Polish War of 1920 Yes Yes 
118 45 Manchurian War of 1929 Yes No 
121 46 Second Sino-Japanese War of 1931-1933 Yes Yes 
124 47 Chaco War of 1932-1935 Yes No 
125 48 Saudi-Yemeni War of 1934 Yes No 
127 49 Conquest of Ethiopia of 1935-1936 Yes No 
130 50 Third Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1941 Yes Yes 
133 51 Changkufeng War of 1938 Yes No 
136 52 Nomonhan War of 1939 Yes No 
139 53 World War II Yes Yes 
142 54 Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 Yes No 
145 55 Franco-Thai War of 1940-1941 Yes No 
147 56 First Kashmir War of 1947-1949 Yes No 
148 57 Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949 Yes Yes 
151 58 Korean War of 1950-1953 Yes No 
153 -- Off-shore Islands War of 1954-1955 No451 -- 
155 59 Sinai War of 1956 Yes Yes 
156 -- Soviet Invasion of Hungary of 1956 No452 -- 
158 60 Ifni War of 1957-1958 Yes No 
159 -- Taiwan Straits War of 1958 No453 -- 
160 61 War in Assam of 1962 Yes Yes 
163 62 Vietnam War Phase 2 of 1965-1975 Yes No 
166 63 Second Kashmir War of 1965 Yes No 
169 64 Six-Day War of 1967 Yes Yes 
                                                                                                                                                 
449 The Greek Occupation of Smyrna began prior to the initiation of the war. The conflict, however, is 
between the Greek forces and those of Ataturk, not the official government of Turkey are that time. I 
include the occupation as an outgrowth of World War I, and the conflict as an extra-state war against the 
occupying Greek military forces. See the sources listed in the case appendix under the Greek Occupation of 
Smyrna.  
450 The French Occupation of Cilicia began prior to the initiation of the war. The conflict, however, is 
between the French forces and those of Ataturk, not the official government of Turkey are that time. I 
include the occupation as an outgrowth of World War I, and the conflict as an extra-state war against the 
occupying French military forces. See the sources listed in the case appendix under the French Occupation 
of Cilicia. 
451 The status of Taiwan as a state in the international system is questionable here. I excluded the war from 
the project. 
452 Hungary remained under a Soviet occupation until May 1957. The fighting was an enforcement measure 
by Soviets when Hungary continually refused to comply with its demands. Since Hungary was still under 
Soviet occupation, this conflict is classified as an extra-state conflict. Karen Ruth Adams takes a similar 
position that Hungary was still under Soviet occupation when the revolt occurred in the code book to her 
article. See the data appendix to Karen Ruth Adams 2004 and the sources listed in the case appendix under 
the Soviet Occupation of Hungary. Karen Ruth Adams, “Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and 
the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance,” International Security 28, no. 3 (2003-2004): 45-83. 
453 See footnote 451.  
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170 65 Second Laotian War Phase 2 of 1968-1973 Yes No 
172 66 War of Attrition of 1969-1970 Yes No 
175 67 Football War of 1969 Yes No 
176 68 War of the Communist Coalition of 1970-1971 Yes No 
178 69 War of Bangladesh of 1971 Yes No 
181 70 Yom Kippur War of 1973 Yes No 
184 71 Turco-Cypriot War of 1974 Yes Yes 
186 72 War over Angola of 1975-1976 Yes No 
187 73 Second Ogaden War Phase 1 of 1977-1978 Yes No 
189 74 Vietnamese-Cambodian Border War of 1977-
1979 
Yes Yes 
190 75 Uganda-Tanzanian War of 1978-1979 Yes Yes 
193 76 Sino-Vietnamese Punitive War of 1979 Yes No 
199 77 Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 Yes No 
202 78 Falklands War of 1982 Yes No 
205 79 War over Lebanon of 1982 Yes Yes 
207 80 War over the Aouzou Strip of 1986-1987 Yes No 
208 81 Sino-Vietnamese Border War of 1987 Yes No 
211 82 Gulf War of 1990-1991 Yes No 
215 83 War of Bosnian Independence of 1992 Yes No 
216 84 Azeri-Armenian War of 1993-1994 Yes Yes 
217 85 Cenepa Valley War of 1995 Yes No 
219 86 Badme Border War of 1998-2000 Yes Yes 
221 87 War for Kosovo of 1999 Yes No 
223 88 Kargil War of 1999 Yes No 
225 89 Invasion of Afghanistan of 2001 Yes Yes 
227 90 Invasion of Iraq of 2003 Yes Yes 





Appendix B: Auxiliary Analysis for Identity and Democracy 
 
In this appendix, I re-run the analysis from Chapter 4 to further investigate the 
finding that a difference in identity between the occupying power and the occupied elite 
contributes to failure in achieving the former’s peace. I accomplish this be disaggregating 
the identity variable into its two components: race and religion.
454
 In the Table B.1, 
Model 1 includes a measure for identity that focuses on whether the occupying power and 
occupied elite have a different religion. Model 2 includes a dichotomous measure for 
identity that captures whether the occupying power and occupied elite are not of a similar 
race. Model 3 includes a dichotomous measure for identity that captures whether the 
occupying power and occupied elite are not of either the same race or religion. Model 3 
also excludes the dichotomous measure for whether the occupying power is a democratic 
state.  
 The empirical results from disaggregating the identity variable do not support the 
findings from Chapter 4. In Model 1 with the measure for religion and Model 2 with the 
measure for race, both coefficients are negative, but neither result is statistically 
significant. This suggests that the combined identity measure has an unexpected 
interaction with another variable in the analysis. The culprit here is likely the measure for 
democratic institutions in the occupying power. I suspect that democratic states are more 
likely to engage in military occupations on non-contiguous territory, and that 
subsequently increases their chances of interacting with populations of different religions 
and races. As Model 3 demonstrates, the coefficient for the combined identity measure 
                                                 
454 For a complete description on the coding procedures for the identity variable, please see chapter 4. 
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remains negative when the measure for democracy is removed. However, the result is no 




Table B.1: Probit Analysis of Democracy & Identity 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2  
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Identity, Religion -.584 
(.369) 
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Log Likelihood -47.55 -48.31 -49.59  
Observations 134 134 134  
Pseudo R2 .4736 .4652 .4511  
Expected % 
Correctly Predicted 
77.65 77.12 76.68  
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered to War and Country 
*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 (one-tailed) 






Appendix C: Military Occupations Dataset & Case Sources 
 
Appendix C presents the list of sources used to identify and code military 
occupations that result from interstate wars from 1815 until 2003. The respective 
footnotes contain the list of relevant sources. I have organized the dataset in 
chronological order.  
 
Occupation Number: 001 
Occupation Name: Austrian Occupation of Naples 
Participants: Austria 
Target: Naples 




Occupation Number: 002 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of France 
Participants: Austria, Prussia, Russia, United Kingdom  
Target: France 
Dates/Duration: July 1815 to November 1818
456
 
                                                 
455 Pietro Colleta, History of the Kingdom of Naples, 1734-1825 Trans. S. Horner. Vol. II. (Edinburgh: T. 
Constable and Co, 1858); Susan Horner, A Century of Despotism in Naples and Sicily (Edinburgh: 
Edmonston and Douglas, 1860); Foreign Office, British And Foreign State Papers Vol.  4 (London: James 
Ridgway and Sons); Bolton King, A History of Italian Unity: Being a Political History of Italy from 1814 
to 1871 Vol. 2 (London: James Nisbet & Co., Limited, 1899); Robert Matteson Johnston, The Napoleonic 
Empire in Southern Italy and the Rise of the Secret Societies Vol. 2. (London: MacMillan and Co, Ltd., 
1904); Contessa Martinengo-Cesaresco, The Liberation of Italy (London: Seeley, Service & Co. Limited, 
1915): Stuart Joseph Woolf, A History of Italy, 1700-1860: The Social Constraints of Political Change 
(London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1979): John A. Davis, Naples and Napoleon: Southern Italy and the 
European Revolutions (1780-1860) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
456 British And Foreign State Papers Vol. 3 (1838); Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe By Treaty Vol. 1 
(London: Butterworths, 1875); Frederick Herman, “The Victors and The Vanquished: The Quest for 
Security as Illustrated by the Three Allied Occupations of Territory of the Defeated Power – France, 1815-
1818, Germany, 1919-1929, and Germany 1945” (PhD diss., Tufts University, 1954); J. Gartson, “Armies 
of Occupation, I: The British in France 1815-1818,” History Today 11, no. 6 (1961): 396-404; Guillaume 
de Bertier de Sauvigny, The Bourbon Restoration Translated by Lynn M. Case (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1966); Walter Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe: A Study of the European 
Alliance, 1813-1823 as an Experiment in the International Organization of Peace (New York: Noblet 
Offset Printers, 1966); Andre Jardin, and Andre-Jean Tudseq, Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848 
Translated by Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Anthony L. H. Rhinelander, 
Prince Michael Vorontsov: Viceroy to the Tsar (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990); 
Thomas Dwight Veve, The Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815-1818 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992); Robert J. Smith, John Bull’s Proconsuls: Military Officers who 




Occupation Number: 003 
Occupation Name: Russian Occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia 
Occupying State: Russia 
Target: Boyars of Moldavia and Wallachia 




Occupation Number: 004 
Occupation Name: Russian Occupation of Bulgaria and Roumelia 
Occupying State: Russia 
Target: Ottoman Empire 




Occupation Number: 005 
Occupation Name: Russia Occupation of Silistria 
Occupying State: Russia 
Target: Ottoman Empire 




Occupation Number: 006 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of New Mexico 
Participants: United States 
                                                 
457 Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. 2: United Kingdom Foreign Office, Turkey: 
Correspondence Respecting the Organization of Danubian Principalities, 1828-1836 Confidential Print, 
FO 881/3666 (1978); C. M. Woodhouse, The Greek War of Independence (New York: Hutchinson, 1952); 
Radu R. Florescu, “British Reactions to the Russian Regime in the Danubian Principalities, 1828-1834," 
Journal of Central European Affairs Vol. 22 (April): 27-42; Radu R. Florescu, “The Rumanian 
Principalities and the Origins of the Crimean War,” The Slavonic and East European Review 43, no. 100 
(1964): 36-67; Lynda Krueger Lewis, “The Administration of Pavel D. Kiselev in the Rumanian 
Principalities , 1829-1834” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966); Keith Hitchins, The Romanians, 
1774-1866 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Radu R. Florescu, The Struggle against Russia in the 
Romanian Principalities: A Problem in Anglo-Turkish Diplomacy, 1821-1854 (Iasi: Center for Romanian 
Studies, 1997); John P. Ledonne, “Geopolitics, Logistics, and Grain: Russia’s Ambitions in the Black Sea 
Basin, 1737-1834,” International History Review 28, no. 1 (2006): 1-41; Victor Taki, “Russia on the 
Danube: Imperial Expansion and Political Reform in Moldavia and Wallachia, 1812-1834” (PhD diss., 
Central European University, 2007); Miroslav Sĕdivý, “From Hostility to Cooperation? Austria, Russia and 
the Danubian Principalities 1829-40,” The Slavonic and East European Review 89, no. 4 (2011): 630-661. 
458 Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. 2: United Kingdom FO 881/3666 (1978); Alexander Bitis, 
“The 1828-1829 Russo-Turkish War and the Resettlement of Balkan Peoples into Novorossiia,” 
Jahrbücher Geschichte Osteuropas 53, no. 4 (2005): 506-525.  
459 Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. 2: United Kingdom FO 881/3666 (1978); Florescu, “The 
Rumanian Principalities”; Florescu, The Struggle against Russia; Taki, “Russia on the Danube”; Sĕdivý, 
“From Hostility to Cooperation”. 
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Target: New Mexico 




Occupation Number: 007 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of California 
Participants: United States 
Target: California 




Occupation Number: 008 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Northern Mexico 
Participants: United States 
Target: Mexico 
Dates/Duration: February 1847 to July 1848
462
 
                                                 
460 United States Congress, Insurrection against the Military Government in New Mexico and California, 
1847 and 1848 (56th Congress, 1st session, Document No. 442) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1900); David Yancey Thomas, “A History of Military Government in Newly Acquired Territory of the 
United States” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1904); Ralph Emerson Twitchell, The History of the 
Military Occupation of the Territory of New Mexico from 1846 to 1851 by the Government of the United 
States (Denver: Smith-Brooks Co., 1909); Byron Bertrand Banta, “The Military Occupation of New 
Mexico, 1846-1851” (PhD diss., Washington University, 1947); R Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, 
The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present 2nd Revised (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1986); Joseph G. Dawson, “American Civil-Military Relations and Military Government: The 
Service of Colonel Alexander Doniphan in the Mexican War,” Armed Forces and Society 22, no. 4 
(1996a): 555-572; Joseph G. Dawson, “‘Zealous for Annexation’: Volunteer Soldiering, Military 
Government, and the Service of Colonel Alexander Doniphan in the Mexican-American War,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (1996b): 10-36; Myra K. Saunders, “California Legal History: The Legal System 
under the United States Military Government, 1846-1849,” Law Library Journal 88, no. 4 (1996): 488-522; 
Durwood Ball, “By Right of Conquest: Military Government in New Mexico and California, 1846-1851,” 
Journal of the West 41, no. 3 (2002): 8-16; Stephen A. Carney, The Occupation of Mexico, May 1846-July 
1848 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 2006) accessed on  October 18, 2014, 
http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Occupation/Occupation.htm. 
461 Rockwell D. Hunt, “Legal Status of California 1845-1849,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 12 (1898): 63-84; United States Congress, Insurrection against the Military 
Government; Thomas, “A History of Military Government”; Cardinal Goodwin, The Establishment of State 
Government in California, 1846-1850 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916); Joseph Ellison, “The 
Struggle for Civil Government in California, 1846-1850,” California Historical Society Quarterly  10, no. 
1 (1931): 4-26; Neal Harlow, California Conquered (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); 
Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History; Saunders, “California Legal History”; Ball, “By 
Right of Conquest”; Carney, The Occupation of Mexico.  
462 Luther Giddings, Sketches of the Campaign in Northern Mexico in 1846 and 1847 (New York: George 
P. Putman & Co., 1853); Cadmus M. Wilcox, History of the Mexican War (Washington, D.C.: Church 
News, 1892); Harwood P. Hinton, The Military Career of John Ellis Wood, 1812-1863 (PhD diss, 
University of Wisconsin, 1960); John Porter Bloom, ““Johnny Gringo” In Northern Mexico, 1846-1847,” 
Arizona and the West 4, no. 3 (1962): 237-248; John H. Schroeder, Mr. Polk’s War: American Opposition 
and Dissent, 1846-1848 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973); K. Jack Bauer, Zachary Taylor: 




Occupation Number: 009 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Central Mexico 
Participants: United States 
Target: Mexico 




Occupation Number: 010 
Occupation Name: Austrian Occupation of Novara 
Participants: Austria 
Target: Piedmont  




Occupation Number: 011 
Occupation Name: Austrian Occupation of Tuscany 
Participants: Austria 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History; John D. Waghelstein, “The Mexican War and the American 
Civil War: The American Army’s Experience in Irregular Warfare as a Sub-set of a Major Conventional 
Conflict,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 7 no. 2 (1996): 139-164; Dean B. Mahin, Olive Branch and Sword: 
The United States and Mexico, 1845-1848 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1997); Carney, The 
Occupation of Mexico; Spencer C. Tucker, ed., U.S. Leadership in Wartime: Clashes, Controversy, and 
Compromise Vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2009); Felice Flanery Lewis, Trailing Clouds of Glory: 
Zachary Taylor’s Mexican War Campaign and His Emerging Civil War Leaders (Tuscaloosa: The 
University of Alabama Press, 2010). 
463 Winfield Scott, Memoirs of Lieut. General Scott. Vol. 2 (New York: Sheldon and Company, 1864); 
Wilcox, History of the Mexican War; Joseph Smith, The War with Mexico Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 
1919); Ralph H. Gabriel, “American Experience with Military Government,” The American Historical 
Review 49, no. 4 (1944); 630-643; Edward S. Wallace, “The United States Army in Mexico City,” Military 
Affairs 13, no. 3 (1949): 158-166; Lofgren, C. A., “Force and Diplomacy, 1846-1848: The View from 
Washington,” Military Affairs 31, no. 2 (1967): 57-64; Dennis E. Berge, “A Mexican Dilemma: The 
Mexico City Ayuntamiento and the Question of Loyalty, 1846-1848,” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 50, no. 2 (1970): 229-256; Schroeder, Mr. Polk’s War; John Edwards Weems, To Conquer a 
Peace: The War Between the United States and Mexico (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974); 
Robert E. May, John A. Quitman, Old South Crusader (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1985); Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History; Waghelstein, “The Mexican War and the 
American Civil War”; Mahin, Olive Branch and Sword; Carney, The Occupation of Mexico; Levinson, 
Irving, “A New Paradigm for an Old Conflict: The Mexico-United States War,” The Journal of Military 
History 73, no. 2 (2009): 393-416. 
464 Archdeacon Coxe, History of the House of Austria Vol. IV (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853);British and 
Foreign State Papers 1862, Vol. 38;  King, A History of Italian Unity Vol. 1; Howard M. Smyth, “The 
Armistice of Novara: A Legend of a Liberal King,” Journal of Modern History 7, no. 2 (1935): 141-171; 
Derek Beales, The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971); 
William A. Jenks, Francis Joseph and the Italians, 1849-1859 (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1978); Elio Balossini, “The Austrian Military Occupation of the Oltreticino Novarese in 1849,” 
Journal of the Associazine Filatelica Numismatica Scalegera (1998) Trans. by Salvatore J. Rizza, Accessed 








Occupation Number: 012 
Occupation Name: Austrian Occupation of the Marches, Romagna, and Umbria 
Participants: Austria 
Target: Papal States 




Occupation Number: 013 
Occupation Name: French Occupation of Rome 
Participants: France 
Target: Papal States 




Occupation Number: 014 
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Bushire 
Participants: United Kingdom 
Target: Persia 
Dates/Duration: December 1856 to October 1857
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465 Anatole von Hügel, Charles von Hügel, April 25, 1795 – June 2, 1870 (Cambridge: Privately Printed, 
1903); King, A History of Italian Unity Vol. 1; R. M. Johnston, The Roman Theocracy and the Republic, 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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some account of his previous history and labours (London: Patridge and Oakey, 1850); Richard Heber 
Wrightson, A History of Modern Italy, From the First French Revolution to the Year 1850 (London: 
Richard Bentley, 1855); King, A History of Italian Unity Vol. 1; Johnston, The Roman Theocracy; De 
Cesare, The Last Days of Papal Rome; Howard R. Marraro, “Unpublished American Documents on the 
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Occupation Number: 015 
Occupation Name: Spanish Occupation of Tétouan 
Participants: Spain 
Target: Morocco 




Occupation Number: 016 
Occupation Name: French Occupation of Central Mexico 
Participants: France 
Target: Mexican Emperor 
Dates/Duration: May 1863 to February 1867
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Occupation Number: 017 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of the Jutland 
Participants: Austria, Prussia 
Target: Denmark 




Occupation Number: 018 
Occupation Name: Prussian Occupation of Schleswig 
Participants: Prussia 
Target: Schleswig 




Occupation Number: 019 
Occupation Name: Austrian Occupation of Holstein 
Participants: Austria  
Target: Holstein 




Occupation Number: 020 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Paraguay 
Participants: Argentina, Brazil 
Target: Paraguay 
Dates/Duration: August 1869 to June 1876
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Occupation Number: 021 
Occupation Name: Prussian Occupation of France 
Participants: Prussia 
Target: France 




Occupation Number: 022 
Occupation Name: Russian Occupation of Bulgaria 
Participants: Russia 
Target: Bulgaria 
Dates/Duration: January 1878 to April 1879
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Occupation Number: 023 
Occupation Name: Russia Occupation of Eastern Rumelia 
Participants: Russia 
Target: Eastern Rumelia 




Occupation Number: 024 
Occupation Name: Chilean Occupation of Peru 
Participants: Chile 
Target: Peru 
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Occupation Number: 025 
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Egypt 
Participants: United Kingdom 
Target: Egypt 




Occupation Number: 026 
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Weihaiwei 
Participants: Japan 
Target: China 




Occupation Number: 027 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Cuba 
Participants: United States 
Target: Cuba 
Dates/Duration: August 1898 to May 1902
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Occupation Number: 028 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Puerto Rico 
Participants: United States 
Target: Puerto Rico 




Occupation Number: 029 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of the Philippines I 
Participants: United States 
Target: Philippines 
Dates/Duration:  August 1898 to May 1942
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Occupation Number: 030 
Occupation Name: Occupation of Peking & the Province of Chihli 
Participants: Germany, France, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States 
Target: China 




Occupation Number: 031 
Occupation Name: Occupation of Manchuria 
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Occupation Number: 032 
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Southern Manchuria 1905-1907 
Participants: Japan 
Target: China 




Occupation Number: 033 
Occupation Name: Greek Occupation of Northern Epirus 
Participants: Greece 
Target: Albania 




Occupation Number: 034 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Luxembourg 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Luxembourg 
Dates/Duration: August 1914 to November 1918
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Occupation Number: 035 
Occupation Name: Russian Occupation of East Galicia & Bukovina I 
Participants: Russia 
Target: Austria 




Occupation Number: 036 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Belgium 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Belgium 




Occupation Number: 037 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Northern France 
Participants: Germany 
Target: France 
Dates/Duration: November 1914 to November 1918
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Occupation Number (occnum): 038 
Occupation Name (occname): Japanese Occupation of Shandung Peninsula 
Participants (parties): Japan  
Target: China 




Occupation Number: 039 
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Valona 
Participants: Italy 
Target: Albania 




Occupation Number: 040 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Lithuania 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Lithuania 




Occupation Number: 041 
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Occupation Name: Central Powers Occupation of Poland 
Participants: Austria, Germany 
Target: Poland 




Occupation Number: 042 
Occupation Name: Central Powers Occupation of Serbia 
Participants: Austria, Bulgaria 
Target: Serbia 




Occupation Number: 043 
Occupation Name: Central Powers Occupation of Montenegro   
Participants: Austria, Bulgaria 
Target: Montenegro 




Occupation Number: 044 
Occupation Name: Russian Occupation of East Galicia & Bukovina II 
Participants: Russia 
Target: Austria 
Dates/Duration: June 1916 to July 1917
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Occupation Number: 045 
Occupation Name: French Occupation of Korce 
Participants: France 
Target: Albania 




Occupation Number: 046 
Occupation Name: Occupation of Dobrudja & Wallachia 
Participants: Austria, Germany 
Target: Romania 




Occupation Number: 046 
Occupation Name: Occupation of Southern Dobrudja  
Participants: Bulgaria 
Target: Romania 




Occupation Number: 048 
Occupation Name: Greek Occupation of Northern Epirus II 
Participants: Greece 
Target: Albania 




Occupation Number: 049 
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Occupation Name: British Occupation of Palestine 
Participants: United Kingdom 
Target: Palestine 




Occupation Number: 050 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of the United Baltic Duchy  
Participants: Germany 
Target: Estonia, Latvia 




Occupation Number: 051 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Belorussia 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Russia 




Occupation Number: 051 
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Iraq 
Participants: United Kingdom 
Target: Iraq 
Dates/Duration: October 1918 to October 1932
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Occupation Number: 053 
Occupation Name: French Occupation of Syria & Lebanon 
Participants: France 
Target: Syria & Lebanon 




Occupation Number: 054 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of the Rhineland 
Participants: France, Belgium, United Kingdom, and United States 
Target: Germany 
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Occupation Number: 055 
Occupation Name: French Occupation of the Saar 
Participants: France  
Target: Germany 




Occupation Number: 056 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Istanbul 
Participants: France, United Kingdom, Italy 
Target: Turkey 




Occupation Number: 057 
Occupation Name: Romanian Occupation of Hungary  
Participants: Romania 
Target: Hungary 
Dates/Duration: November 1918 to April 1920
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Occupation Number: 058 
Occupation Name: French Occupation of Cilicia 
Participants: France 
Target: Turkey 




Occupation Number: 059 
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Adalia/Antalya 
Participants: Italy 
Target: Turkey 




Occupation Number: 060 
Occupation Name: Greek Occupation of Smyrna 
Participants: Greece 
Target: Turkey 




Occupation Number: 061 
Occupation Name: Polish Occupation of Vilnius 
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Occupation Number: 062 
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Manchuria 
Participants: Japan 
Target: Manchuria 




Occupation Number: 063 
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Inner Mongolia 
Participants: Japan 
Target: Inner Mongolia 




Occupation Number: 064 
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Northern & Central China  
Participants: Japan 
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Occupation Number: 065 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Poland 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Poland 




Occupation Number: 066 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Denmark 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Denmark 
Dates/Duration: April 1940 to May 1945
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Occupation Number: 067 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Luxembourg 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Luxembourg 




Occupation Number: 068 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Belgium & Northern France 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Belgium 




Occupation Number: 069 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of the Netherlands 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Netherlands 




Occupation Number: 070 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of France I 
Participants: Germany 
Target: France 
Dates/Duration: May 1940 to November 1942
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Occupation Number: 071 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Iceland 
Participants: United Kingdom, United States 
Target: Iceland 




Occupation Number: 072 
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Southeastern France 
Participants: Italy 
Target: France 




Occupation Number: 073 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Norway 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Norway 
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Occupation Number: 074 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Serbia 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Serbia 




Occupation Number: 075 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Greece 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Greece 




Occupation Number: 076 
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Greece 
Participants: Italy 
Target: Greece 




Occupation Number: 077 
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Montenegro 
Participants: Italy 
Target: Montenegro 




Occupation Number: 078 
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Italian Somaliland 
Participants: United Kingdom 
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Target: Italian Somaliland 




Occupation Number: 079 
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Eritrea 
Participants: United Kingdom 
Target: Eritrea 




Occupation Number: 080 
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Iraq II 
Participants: United Kingdom 




Occupation Number: 081 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Lithuania 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Lithuania 
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Occupation Number: 082 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Latvia 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Latvia 




Occupation Number: 083 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Belarus 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Belarus 




Occupation Number: 084 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Ukraine 
Participants: Germany 




Occupation Number: 085 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Estonia 
Participants: Germany 
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Occupation Number: 086 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Croatia 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Croatia 




Occupation Number: 087 
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Croatia 
Participants: Italy 
Target: Croatia 




Occupation Number: 088 
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Southern Iran 
Participants: United Kingdom, United States 
Target: Iran 
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Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Northern Iran 
Participants: Soviet Union 
Target: Iran 




Occupation Number: 090 
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of British Borneo 
Participants: Japan 
Target: British Borneo 




Occupation Number: 091 
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of the Philippines 
Participants: Japan 
Target: Philippines 




Occupation Number: 092 
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of British Malaya 
Participants: Japan 
Target: British Malaya 
Dates/Duration: February 1942 to August 1945
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Occupation Number: 093 
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Dutch East Indies  
Participants: Japan 
Target: Dutch East Indies 




Occupation Number: 094 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Crimea 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Crimea 




Occupation Number: 095 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of France II 
Participants: Germany 
Target: France 
                                                                                                                                                 
546 Boon Kheng Cheah, Red Star over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict during after the Japanese 
Occupation of Malaya, 1941-1946 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983); Paul H. Kratoska, The 
Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1997); G. C. Gunn, “Remembering the Southeast Asian Chinese Massacres of 1941-45,” Journal of 
Contemporary Asia 37, no. 3 (2007): 273-291; Paul H. Kratoska, “Labor in the Malay Peninsula and 
Singapore under Japanese Occupation,” in Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown 
Histories ed. by Paul H. Kratoska (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2007); Hayashi Hirofumi, “Massacre of Chinese 
in Singapore and Its Coverage in Postwar Japan,” in New Perspectives on the Japanese Occupation in 
Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1945 ed. by Yoji Akashi and Mako Yoshimura (Singapore: NUS Press, 
2008); Yoshimura Mako, “Japan’s Economic Policy for Occupied Malaya,” in New Perspectives on the 
Japanese Occupation in Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1945 ed. by Yoji Akashi and Mako Yoshimura 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2008); Nakahara Michiko, “The Civilian Women’s Internment Camp in Singapore: 
The World of POW WOW,” in New Perspectives on the Japanese Occupation in Malaya and Singapore, 
1941-1945 ed. by Yoji Akashi and Mako Yoshimura (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008);  Akashi Yoji, "Colonel 
Watanabe Wataru: The Architect of the Malayan Military Administration, December 1941-March 1943,” in 
New Perspectives on the Japanese Occupation in Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1945 ed. by Yoji Akashi 
and Mako Yoshimura (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008). 
547 William H. Frederick, and Robert L. Worden, Indonesia: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: Federal 
Research Division, 1993); Shigeru Sato, War, Nationalism, and Peasants: Java under the Japanese 
Occupation 1942-1945 (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Jean Gelman Taylor, Indonesia: Peoples and 
Histories (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Vickers, Adrain, A History of Modern Indonesia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Harry A. Poeze, “The Road to Hell: The Construction of 
a Railway Line in West Java during the Japanese Occupation,” in Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese 
Empire: Unknown Histories ed. by Paul H. Kratoska (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2007); Shigeru Sato, 
“‘Economic Soldiers’ in Java: Indonesian Laborers Mobilized for Agricultural Projects,” in Asian Labor in 
the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories ed. by Paul H. Kratoska (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2007); 
Peter Post, ed., The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
548 Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945; Rich, Hitler’s War Aims. 
294 
 




Occupation Number: 096 
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Cyrenica 
Participants: United Kingdom 
Target: Cyrenica 




Occupation Number: 097 
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Tripoli 
Participants: United Kingdom 
Target: Tripoli 




Occupation Number: 098 
Occupation Name: French Occupation of Fezzan 
Participants: France 
Target: Fezzan 
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Occupation Name: German Occupation of Montenegro 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Montenegro 




Occupation Number: 100 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Italy 
Participants: United Kingdom, United States 
Target: Italy 




Occupation Number: 101 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Albania 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Albania 




Occupation Number: 102 
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Hungary 
Participants: Germany 
Target: Hungary 
Dates/Duration: March 1944 to April 1945
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Occupation Number: 103 
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Romania 
Participants: USSR 
Target: Romania 




Occupation Number: 104 
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Bulgaria 
Participants: USSR 
Target: Bulgaria 




Occupation Number: 105 
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Poland 
Participants: USSR 
Target: Poland 




Occupation Number: 106 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Austria 
Participants: United States, United Kingdom, France 
Target: Austria 
Dates/Duration: April 1945 to May 1955
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Occupation Number: 107 
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Austria 
Participants: USSR 
Target: Austria 




Occupation Number: 108 
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Hungary 
Participants: USSR 
Target: Hungary 




Occupation Number: 109 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of the Philippines II 
Participants: United States 
Target: Philippines 
Dates/Duration:  April 1945 to July 1946
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Occupation Number: 110 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of West Germany 
Participants: United States, United Kingdom, France 




Occupation Number: 111 
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of East Germany 
Participants: Soviet Union 
Target: East Germany 
Dates/Duration: May 1945 to March 1954
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Occupation Number: 112 
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Czechoslovakia 
Participants: Soviet Union 
Target: Czechoslovakia 




Occupation Number: 113 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Czechoslovakia 
Participants: United States 
Target: Czechoslovakia 




Occupation Number: 114 
Occupation Name: Polish Occupation of Oder-Neisse 
Participants: Poland 
Target: East Germany 




Occupation Number: 115 
Occupation Name: French Occupation of the Saarland 
Participants: France 
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Occupation Number: 116 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Berlin 
Participants: France, United Kingdom, United States 
Target: Soviet Union 




Occupation Number: 117 
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Berlin 
Participants: Soviet Union 
Target: France, United Kingdom, United States 




Occupation Number: 118 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Japan 
Participants: United States 
Target: Japan 




Occupation Number: 119 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Ryukyu Islands 
Participants: United States 
Target: Japan 
Dates/Duration: August 1945 to May 1972
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Occupation Number: 120 
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Korea 
Participants: Soviet Union 
Target: North Korea 




Occupation Number: 121 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Korea 
Participants: United States 
Target: South Korea 




Occupation Number: 122 
Occupation Name: Egyptian Occupation of Gaza I 
Participants: Egypt 
Target: Gaza 
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Occupation Number: 136 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Afghanistan 
Participants: United States 
Target: Afghanistan 




Occupation Number: 137 
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Iraq 
Participants: United States 
Target: Iraq 
Dates/Duration: May 2003 to December 2008
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